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


PROBSTHAIN'S ORIENTAL SERIES
VOL. XV

HSÜNTZE

THE MOULDER OF
ANCIENT CONFUCIANISM





HSÜNTZE

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THE MOULDER OF

ANCIENT CONFUCIANISM

14669

BY

HOMER H. DUBS, Ph.D.

(Translator of the Works of Hsüntze)

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

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TO MY WIFE

*Without whose aid and encouragement this
work could never have been written.*





TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAP.		PAGE
	FOREWORD	xi
	PREFACE	xvii
I.	THE BACKGROUND	1
II.	THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HSÜNTZE	19
III.	THE WRITINGS OF HSÜNTZE	39
IV.	THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS.	48
V.	SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY AND SUPERSTITION	57
VI.	HUMAN NATURE	77
VII.	THE BASIS OF ETHICS	85
VIII.	<i>LI</i> AND <i>JEN</i> , OR THE RULES OF PROPER CONDUCT AND BENEVOLENCE	111
IX.	OTHER ETHICAL CONCEPTS	155
X.	MUSIC	161
XI.	DESIRE AND THE MIND; PSYCHOLOGY	169
XII.	PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION	181
XIII.	LOGICAL THEORY	198
XIV.	INEQUALITY	242
XV.	POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY	255
XVI.	IDEALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL	275
	BIBLIOGRAPHY AND LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	295
	INDEXES	299



FOREWORD

By

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President of Tsingking University, Peking, China.

RECENT events in China have attracted a certain sort of interest on the part of Western peoples. Student demonstrations have directed attention to the rising flood of nationalistic sentiment throughout the country. The Western Powers have been sufficiently stirred to call long-delayed conferences on a few specified international problems. But to most Westerners the problems being discussed are those of safeguarding Western interests, not those concerned with understanding the thought and life of another race. Yet it is clear that the major problem of inter-racial relationships is just this one of securing a truer knowledge of the fundamental conceptions, methods of thinking and guiding ideals involved in the contrasted civilizations. Each race must know and appreciate the culture of the other.

It must be admitted that in the case of China and the West the greatest effort to understand the alien culture has been made by the Chinese. Thousands of Chinese pupils study some Occidental language: university students make a large use of Western text-books: large numbers of China's best trained and keenest-minded youth take advanced studies in Western universities: there is a steady increase in the number of translated books that interpret to China the intellectual and spiritual achievement of the West. Modern

China, through her best minds, is making every effort to add to her own indigenous heritage and experience the advantages to be chosen from Western civilization.

In contrast with such efforts the Western interest in Chinese civilization seems strangely limited. The charge of full satisfaction with its own and of indifference to alien culture, is to be laid upon the West to-day, rather than upon China. Western scholars are eager to burrow among the fragmentary relics of the ancient civilizations of the Near East, for these are connected with the Hebrew or Greek origins of European culture. Few, indeed, are found to explore the rich treasures of historical and cultural material in which the mind of the Chinese people has recorded its development and achievements. Here is a growth all the more valuable because so completely independent of almost any sort of Western influence. And study of it will yield results valuable not merely for scholarship, but for practical politics as well.

For these reasons an especially hearty welcome should be given to every book that makes available for Western readers a better understanding of what great Chinese have thought and said. The Chinese philosophers have wrought out the ideas and ideals that express the genius of the race. The Western student knows the names of only a few of these representative thinkers. He can turn to but few translations of their works. Except for the classical and orthodox Confucianists only a few thinkers have been interpreted. There is no adequate material for tracing the course of Chinese thought or for noting the varied cross-currents that make up the full stream.

Dr. Dubs has made a valuable selection in taking the

works of Hsüntze for his task of translation and interpretation. This philosopher lived in the latter half of the third century B.C. He was the last of the great thinkers of China's earliest period of creative thought. His systematic defence of Confucian ideas against the persistent attacks of varied types of opponents was a significant factor in the ultimate dominance of those ideas in Chinese thought, while the features which he emphasized and the interpretations he gave became determinative influences in the later Confucian orthodoxy. However, this result occurred in spite of other features in his thought regarded as unorthodox by later Confucianists. In the work of Hsüntze is found a synthesis of the conflicting currents of interpretation within Confucian circles in his day, as well as a clear portrayal of the non-Confucian theories of the time. In the two-fold process of defence Hsüntze makes use of methods and of materials derived from those whose views he opposed. In the variety of interests on which Hsüntze touches, and in the systematic formulation of his own eventual views is to be found the first rounded statement of Confucian thought, and, in addition, a clear presentation of the place of early Confucian thought in relation to several other types of indigenous Chinese philosophy. Hsüntze, in a way, gives a summary of most of the phases of the most distinctive period of Chinese thinking.

The characteristic word in Hsüntze's thinking is "Nurture". Nurture is set in opposition to "Nature". Nurture stands for the factors in human development that are distinctively man-made; the influences of training, education, social tradition, established authority. In these latter, Hsüntze found the basis for human improvement. He

opposed the somewhat fatalistic confidence in the spontaneous processes of Nature which Lao Tzu represents. He also disagreed with Mencius' statement that "Nature is originally good". Much of the discussion of Nurture versus Nature suggests modern conflicts between inherited and acquired characteristics and discussions over the relative significance of heredity and environment in human development. In defence of his views, Hsüntze begins with a careful psychological analysis. He develops the necessity for an external standard by which to guide the processes of training and of education. Developing the suggestions of logical method left by Confucius, and making use of the really highly developed logical methods of his opponents from the Neo-Mician side, Hsüntze proceeds to a philosophical defence of the authoritarianism which is typical of the Confucian tradition throughout its course.

In the doctrine of *Li*—the rules of proper conduct—Hsüntze sums up his teaching as to the way in which Nurture, or training, is to be carried out. The *Li*, or correct forms of conduct, were for Confucius the outward expression of an inner principle, *Jen*, or honour. And for Confucius it is probable that the inner and the outer factors were of nearly equal importance. By the time of Hsüntze the struggle between an inner and an outer standard of morality had become accentuated. Social disorder had increased, the political conditions were confused by perpetual wars between the feudal states, while the most varied standards were offered for individual choice. Hsüntze, by his own temperament and the tendencies of all his own thinking, was led to emphasize the place of the external standard, the *Li*, in moral

life and in social relations. For him *Li* became the chief virtue. And this choice by Hsüntze was ratified by his later countrymen. His discussion of the rules and proprieties was incorporated in the classical canon on those subjects. It is the contention of Dr. Duba that to Hsüntze more than to any other Chinese thinker, is to be attributed the establishment in Chinese thought of the pre-eminence of the principle of authority and of external morality. Hsüntze should, therefore, be studied the more earnestly by all who need to deal with Chinese characteristics. The definition of *Li* as something that gives beautiful expression to emotion suggests one of its particular values in Chinese life. Chinese good form does surely tend to beautify social life through common and formal ceremonies and courtesies.

Applied to the problems of government Hsüntze's views led directly to an emphasis on the responsibility of the ruler for fixing the standards to be followed by his people. Established authority becomes the guide for all. The individual becomes subservient to law for the sake of a common good. On this point also the verdict of Chinese experience has upheld Hsüntze against the more democratic tendencies of Mencius. Stability was, perhaps, more necessary than it had been earlier. The logical outcome of Hsüntze's position was the stiff legalism which followed only a few decades after his death, when the unifying tyrant Ch'in Shih Huang set out to establish by his own *fiat* all the standards needed by his people. The doctrine of Nurture ends in despotism. What a paradox that Hsüntze, the systematic defender of Confucianism ideals, should have been appealed to in order to justify the destruction of Confucianism!

Ancient China and the doctrine of Hsüntze seem very far away from modern Western life. But in reality are not many of the problems of his thinking and of the life of his times very similar to our own? We still struggle to adjust the inner and the outer phases of moral standards. We have not yet discovered how to use institutions for real nurture of personality without leading to dominance. Surely the West has much to learn of the beautifying of emotion and of courtesy in social life. What are Fascism and the Soviet system but modern attempts to establish a universal national authority? East or West, in modern life or in ancient days, human life deals with the same general factors. The thoughts therefore of a representative Chinese thinker, and the experience of those who followed some of his ideals through several centuries, cannot but have some light to throw upon the pathway along which other peoples walk. Since, in this narrowing modern world, the West must deal with the Chinese, either for good or for ill, it is essential to understand the basic traditions that determine the Chinese outlook on the world which they have always known and the wider one of which they are now so eagerly learning.

PREFACE

CONFUCIUS, Mencius, and Hsüntze¹ are the three thinkers to whom ancient China owes the most in the elaboration and defence of the Confucian philosophy. Of these three, Hsüntze was by no means the least important. Coming into prominence just after Mencius had died, he carried on the Confucian tradition as its most prominent exponent and defender, and was acknowledged as such by his own and subsequent generations. Like Mencius he was an orthodox follower of Confucius, and in ability he was not a whit inferior to his elder contemporary. As a philosopher, he was indeed the superior of the two. But he lacked the expository brilliance and the grace of style of Mencius, which have been so attractive, especially in China, where literary style has counted so much. Hsüntze had instead a logical mind, profound scholarship, a merciless attack upon the detractors of Confucianism and a systematic building up of that philosophy into a coherent system based upon an analysis of human nature and of history. Confucius wrote no account of his teachings; the best that we have is a collection of sayings written down by his disciples. Mencius may have written the book that bears his name, but it is in the form of debates and discussions, and is rather disjointed. Hsüntze wrote his works himself, in the form of unitary discussions with a single theme running through each of them. He is much more voluminous than

The Place of
Hsüntze in
the history of
Chinese
thought.

¹ Confucius, 551-478 B.C.; Mencius, 398-314 B.C.; Hsüntze c. 320-235 B.C.

either Mencius or Confucius, and so we can gain from his writings a much more coherent and fuller picture of ancient Confucianism than anywhere else. Not only that, but he was conversant with all the thought of his day, and reveals the thinking of his age better than any other writer. He was the recognized leader of Confucianism, and shows the contemporary attitude to the Classics, to the continual warfare of the states, to spirits, and to many other items. He is a valuable contemporary witness to history and ceremonials, in which he was deeply learned. Systematic and logical, he covered the whole ground of the Confucian teaching. In many matters, especially as showing the fundamental authoritarianism of Confucianism, he reveals an attitude more truly Chinese than can be had from a cursory reading of either Confucius or Mencius. He is a thinker who cannot be neglected in any picture of Confucianism or of Chinese ideals.

Comparison
with Greek
philosophers.

The ancient period of Chinese thought may well be compared with the classic period of Greek philosophy with which it coincided in time. Confucius, Mencius, and Hsüntze may well be compared with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Although in some respects such a comparison must be inaccurate, in others it is quite apt. Socrates was not the first of Greek thinkers, yet he set the direction of later philosophic thought ; so Confucius was the determining force in all subsequent Chinese philosophy. Like Socrates he never wrote down any of his teachings ; he only wrote a moralistic history. Like him he was later looked upon as the great authority. We know his teachings only through the reports of his disciples, just as with Socrates. But Mencius was not his immediate

disciple, being removed several generations, and so we do not have the difficulty of separating the teaching of master and disciple. Just as with Plato, so Mencius gave Chinese philosophy a direction in some respects different from that of Confucius. Confucius and Mencius were much more on a par in ability than were Socrates and Plato, and so the one was not eclipsed by the brilliance of the other. By posterity Mencius has always been judged by the standard of Confucius. Of this group, Hsüntze was the Aristotle. Although Hsüntze lacked the interest in metaphysics and science that distinguished the Stagirite, yet he had a capacity for rounding out and systematizing the Confucian philosophy, which until his time had been mostly a set of authoritarian deliverances, that shows him akin to his Greek contemporary. His, too, was an interest in psychology, in the analysis of experience, and above all a synthetic power that reveals a truly great man. To the Confucian philosophy he gave a systematic theoretical foundation that served it in good stead until imperial authority established it as authoritarian. Just as to-day we realize that Plato and Aristotle were not so very far apart in fundamental matters, yet the strife between the Academy and the Lyceum continues, so in China there has been strife between the followers of Mencius and of Hsüntze, and between their interpretations of Confucianism. But there is this great difference between the Greek and the Chinese philosophers: although Hsüntze profoundly influenced Confucian thought, he was later declared to be unsound by the great authority, Chu Hsi, and Mencius took the place of pre-eminence, whereas Plato and Aristotle have both continued to be honoured. But before his condemnation, the fundamental ideas for which

Hsüntze stood had been incorporated into the Confucian tradition, and he has moulded Confucianism equally as much as his more brilliant but less systematic older contemporary.

Western
neglect of
Hsüntze.

Such being the fact, why has Hsüntze been so completely neglected by almost all Westerners who have sought to know and reveal to others the riches of Chinese literature and thought? Wylie, writing in 1867,¹ still sums up almost all that has been written in any language except Chinese or Japanese about this important thinker,² viz., that he was a pessimist who held that human nature was evil in opposition to Mencius, who held that it was good. Such a view caricatures Hsüntze grossly. Yet it is the view commonly held by many Chinese scholars to-day, and it is not at all surprising that Westerners should have adopted this uncritical opinion. Quite different is the view presented by the Japanese scholar, Suzuki,³ who in his section on "Ceremonialism" gives a sympathetic exposition of that aspect of Hsüntze's philosophy. With this single exception, no writer in any European language has

¹ A. Wylie, *Notes on Chinese Literature*. He writes:—荀子. A celebrated author of the fourth century B.C., named Seun K'uang, has left a philosophical work in twenty books, which holds a high reputation among scholars. The most distinctive point in his teaching is the original depravity of human nature, which he maintains by some cogent reasoning, in opposition to Mencius. Formerly these two philosophers were esteemed about a par till the Sung dynasty, when the tendency of Chu Hai's writings was to exalt the views of Mencius at the expense of Seun tse, who has since that time been generally considered in error regarding human nature. The freedom with which Seun criticized the defects of several disciples of Confucius has also tended to his disparagement; but still his work holds a prominent place among the literary productions of his time.

² Cf. p. 47, note 3, for a list of the literature upon Hsüntze.

³ D. T. Suzuki, *History of Ancient Chinese Philosophy*, pp. 101-11.

realized the importance of this great philosopher. Nor is this fact so surprising when we realize that the chief interest of almost every Westerner who has written on Chinese philosophy has been predominantly religious, whereas Hsüntze's chief interest is philosophical, and there is little, if anything, that can be called religious, in his writings. So Hsüntze has been neglected, and much of the true spirit of Confucianism has been misunderstood, or has remained unappreciated.

Yet among Chinese writers, Hsüntze has always ranked very high. In his own day he was recognized as the leader of the Confucian school. Han Fei-tze, the last of the great original philosophers of the period, was his disciple. In the list of works issued by each great dynasty, from the Han dynasty on, Hsüntze has been classed as a Confucian. It was not until comparatively modern times that he was finally given his present subordinate position as unsound, because of his doctrine that human nature is evil—that decision dates only from Chu Hsi (A.D. 1130-1200) who fixed the interpretation of orthodox Confucianism until recently, when there has come a reaction against his authority. But until that time, Hsüntze and Mencius were almost equally esteemed, and much of Hsüntze's teaching became incorporated in the orthodox tradition, so that when he was finally condemned, his influence lived on, even, in part, in the teaching of Chu Hsi himself. Subsequent to that condemnation, the subject of "Human Nature" was frequently given out as a subject for the official examinations, and consequently every literatus of pretensions to scholarship studied Hsüntze, at least in order to be able to refute him.

Chinese
estimates of
Hsüntze.

Influence on
the Rites.

It was during the Han period that his influence was greatest. When the present *Book of Rites* was compiled,¹ not only was one book a direct quotation from Hsüntze,² but his influence is found in many other parts. Of the forty sections remaining of the larger collection, the *Ritual of the Senior Tai*, two are quotations from Hsüntze. Although this work has not the imperial authority, yet many scholars hold it to be of equal value with the *Book of Rites*. Thus Hsüntze was incorporated into the official Confucian canon.

¹ I here append Wylie's account of the two Rituals: "The doctrine of the Rites as contained in the I-Li gave rise to several schools of exposition and teaching in early times. One of the most famous of these was that of Hou Ts'ang, who flourished during the first century n.c. A pupil of his, named Tai Teh, collected together the existing documents on the subject, to the number of 214 sections, only a small portion of which were held to have emanated from Confucius, and to have been put on record by his disciples and others. These he revised and reduced to eighty-five, his work being named the 大戴禮 *Ritual of the Senior Tai*. This was further revised by his nephew, Tai Sheng, who reduced the sections to forty-nine in number, in which form the compilation was entitled 小戴禮 *Ritual of the Junior Tai*. Such is the work that has come down to us under the name of the 禮記 *Book of Rites*, and is now by imperial authority designated one of the five Classics.

"There are only forty out of the eighty-five sections of the 大戴禮 now preserved, the remainder having been lost during the Han, at which period the work was lightly esteemed by the literati. Later scholars have, however, formed a higher estimate of its value, and it is now looked upon by many, at least equal to, if not of higher authority, than the *Book of Rites*." A. Wylie, *Notes on Chinese Literature*, p. 6.

² The 大戴禮 contains Book I and part of Book XIX of Hsüntze. The *Book of Rites* quotes another part of Book XIX, making it the whole of Book XXXV of the *Book of Rites*. In addition it quotes part of Book XX of Hsüntze as Book XVII. The various quotations of Hsüntze by these other works and by Ssu-ma Ch'ien's *Historical Record* are indicated in the notes appended to the translation.

Hsüntze was similarly quoted (without acknowledgement) by other writers. The most famous Confucian of the period, Tung Chung-shu,¹ wrote a book (now lost), praising Hsüntze, and was profoundly influenced by him. When Sze-ma Ch'ien came to write the sections of his *Historical Record*² on Rites and on Music, he incorporated large sections of Hsüntze. Yang Hsiung³ tried to mediate between Hsüntze and Mencius by holding that the nature of man at birth is neither good nor bad, but a mixture of both, and the subsequent development in either direction depends upon environment. The famous Liu Hsiang⁴ made a new edition of Hsüntze's works which was the standard down to the T'ang dynasty. But the language of Hsüntze's deeper passages is too difficult to be read easily, his doctrine that human nature is evil failed to appeal to human vanity, and he does not have the expository grace and charm of style which distinguishes Mencius—these, together with the other objections mentioned below,⁵ raised a prejudice against Hsüntze, and in the decay of learning that followed the Han period, he fell into obscurity, but not before his arguments, together with those of Mencius, had established Confucianism firmly as the official philosophy of China, and all other schools had been proscribed just as Hsüntze advocated.

With the revival of learning in the T'ang dynasty, Hsüntze again came into prominence, but by this time Mencius' teaching has established itself so firmly in the hearts of the

In the Han period.

In T'ang and Sung Periods.

¹ Second century B.C.

² Written after 110 B.C.

³ 83 B.C.—A.D. 18.

⁴ 80-9 A.D.

⁵ p. xxiii ff.

Chinese, that Hsüntze was often ranked as only second to him. Han Yü,¹ who is probably the most famous of post-classical writers, praised Hsüntze as second only to Mencius, saying that his writings were "mostly pure with only small flaws".² It was during this period that Yang Liang prepared the first commentary on Hsüntze, and made the present arrangement of his works.³ But in the next revival of learning, that of the Sung dynasty, Hsüntze was attacked by many writers, especially by Chu Hsi, and condemned as unsound, though he still remained a Confucian, and part of the study of every earnest scholar.

In Recent
Times.

That even down to comparatively recent times Hsüntze was held in high esteem is shown by the fact that Legge, evidently quoting a Chinese scholar, says: "By many he (Hsüntze) is regarded as the ablest of all the followers of Confucius."⁴ In the *Important Selections from Many Books*,⁵ Hsüntze is given forty-six pages, and Mencius only nine. More recently Professor Hu, in his *Outline of the History of*

¹ A.D. 768-824.

² Han Yu, in his famous essay, *The Original Way*, 原道, writes, "What I call the Way (Tao) . . . Yao transmitted it to Shun; Shun transmitted it to Yu; Yu transmitted it to T'ang; T'ang transmitted it to King Wen, King Wu, and Duke Chou. Wen, Wu, and Duke Chou transmitted it to Confucius. Confucius transmitted it to Mencius. Since Mencius died, it has not been transmitted. Hsüntze and Yang selected elements from it, but their doctrine was not pure; they spoke of it but they did not examine fully into it."

Even this criticism is admitting that Hsüntze, together with Yang Hsiung, are the next greatest Confucians to Mencius; it is not making them heterodox; they are Confucians, though not of the purest strain.

³ Dated A.D. 818.

⁴ Prolegomena to Vol. II of the Chinese Classics, p. 2.

⁵ 羣書治要.

Chinese Philosophy,¹ had devoted fourteen pages to Mencius, but thirty-seven to Hsüntze. These facts indicate that among those best qualified to judge, Hsüntze ranks among the greatest of China's thinkers.

Why is it that Hsüntze has suffered so much opprobrium? Criticisms
of Hsüntze. The charges made against him may be summed up under four heads. (1) His doctrine that human nature is evil. (2) Consequently he has been held to be a pessimist. (3) He committed the unpardonable fault of criticizing Mencius, Tze Sze, and other disciples of Confucius for their personal peculiarities. (4) Li Sze was his disciple.

As we wish to take up the study of Hsüntze without any prejudices, we should first consider these four charges. (1) Human
Nature. Mencius held that human nature was fundamentally good. Hsüntze held that it was fundamentally evil. Yang Hsiung held that it was both. But there is really very little difference between these three positions. We must not confound Hsüntze's view with that of Calvinism, that human nature is irremediably depraved and unable of its own accord to do any good. Hsüntze would have attacked such a view quite as strongly as that of Mencius, for Mencius' view was much nearer to that of Hsüntze than was that of Calvin. Though Mencius held that human nature was originally good, yet it needed cultivation and constant culture to keep it from degenerating into evil. Hsüntze saw that Mencius' view led him away from the truly Confucian position, and held instead that human nature was originally evil, and tended to evil of its own accord,

¹ 中國哲學史大綱. Professor Hu is both a master of Chinese philosophy and is versed in modern critical methods, a combination very rare indeed.

but needed only cultivation and constant culture to make it good. In their chief emphasis both these philosophers agreed; it was only in the metaphysical foundation for their teaching that they disagreed. But this doctrine of human nature is by no means the chief doctrine of Hsüntze; his greatness lies in so many other directions that it is unfair to condemn him on this one ground alone.

(2) A Pessimist?

Nor is he a pessimist. While human nature originally tends to evil, yet that fact does not prevent any individual whatever from so developing his character that he may become equal with the greatest and most virtuous of men, the Sages. The man on the street may become a Yao or Shan. Of course, there were difficulties to be surmounted, but it is surely unfair that a thinker who held such an optimistic view of human nature should be condemned as a pessimist!

(3) His Criticisms of Mencius and Tze Sze.

We in the West acknowledge the fact that some of our greatest thinkers and writers have indulged in scurrilous attacks upon their opponent, and do not lessen our estimate of their greatness because of that fact. But in China, with its more courteous code of manners and higher social cultivation, such attacks are condemned. However, it is quite doubtful if Hsüntze himself is the author of the particular attacks in question. In my opinion, these attacks are spurious and not from his pen at all.¹

(4) His relation to Li Sze.

Neither do we in the West condemn a teacher because one of his disciples turned out wrong. It was quite characteristic of the social solidarity that has been an essential part of Chinese society, that Hsüntze should have been condemned because

¹ Cf. W. H., the note at the beginning of Book VI.

of Li Sze. Li Sze was the prime minister of Ts'in Shih Hwangti, and he prepared the famous edict directing the destruction of certain of the Confucian Classics and the immolation of those Confucian literati who resisted. This act has never been forgiven by the Confucians, and Ts'in Shih Hwangti has been looked down upon as the greatest criminal of all ages for that deed. Yet it was but a more forcible example than had yet been given of the same intolerance that Confucians have sometimes shown since that time to Micians, Buddhists, Taoists, and others. Monasteries have been burned, monks and nuns have been massacred, ill-treated, or turned helpless out into the world in the name of Confucianism, and by the instigation of most orthodox Confucians. As to the burning of the books, it is said that copies of the proscribed Classics were preserved in the royal archives; only the people were not to have access to nor quote them to resist the great innovations of Ts'in Shih Hwangti. Li Sze himself was a scholar, and the inventor of a new form of script, known as the Lesser Seal, which is still recognized as one of the six forms of writing. Sze-ma Ch'ien, who is the authority for the statement that Li Sze was a disciple of Hsüntze,¹ states that this relationship existed merely because the two happened to be at the same place, so their relationship may not have been any deeper than that of a university student and one of his many professors. At any rate, we should not be inclined to condemn Hsüntze merely because one of his disciples became a bad man.

¹ He writes: "Because his home was at Lan-ling, Li Sze, who later became the prime minister of Ts'in was his (Hsüntze's) disciple." Cf. p. 33, 240 ff.

Hsüntze's
 Contributions to
 Confucian
 thought.

Before beginning the study of Hsüntze's writings, it may help us to enumerate some of his contributions to the history of thought in China. In general, he gave a stable and consistent foundation and expression to the Confucian philosophy. Confucius edited the *Book of History* and the *Book of Odes*, and composed the *Spring and Autumn*, thus founding his view of life on the Classics; Mencius elaborated his teaching and gave it a tentative foundation: Hsüntze developed its logical

1. implications, defended it, and founded it firmly upon an analysis of human nature and of history. Thus Hsüntze founds his teachings on an analysis of human nature and a psychological analysis. The ancient Chinese written language, without any conjugation or declension, without any tenses, moods, or voices, is really unfitted to express psychological analysis or logical distinctions, yet the genius of Hsüntze made it do this very thing. That is one of the reasons that his profoundest books are so difficult to read. The doctrine
2. that he is best known by is the one that human nature fundamentally tends to evil and needs training to make it virtuous. Hence the need for a standard of action imposed by authority.
3. Thus Hsüntze gives a philosophical foundation to the authoritarianism which has been one fundamental characteristic of Confucianism through all the ages, even of those who have most attacked Hsüntze. This standard of action
4. Hsüntze finds in *Lî*,¹ Ceremony, Propriety, or as I prefer to translate it, the Rules of Proper Conduct. It is in his exaltation of *Lî* as the basis of morals that Hsüntze is most characteristic of Chinese thought all through the ages, and it

is in this aspect of morals that China has probably the greatest contribution to make to the code of conduct of the rest of the world. Yet Hsüntze does not evade the problem of 6. epistemology, even though his standard of conduct for the average man is authoritarian. He seeks to present the conditions for the knowledge of truth. But it is moral, not speculative truth. It is the problem of knowledge for the practical, not the speculative reason, that he faces. For ancient China the great philosophical problem was "What shall I do?" not as in ancient Greece, "What can I know?" On the metaphysical side Hsüntze is noteworthy for com- 8. bining Lao-tze's concept of the impersonal Tao with the ancient Confucian concept of Heaven and doing away with any personal or anthropomorphic supreme God or spirits. He attacked belief in spirits vigorously, including belief in 7. the existence of the spirits of ancestors and in various kinds of superstitions and fortune-telling. This attitude raised for a him the problem of reinterpreting the funeral and sacrificial ceremonies which form such a large part of the content of *Li*. Thus Hsüntze is responsible for a large part of the religious agnosticism permeating Chinese educated circles. In his 9. psychology, he makes the Mind the ruler of the personality, and uses this doctrine to combat theories of desire, holding 10. that desire can be controlled by the mind. In response to 11. a suggestion made by Confucius, he developed a logic, with its classification of fallacies, holding a thorough going conceptualism. In his political philosophy he makes explicit 12. the fact that although men are potentially equal, yet society and government is founded on human inequality, and defends this theory from his analysis of society. He exposed the 13.

fallacies of other schools of thought, and made a powerful defence of Confucianism and trenchant attacks upon other philosophers. That such a many-sided and fruitful thinker who is so characteristic of many of the aspects of later Chinese thought should have been neglected by Westerners has resulted in an understanding of Confucianism that has been only partial. Truly Hsüntze was one of the greatest of Chinese thinkers, one of the great philosophers of the world.

This work is the companion volume to *The Works of Hsüntze*. Its primary purpose is to help towards an understanding of the philosophy of that great teacher. For that purpose it considers necessary a study of the general social and political movements of the times, as well as the movements of thought, without the Confucian school and within it. Since Hsüntze's work was itself a compendium of the Confucian teaching, and the summation of its development in the ancient period, we gain through it a view of the Confucian philosophy in its wholeness better than anywhere else.

The presupposition of this work is that the various disciples of Confucius did not necessarily agree with their Master nor with each other in all points, and that he was not necessarily consistent with himself; but that we must go to a critical study of the documents left by him and his successors, and let them tell their own story. It is also recognized that the Confucianism developed during the ancient period of Chinese history down to the end of the Chou dynasty was probably different from that of subsequent centuries, especially from that of the harmonizing Sung School, and it seeks to interpret this ancient Confucianism in its own light. The true greatness of Confucius and his followers and their contribution to the

world will be all the more apparent if seen through a critical study.

It is the hope of this volume to make clear some of the peculiar characteristics of Chinese thought and life, and thereby to aid in that mutual comprehension and sympathy which alone can make all within and without the four seas brothers.

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CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND

Of the beginnings of Chinese civilization we know little or nothing. At the opening of history we find this people located on the banks of the Yellow river in North China, engaged in agriculture. As far back as can be traced, either by their histories or by the examination of the primitive form of the Chinese characters, there is no evidence of a nomadic herdsman life.¹ They seem to have been agriculturalists as far back as we can trace them. The most striking confirmation of this fact is in the character for "male",² which is composed of two parts, "strength" and "field", i.e., the distinctive characteristic of man is strength-in-the-field. Consequently they have always been a comparatively peaceful people. Warfare was engaged in only at the right seasons when it would not interfere with the cultivation of the crops, and at the coming of harvest time, the opposing armies would melt away, going home to care for their grain. One of the demands of the ethical teachers was that armies should not be kept in the field when the men were needed to work the crops—a practice which was indulged in more and more towards the end of the Chou dynasty or the ancient period.

¹ Cf. H. F. Budd, *Chinese Moral Sentiments before Confucius* (Chicago, 1914), p. 46 ff., where there is a full discussion of this point.

² 男. The 古文 form is still more striking: a hand holding a farming implement under "field".

Geography.

These civilized Chinese were surrounded by wild tribes, most of whom were racially and linguistically akin to them, and the culture which these Chinese had developed gradually passed, by a process of peaceful penetration, to the more barbarous tribes, until at the end of the ancient period civilized China included roughly what is now known as China proper down to and including the Yangtze valley. Occasionally there were wars with these wild tribes, but the civilized Chinese found that they could make little headway against them; whereas by a process of "peaceful penetration" they could do much.¹

Religion.

The original religion of China was probably ancestor worship, like that of the remaining aboriginal Chinese, the Lolo, to-day.² With the patriarchal family as the foundation of social organization, it was natural that the head of the family should be revered after death as in life, and gradually there grew up a complicated set of burial and sacrificial observances, which remained the chief content of what became the ethical concept of *Li* or "Ceremony". In civilized China we find in addition reverence for nature powers, for the spirits of the land and the grains. It was the duty of the rulers to worship these spirits. These nature powers were conceived of impersonally, and the six chief powers, Heaven, Earth, and the four quarters of the compass, were represented in the coffin by geometrically shaped objects: Heaven by a flat round disk, Earth by a square prism with a round hole in it, etc.³ But this worship was amalgamated

¹ Something like this seems to have been the fact behind the account of Yu's war against the Miao, *Book of History*, II, II, III, 20, 21.

² Cf. Rudd, *op. cit.*, p. 62. ³ Cf. B. Laufer, *Jade*, p. 120 ff.

to the worship of ancestors, and so some distinguished ancestor was taken to represent these nature powers, and they were worshipped through him.¹ Among the people we find belief in the existence of spirits, good and bad, superstitious belief in portents, or that an eclipse was due to some monster eating the sun or moon, and that people must help to rescue it.² Of a more philosophical character was the belief in Heaven, which became the highest and greatest of the nature powers, as supreme over all. Heaven was benevolent, and by prayer Heaven's will could be placated, and happiness secured.³ There was also a conception of a Lord of Heaven or God, who was not always distinguished from Heaven, and thus Heaven came to have a personal connotation. The ruler over the whole country was entitled Son of Heaven, and his ancestors were the representatives of Heaven⁴; thus this worship of Heaven was also conformed to that of worship of ancestors. We must not think that these ideas were clear and distinct. Rather everything was in a flux, and little concerning transcendent beings or principles was clear in the minds of the people, except the worship of ancestors, and the treatment of the spirits of the deceased.

The social organization of these Chinese was founded on ^{The} that of the patriarchal family. Not simply one man, his ^{Family.} wife and their immediate children lived together, but the daughters-in-law, grandchildren, and often uncles, cousins,

¹ Cf. *The Works of Hsüntze*, Bk. xix, p. 20, according to the paging of the Chinese text. *W.H.* (i.e. *The Works of Hsüntze*) will be regularly quoted in this manner.

² Cf. *W.H.*, xvii, 16, 18.

³ Cf. *W.H.*, xvii, 19.

⁴ Cf. *W.H.*, xix, 20.

and other relatives all formed one household, with the patriarch of the family as the absolute ruler of every detail in the life of each member of the household. The opportunity thus given for tyranny was tempered by the natural kindness and affection for children characteristic of the race, and by their great capacity for adaptation to whatever situation in which they find themselves. This family formed part of a clan, which probably held land in common, and thus the welfare of each was to a certain extent the concern of the whole. From this social organization has come the sense of social solidarity so characteristic of this people. At the same time it augmented the authority of the elder. Consequently it was the cradle from which came the distinction of older and younger, so that now in the Chinese language the words for "older brother" and "younger brother", "older sister" and "younger sister", "older brother's wife" and "younger brother's wife", "uncle who is older than my father" and "uncle who is younger than my father", and for many similar relationships are entirely different from each other, whereas in Aryan languages there is only one term for both members of a pair. This respect for the aged became one of the two fundamental Chinese virtues, filial piety, and the respectful devotion which should be shown to an elder. Along with these virtues, there grew up a set of observances towards the aged and those older than oneself, which became included in another ethical concept, that of *Li*, which may be translated "Propriety" or "Proper Conduct".

Sex Morality. In this patriarchal household, which included the wives of various sons, uncles, and others, it was necessary that the standard of the relations between the sexes should be very

high, both to prevent internal conflict, and to preserve the race, and so we find among the Chinese the highest standard of sex relationship practised in any ancient civilized people. The Classics of China are the only Classics of any ancient nation which can be read without a blush. The men and women occupied different parts of the house, and between them there was held to be necessary a respectful reserve and a separation, so much that a person should not even so much as touch the hand of his sister-in-law. Polygamy flourished among the wealthy, but it is probable that monogamy was the rule among the middle and lower classes. The standards of sex relationship also became incorporated into the ethical concept of *Li*, or "Propriety".

It was natural that such a patriarchal family with its reverence for the aged should foster a conservatism that became one of the fundamental factors in Chinese life. While there was opportunity for change, yet that change must be approved by the patriarchal head of the family, and rare was the elder, then as now, who would approve a change in the customs or practices of those under his control. Coincident with a reverence for him, there naturally grew up a reverence for everything old, until even the philosophers sought confirmation for their doctrines in the practices of the ancients, and Confucius called himself "A transmitter and not an originator". Progress there was, as there must be in every living civilized people, but it was slow progress. Custom was the ruling factor in life, and the content of much of Chinese ethics was merely rationalized custom.

At the same time this situation fostered a dependence upon authority. The child was under the authority of his

parents or grandparents until grown, and when grown he was still under the authority of his parents; not until he became older and his parents died, did he come to that position so honoured and desired, of being patriarch and ruler of the family. Much of the content of the happiness of "old age", so highly esteemed by the Chinese, lies in the opportunity of being the head of the family, whom everyone serves. If his parents and grandparents died young, the son was still under the control of custom or had to depend on the advice of an uncle, or the uncle might be chosen head of the clan. For women there were the three obediences: when unmarried, to her parents; when married, to her husband; and when her husband died, to her son. Thus dependence on authority was fostered in children from childhood up, and tended to crush much of the natural originality of the young, and to create a tendency to look for authority even in philosophic thought.

Orthodoxy.

The territory in which the Chinese civilization developed was comparatively homogeneous, unbroken by mountains and sea as in the case of Greece, so we find from the beginning the civilized Chinese owing a common sovereignty to a single ruler, the Son of Heaven, or as he was later styled, the Emperor. While the city-state developed in China, as in Greece, so that originally there were hundreds, if not thousands of these city-states, yet the homogeneity of the country prevented them from developing in different directions, and fostered the reverence for the common overlordship. Thus we find in China at first only one philosophy of life, that expressed in the Classics, especially in the *Odes* and *History*, which was probably the philosophy developed at the imperial

court. When other philosophies developed, it was natural that they should be called "unorthodox", and that the philosophy which best expressed these very ancient ideals of the Chinese should triumph over the rest. Thus Confucianism had an advantage over its rivals from the start, and it is not surprising that it should have conquered and banished other teachings from the remembrance of men.

In these city-states, the government was by the ruling Aristocracy. family. With the patriarchal family, the individual could not emerge from his group, and so there was no true democracy, not even any thought of it. At the same time these aristocratic families fostered the feelings that they were superior, and the distinction between superior and inferior, the ruler and the ruled grew up, which became so influential in Confucian ethics. This distinction was helped by the family organization, and the habit of authority in the family. Inequality became the basis of Chinese social organization; the common people accepted their inferiority as one of the facts of nature, and proceeded to make the best of it. There is no such thing as a people's revolution in Chinese history, and the Chinese peasants have always accepted their lot and have been as industrious as possible in their position. When there has been a revolution, it has been led by the educated, and the essential democracy of Chinese life, which was fostered by a different factor, has prevented a class division between the rulers and the ruled.

A factor of prime importance in the development of Chinese Language. life has been their language and writing. It is like that of no other civilized people elsewhere in the world. It is monosyllabic, tonic, and uninflected, that is, all words are composed

of single syllables, and each word has as an integral part of its pronunciation a certain inflection of the voice. There is no conjugation, declension, or definite parts of speech. Such a language is inherently adapted to a hieroglyphic method of writing. A polysyllabic language leads naturally to a separation into its phonetic elements, but a monosyllabic language leads to the representation of each word by a different symbol. The inflection of a word is inherently difficult to represent alphabetically. Indeed, the fact of this inflection¹ was not realized by the Chinese until ages after the invention of their writing. Most Chinese are ignorant of the fact that they inflect their words to-day, and cannot tell accurately the name of the tone in which they pronounce a word, although their pronunciation is quite accurate. The absence of polysyllables prevented the development of grammatical inflection or conjugation, and consequently of the distinction of different parts of speech. While some characters are used only as certain parts of speech, yet others are used as any part of speech, and there is no inherent difficulty preventing every word being used as every part of speech, with different meanings according to which part of speech it is used. Thus there is gained a wealth of literary power but a lack of accuracy of expression.

Few Sounds. Another result of this monosyllabic character of the language was the small number of sounds possible. The language does not use all possible monosyllabic phonetic combinations, but confines itself to a few, and so has only about 340 monosyllables in actual use, the actual number of which varies

¹ Its discovery is ascribed to 沈約 (A.D. 441-513).

with different dialects.¹ Nor is each monosyllable used in all the different tones, so that there are only about 1,200 differently pronounced words in the language. Thus homonyms are common, in some cases there being as many as fifty differently written words in ordinary use with exactly similar pronunciation. The spoken language avoids the resulting confusion by coupling two synonyms together to make a phrase that will not be misunderstood, but this alternative was not used by the concise written language.

Every written language has begun as a hieroglyphic system. A Hieroglyphic Language. But it was quite natural that Chinese should have remained a hieroglyphic language.² In its development it has not remained merely picture-writing; when the characters were multiplied in number, it was natural that to a homonym should be added a hieroglyphic indicating to what class a different concept belonged, thus making a new character. Nine-tenths of the Chinese written characters were made in this way. In general the characteristic of written Chinese is that there is a different written symbol for each different meaning. That is the ideal; yet there were many characters with two or three different meanings, because of the failure to create enough different characters for them. Thus the ancient written language had about 5,000 different characters, and there have been invented about ten times that many.³

¹ R. K. Douglas, *Chinese Manual*, p. 3, states that Mandarin has 532 syllables, but Pekinese only 420. The number given in the text was reached by a phonetic analysis of the pronunciation at Siangtan, Hunan.

² I.e. non-phonetic or only partly phonetic.

³ The vocabulary of the *Analcts* and *Iactze* includes about 2,500 characters, and that of the *Four Books* and *Five Classics* 4,601 characters. Li-see, in fixing the "Lesser Seal" writing, compiled 5,340 characters.

The presence of so many homophones has prevented the successful use of any other method of writing than the one in use at present.

Difficulty.

In ancient times the written language was more difficult than to-day. The forms of the characters were more complicated, often fantastic, and difficult to distinguish. Paper had not yet been invented, and writing was chiefly done on strips of bamboo, by scratching the characters on the wood with a stylus, or by painting. The difficulty of writing induced men to elaborate a written language different from the spoken language; single characters were used where the spoken language had a phrase; terms of relation were omitted or a phrase was substituted for a single character, and in general the language was made as concise as possible. At the same time literary men would naturally come to use words which originally were only current in the spoken language of particular districts, and so synonyms became common, and many words so used became intelligible only to the educated. Thus the written Chinese language developed, as different from the spoken language as Latin from Italian.

Literati.

It was natural that under these circumstances a class of literati should develop, men who were able to read and write. The man on the street could not take the time to learn four to five thousand different characters, together with a manner of composition different from that of the spoken language. Only those who had many years to give to this study could

The larger edition of the *Khangshih* dictionary includes 42,174 characters, and many have been invented since or are not included; so the total must be about 50,000 characters. But only 8,000 or 6,000 are in ordinary use.

master the difficulties involved. Yet this written language did not become the esoteric secret of a priestly class. There was no organized priesthood in ancient China, and the language was so very difficult that only by great assiduity and perseverance, sufficient to discourage all but a few, could it be learned. The very difficulty of the language prevented it from becoming the exclusive possession of any class or group, by constantly eliminating the lazy. Only the industrious could learn to read and write, and any social group which sought to keep learning to itself soon found its numbers depleted by the elimination of those temperamentally unfitted for such a difficult task. Consequently the learned were compelled to recruit their number from whomever was willing to undergo the severe discipline of learning, and the way became open for the industrious child of any family to make his way into the number of the learned through his own application to study. Thus there came to be a democracy among the ranks of the learned, and every clan tried to have at least one of its members become educated to read and write. The essential democracy of China probably originated in this manner. Democracy.

At the same time this ability to write became a moral test as well. The difficulty of the language operated to select those of at least sufficient force of character to submit to the discipline that learning involved, and thus literacy became a test of moral as well as of intellectual accomplishment. This fact may help to explain why Chinese philosophy has refused to separate ethics from metaphysics—they were combined in experience; intellectual training involved moral training as well. Literacy a Moral Test.

Literati
Needed in
Government.

The rulers found these educated men of great use in government. They were needed to keep records, such as census records, records of how much taxes each group was to pay, write dispatches, etc., and they soon busied themselves in writing history, of which the Chinese are very fond, in writing down the popular ballads, in composing odes in honour of the prince. They studied what literature they could find, and became the advisers of the prince, informing him of what kings of ancient days had done, and thus there grew up that type of argument from ancient history which forms so large a part of Chinese philosophy.

The Business
of the Scholar
is to Govern.

The rulers began to depend on these educated men more and more, until education came to be the *sine qua non* of government position, and the purpose of education evolved into the education of men who were to hold high official position. Confucius became the Minister of Crime in his native state, and his disciples found high government office. Mencius was but expressing the popular opinion when he said: "Some labour with their minds, and some labour with their strength. Those who labour with their minds govern others; those who labour with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported by them."¹ In other words, the business of the scholar is to govern. Government service became the only legitimate occupation for a gentleman; either he took government service, or else he lived in retirement; there was no third occupation for a gentleman.

History.

This situation had its reaction upon the government. History was written from the point of view of the official

¹ *Menc.* III, 1, iv, 8

class, and the great extent to which the Sage Kings in the *Book of History* depend on their advisors is doubtless a reflex of the attitude of these literati-historians towards their masters. They wrote into their histories their opinions of how an ideal king should act, and subsequent generations of rulers endeavoured to act accordingly. The *Book of History* is full of moralizing, and the history it presents points a moral—virtue leads to the throne, and vice brings about the downfall of a dynasty. It is history similar to that found in the *Books of Chronicles*, and was intended for a similar purpose; combined with the conservative tendency of the Chinese, which led them to look backward, it could not fail to have a profound effect upon philosophy.

As we would expect from their strong practical interests, Historical Sense. the Chinese have always made much of history, perhaps more than any other nation. The feudal rulers wanted to see their names perpetuated and they wanted records of the ancestors whom they worshipped. Each feudal state had its history—at first bare records of events without elucidation, such as the *Bamboo Annals* or the *Spring and Autumn*. Elucidation was carried in the memories of men until written down in the Han period. But history came to be cultivated for its own sake, and the ancient Chinese achieved a historical sense which the ancient Greeks never acquired, and which makes the spirit of ancient China in this respect nearer that of our own time than the spirit of any other ancient people. Origins were emphasized; Confucianism based itself upon a philosophy of history which was found in the historic record of the Chou emperors, and Chuangtse even proposed a theory of biological evolution which startlingly resembles our present account.

Every philosophy had to deal with history and the interpretation of history as one of its elements, with the result that there never were developed a set of purely timeless ideals such as we find in ancient Greece.

Peacefulness.

At the same time this class of educated government officials could not help but make the country peaceful. They themselves came from the people; while they may originally have come from aristocratic families, as time went on these aristocratic families were gradually dispossessed as the country was more and more unified, and so education was increasingly widened to include children of any family wealthy enough to give them leisure for a period of years in order to study. The losses of war fell upon the families and clans of these educated government officials, and with the great social solidarity characteristic of Chinese society, these educated men in high position everywhere helped to moderate the warlike ambitions of the princes. Of course there were numerous exceptions, but the condemnation of war by the philosophers originated in this feature of Chinese life.

The
Philosopher-
ruler.

No other country illustrated better Plato's insistence that the philosopher should be the ruler of the state. Plato may have gone to Syracuse to reform that state, but Confucius travelled to the courts of many states seeking for a prince wise enough to employ him. Mencius did the same, accepting honorary appointments from various princes; and Hsüntze similarly travelled around before he found a prince willing to give him a minor position where he could write and teach. Duke Huan of Ts'i was eulogized because he selected the philosopher Kuan Chung as his prime minister.¹ Hence the

¹ Cf. *W.H.*, vii, 23.

educated were government officials, and so the philosophers were also all of them government officials.¹ Their philosophy likewise turned to practical purposes. Hence we find in ancient China very little speculative philosophy; it is practical philosophy, especially ethics and political philosophy that forms the bulk of Confucius' teaching. These men were practical administrators, why should they waste their time in discussions that had no bearing upon practical life? Chuangtze indulged in metaphysical and epistemological speculations, but he showed his true colours in refusing to accept the office of prime-minister when it was offered him.

Likewise science and mathematics formed no part of philosophy.² Education was restricted to literature, mathematics was not included. Not that there was no mathematics, for the Chinese established and rectified their calendar very early, but that was left to the astronomers and fortune tellers, who occupied a minor place in the official hierarchy. Consequently formal logic was never emphasized. Logic and mathematics have always been closely related; we need only remember that it was Plato who made geometry an integral part of his curriculum, who developed the doctrine of universals and prepared the way for the formal logic of Aristotle. The Chinese written language is inherently unfitted for exact reasoning, even though Hsüntze made it perform that office; this fact together with the absence of respect for mathematics prevented the importance of formal logic from being seen; although Micius and

¹ This was true of the Confucian and Mician schools; Yangtze and Chuangtze characteristically refused office.

² Cf. p. 217 for exceptions.

his school worked out a set of rules for reasoning, his work was not followed up by the orthodox philosophy.

No Science.

Similarly there was no science, not even any physics. Mechanical arts were for the artisans; physical work could never produce a superior man; the superior man "is expert in the principles of life, not expert in things".¹ Consequently we do not find any investigation for its own sake in Confucianism, and so no metaphysics or epistemology, except as incidental to something else. Speculation as such is banished from philosophy; philosophic thought is for the sake of social control.

Thus we see the reasons for the limited outlook of the ancient Confucian philosophy, and that while it went very far in some directions, particularly in ethics, yet it never started at all in other directions. Social control was the aim of the personal lives of the philosophers, and so it became the aim of their philosophies too. Those who broke away from this tendency were exiled from the orthodox stream of philosophic teaching, which found its source and basis in the literary inheritance of the country.

Previous to Confucius and Laotze, there was philosophic thought, but there were no philosophers as such. This early philosophic thought we now find in the *Book of Odes* and the *Book of History*. There are references to other works now lost, but none that we now have can be dated from that time with any degree of probability. China of the great period of ancient philosophy was most unlike Greece in that she then already possessed a hoary past of history and tradition, and that the traditions and customs of the past possessed a tremendous hold upon the people and rulers.

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 9.

About the year 600 B.C. iron was introduced into general use, and a new cultural age was thereby inaugurated. From that time on to the end of the Chou dynasty (220 B.C.) Chinese thought came into its own. The philosophic impulse which had been present for so long suddenly burst into flower; with the new age there came a brilliant group of thinkers never since equalled in the history of the race; at the end of this period there was a decline and stopping of philosophical activity.¹ First of all came Lao-tze (c. 570-480 ? B.C.), who conceived the Unknowable as impersonal Law, and whose metaphysical realism led him to deny the value of civilization and to advocate quietism and a return to primitive conditions. Contemporary with him was Confucius (551-479 B.C.) who sought to reform the age by carrying out in full the principles practised by the Sages of old, and whose powerful personality has stamped itself upon his disciples and upon China more thoroughly than any other person in any country has affected his people, excepting Jesus of Nazareth. His younger contemporary, Micius (500 or 490 to 425 or 416 B.C.) revolted against the ceremonialism and traditionalism of Confucius, and sought to begin anew on the basis of utilitarianism, from which he deduced a religion with a belief in Heaven and hosts of spirits, and with universal love and pacifism as its chief tenets. After him came the extreme nominalist, Yangtze (c. 440-360 B.C., a contemporary of Socrates and Plato), whose extreme individualism led him to an ethics thoroughly Cyrenaic in character. Hwei Shih (c. 380-300 B.C.) and Kung Suen-lung (325 or 315-c. 250 B.C.) developed

¹ For the political history of this period cf. W.H., "A Sketch of Chinese History."

Mencius' teaching along the line of epistemology and logic, and even attempted to formulate a scientific method for philosophy, thus forming the Neo-Mencian school. Their most striking achievements were a set of logical puzzles similar to those of Zeno. The attacks of these "unorthodox schools" would have overcome the Confucian teaching, had it not been supported by two powerful personalities, Mencius and Hsüntze. Mencius (372-289 B.C., a contemporary of Aristotle) upheld the teaching of Confucius, and his brilliant argumentation was a powerful force in its support. He endeavoured to support the Confucian ethic by a doctrine of human nature. Chuangtze (died 275 B.C.), the brilliant follower of Lao-tze, developed that doctrine in the direction of universal change and relativism, which brought him to complete scepticism as to the possibility of knowledge and of any ethical standards, and to pessimism and fatalism. Hsüntze (c. 320-235 B.C.) lived at the end of this period, and was influenced by all the streams of philosophical thought that had been developed. He was a keen critic of these other schools of thought, and was widely read and deeply learned in them. Yet he was a true exponent of the Confucian philosophy and its staunchest defender, the first Confucian who attempted a rounded philosophy.

CHAPTER II

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HSÜNTZE

Of the life of Hsüntze we know almost nothing. Even the dates of his birth and death are unknown. At that time historians were not anxious to record much about private individuals. Kings and battles, the doings of the great, were thought most worthy of consideration, and it was held that virtue is necessarily rewarded by official rank.

Hsüntze's life fell towards the end of the period called by Chinese historians, "The Period of the Warring States." By that time the number of feudal states had been reduced by internecine warfare from fifty-five to ten, of whom seven were most important. These were engaged in a struggle to the death among themselves when they were not trying to stem the advance of Ts'in. Lu was annexed by Ts'in in 249 B.C., Han in 230 B.C., Chao in 228 B.C., Wei in 225 B.C., Ts'u in 223 B.C., Yen in 222 B.C., and Ts'i in 221 B.C. There was no opposition now in all China, and so in 220 B.C., the king of Ts'in proclaimed himself as Shih Hwangti, or The First Emperor.

Hsüntze's productive life coincided with the latter part of this period of warring states. It was a time of turmoil and discouragement to every serious thinker. The old standards had gone and nothing seemed to have taken their place. It was, in fact, the death-struggle of the old feudal system, preparatory to the founding of the absolute empire; but neither Hsüntze nor any other great thinker saw it as Political Disorder.

such. It was a time of great unsteadiness of political life; the most unexpected changes in politics were constantly occurring. Similarly there was an unprecedented freedom of thought. Certain philosophers became the fashion, overshadowing the Sages of old, and then went out of fashion again. There was a new freedom of travel, which enabled the different teachers of philosophy to go from one court to another until they found a responsive prince. At the same time public morality was at its lowest ebb. There were some unforgotten patriots, but the general character of the age is shown in the career of such a man as Chang Yi, one of the greatest diplomats of the time, who spent most of his life furthering the intrigues of Ts'in to injure his native state, Wei.

The emperor¹ was neglected; the feudal nobles no longer assembled to do him formal homage; he became a shadowy figure without any power or authority. Every ruler of a large state assumed the title of King, and thus put himself on an equality with the Son of Heaven in title. As "Son of Heaven" was a purely religious title, no one cared to assume it. King Nan, the last of the Chou emperors, dared to intrigue with some of the other states, consequently Ts'in invaded his territory and wrenched the western half of it from him, then took from him the nine sacred tripods of Emperor Yu, which had been in the possession of the Chou emperors ever since King Wu had taken them from the vicious emperor Chou. Soon afterwards King Nan died (256 B.C.). The eastern half of his territory went to a relative who reigned for seven years with merely the title of "Prince", and then Ts'in put an end to the dynasty.

¹ At the time the Chou emperor only took the title of "King".

The period was a time of innovations. On the north Ts'in Innovations. and Chao were in contact with Tatar, Scythian, Hun and Turkish tribes; the strength of these two states lay in their continued absorption and civilization of these fresh tribes. To the south Ts'u was similarly in contact with the barbaric races in that region, and from these sources many new elements were introduced into the ancient Chinese civilization. King Wu-ling of Chao (327-299 B.C.) exchanged the Chinese court dress for that of the Tatars, and introduced the boot as part of the dress of a gentleman. Irresponsible adventurers travelled through the country, insinuating themselves into the good graces of the rulers by their tongues, and had a profound influence upon the politics of the country. Two of these, Su Ts'in and Chang Yi, rose from the lowest ranks to be the two most influential personages in the country.

Likewise in philosophy there was innovation. The old ideals no longer sufficed. The Micians, with their attempt to get rid of the old and begin anew in thought, became more and more influential. Together with Chuangtze and his school, they heaped ridicule and criticism upon the Confucian teachings, and upon the ethical ideals that they represented. The paradoxes of the Neo-Micians and the relativism of Chuangtze set people doubting everything. A school of sophists appeared who taught people to persuade anyone of anything, such was Kuei-ku-tze, the "Philosopher of the Devil Valley", whose most famous pupils were the Su Ts'in and Chang Yi mentioned above. Everything was in a ferment; the times called for someone who should stand up for the stern ideals of ancient days. This had been done by Mencius; but it is doubtful in view of the great influx of new influences

and new thought, whether the older view would have prevailed, had he not been followed by the equally great Hsüntze.

Hsüntze's
Life.

Of the details of Hsüntze's life almost nothing is known. He was born in the northern state of Chao about 320 B.C., when Mencius was already over 50 years old, and did not come into prominence until after the death of that philosopher. It is tempting to conjecture that he felt the call for someone to take up Mencius' mantle as the exponent and defender of the "teachings of the Sages". We hear of him first at Ts'i, to which he came at the age of fifty, already a mature man, where he went to spread his teaching. The court of Ts'i had always encouraged learning; Mencius had spent a great deal of time there, and hoped to make the King of Ts'i into a model Sage-King. To encourage learned men to come to the state, the ruler had established a college at Ts'i-hsia near the capital, where these scholars were collected from all parts of the empire, and where they were given honorary rank as "Ranking Great Prefects". It is natural to suppose that among these philosophers there should have been many who criticized the orthodox teaching, and we are told that all wrote books criticizing the times. Here Hsüntze upheld the orthodox Confucian position, and attained the high honour of thrice offering the wine in the great sacrifice. Yet he was not without his envious detractors. Possibly one of these slandered him to the King; at any rate, Hsüntze left Ts'i-hsia.

Travel.

At this time he probably spent some years in travelling about the states, spreading his teaching, and seeking for a king who would employ him, just as did Confucius and Mencius, and arguing against the use of war. Then probably occurred the debate which was the foundation for

Book XV of his works. We can picture the sixty-year-old philosopher facing the general of the king's armies and the warlike, intriguing king, and arguing for peace, justice, righteousness, and benevolence, controverting with great logical power the arguments of the general, until both king and general were content to sit and listen to the teaching of this disciple of the Sages. We know that he went to Ts'in and to Chao, two of the most powerful states of the time, and finally to Ts'u.

Confucius had spent most of his life in search for a worthy prince; Mencius ceased his travels sooner; Hsüntze seems to have seen the futility of that procedure earlier, and so did not travel widely. Mencius had declared that there were three cases in which a superior man can take office; in the first case if he was received respectfully and the prince promised to follow his advice, he should take office, but should resign if his advice was not accepted; in the second case, even though there seemed no chance of his advice being taken, yet he could take office if he was respectfully treated, but if there was any remission in the deference accorded him, he should resign; in the third case, if he had no other means of supporting himself, he could accept a proffered office, but it must be a low one.¹ In Ts'u, Prince Ch'uin-shen, a commoner who by his ability had raised himself to the position of prime minister and who had been ennobled by the King, offered Hsüntze office, and so Hsüntze accepted a low office in order to support himself. Evidently he preferred a quiet position where he could train a few disciples and write out his philosophy, to the uncertainty of travel. Ts'u had just

He Accepts
Office.

¹ *Mencius*, V, II, v; VI, II, xiv.

conquered a group of cities from the neighbouring state of Lu, and so Prince Ch'uin-shen appointed the philosopher, who was by this time about 65 years old, to the magistracy of the city of Lan-ling, in what is now southern Shantung.

The position of district magistrate was by no means what a Worthy was thought capable of; for a true Worthy should be given at least the position of prime minister where he would raise his master to the sovereignty of the empire; or else a Worthy should rise from the government of a small place to rule over the empire, as did King Wu. Whether Hsüntze had any such idea we do not know; the theory is found in his writings as in that of all Confucians, but nowhere is there any hint that he cherished any personal ambitions. His disciples mourned the fact that he had not the opportunity to rise. But the day for that was over. What Hsüntze did discover was the power of the written word, and we find that he went to work to write down his teaching in orderly form. His logical mind grasped the Confucian philosophy in systematic form, and he set to work to express and defend the Confucian teaching in its wholeness as none before him had done. Through his teaching we find running a few foundation principles, holding it together in a consistent whole.

His
Character.

The date of his appointment to Lan-ling, 255 B.C., is the only definite date in all his long life. In all probability he made a good magistrate; we find indications of profound respect for him on the part of the people of the place. He encouraged learning; indeed he himself was a compendium of all the learning of the age. Among his disciples were the

two greatest men of the next generation—Han Fei-tze, the last of the Chou philosophers, and Li Sze, who inaugurated the new age as the prime minister of the "First Emperor". Two hundred years after, Liu Hsiang found that people still loved to call their children by the personal appellation of Hsüntze, and that the impetus he had implanted towards scholarship was still bearing fruit so that Lan-ling produced many good scholars. For eighteen years Hsüntze continued in office, until the assassination of Prince Ch'uin-shen in 237 B.C., whereupon he lost his position in the change of administration.

By this time he was about 83 years old, but still hale and hearty. Only a man who remained in full possession of his faculties could write as he did about old age.¹ But he was too old to move and had formed close ties in the city, so retired there. When he died we do not know, possibly about 235 B.C.

APPENDIX

Every account of Hsüntze's life that we have is based on that of Sze-ma Ch'ien in the *Historical Record* (史記). Consequently it is translated here. It is found in Chapter 74, Section 14, together with the account of Mencius.

¹ Cf. *W.H.*, xviii, P.E.

"Hsün¹ Ch'ing² was a native of Chao.³ At fifty years of age he first came to spread abroad his teachings⁴ in Ts'i.⁵ Tsou-Yen's⁶ knowledge was very great, and he disputed widely. The learning of Shih was great but exhibited with difficulty. Shun Yü-K'un lived with him long and at times had profitable conversations. Hence the people of Ts'i praised them, saying, 'Yen speaks of Heaven; Shih carves the dragon; K'un hits the mark best.'⁶ T'ien P'ien's relatives had already died. In the time of King Siang of Ts'i,⁷ Hsün Ch'ing was most important as a learned scholar.⁸ Ts'i was still repairing the

¹ Surname.

² An appellation commonly used instead of his given name. It means "noble" or "minister", and is a term of respect applied by courtiers to the prince, and by gentlemen to each other. But in the case of Hsüntze it was an appellation of honour, rather than a title like "Mr." At Ts'i-hua all the scholars were entitled "Ranking Great Prefects"; their leader was given the title of "Minister". Hsüntze thrice offered the wine in the great sacrifice and so was the most prominent of these "Ranking Great Prefects", hence was styled "Minister". This conjecture explains the use of 卿 with Hsüntze's surname. Cf. Wang Hsien-ch'ien 荀子集解, "Introduction," 孝證, f. 40. "Hsün-tze" is composed of the surname and the appellation "tze", which meant "teacher" or "philosopher", and was applied to all philosophers of this period. It is the Chinese original of the last syllable in the words Confucius, Mencius, Moilus, Sungtze, etc.

³ An ancient feudal state in the south of Chihli and Shensi.

⁴ The meaning may be "He went to Ts'i to study", but in view of his age the other translation is more probable.

⁵ An important ancient feudal kingdom comprising a large part of northern Shantung and southern Chihli.

⁶ Possibly the words enclosed by broken brackets are an interpolation, reading instead, "The relatives of Tsou-Yen and T'ien P'ien had already," etc. Cf. *Id.*, 中國招學史大綱, p. 303 ff.

⁷ 283-265 B.C.

⁸ Or we may punctuate differently and read, "T'ien P'ien's relatives had already died in the time of King Hsiang of Ts'i. Hsün Ch'ing was most important as a learned scholar."

breaks in the ranks of the 'Ranking Great Prefects',¹ and Hsün Ch'ing thrice offered the wine.² Someone in Ts'i possibly slandered Hsün Ch'ing; at any rate Ch'ing³ went to Ts'u⁴ and Prince Ch'uin-shen⁵ made him magistrate of Lan-ling.⁶ When Prince Ch'uin-shen died,⁷ Hsün Ch'ing lost his position. Because his home was at Lan-ling, LiSze, who later became the prime minister of Ts'in,⁸ was his disciple. Hsün Ch'ing belonged to a generation of evil and foul governments, of dying states and evil princes, who did not follow the great Way (*Tao*), but attended to magic and prayers, and believed in omens and luck. It was a generation of low scholars and worthless fellows such as Chuang Chou,⁹

¹ The state of Ts'i encouraged scholars to gather by giving them the honorary title of "Ranking Great Prefects", but without any power. In ancient times a "Great Prefect" was a high officer in a feudal state.

² In the great sacrifice. This office was performed only by one chosen as pre-eminent among the scholar "Ranking Prefects".

³ Hsüntze.

⁴ A large feudal state in the south of civilized China of the day; it occupied Hupah, Hunan, and parts of Honan and Kiangsu.

⁵ One of the "Four Nobles", prominent members of the princely houses of their states or of princely rank who had gained great influence coupled with political success in the management of the government of their sovereigns, during the latter days of the Chou dynasty. Prince Ch'uin-shen was the only one of the four who was not of princely blood. He was made prime minister and ennobled as prince by King Kao-lieh of Ts'u (263-238 B.C.), and was instrumental in slowing down the advance of the state of Ts'in to its final place of dominance over the whole empire under Ts'in Shih Hwangti in 220 B.C.

⁶ A place in Southern Shantung.

⁷ He was assassinated in 237 B.C.

⁸ The state which, beginning in Shensi and Kansuh, finally subdued all China. LiSze was prime minister under Shih Hwangti, who completed this subjugation, and became Emperor. Much of Hsüntze's opprobrium arose from the fact that LiSze was his disciple.

⁹ Chuangtze, the Taoist.

and others, and also of specious and disorderly customs. Therefore he put forth and exhibited in order the prosperity and decay that came from putting into practice the Confucian and Mician doctrines and virtues. He wrote several tens of thousands of words and died, then was buried in Lan-ling."¹

This account by Sze-ma Ch'ien was written somewhere about 100 B.C., not much more than a hundred years after Hsüntze's death. Many years later, when Liu Hsiang came to edit a new edition of Hsüntze's works, he wrote an account of Hsüntze, which is the only other early account we have of this philosopher, so it is translated here :

"I, Hsiang,² High Vice-Commissioner of the Water at the capital, and Banqueting Official, memorialize Your Majesty :

"Of the writings of Hsun³ Ch'ing that I collated and compared, altogether there were 322 books. In collating them, I threw out 290 duplicates,⁴ and decided on publishing 32

¹ The *Historical Record* now goes on to mention some minor philosophers, but this part of the chapter is probably spurious, and so is not translated.

² Liu Hsiang, 80-9 B.C. A descendant of the founder of the Han dynasty. He was one of the most prominent scholars of the time and rose to be a Minister of State. He was the author of a number of works.

³ This is a different character from that usually used for this surname, probably used because the two had the same pronunciation and were interchanged. Cf. Wang Hsien-ch'ien, "Introduction" 考證, t. 30.

⁴ Evidently Hsüntze's writings came to him not in the form of one edition of complete works, but in the form of separate books, each book containing a chapter. We must remember that previous to the time of Liu Hsiang, writing was on bamboo, and so books were bulky. Of these books there were many duplicates, probably more of one book than of another, but sufficient to make more than ten complete copies of the whole—evidently Hsüntze's works had not suffered greatly in the Burning of the Books. Probably his works were exempted from the burning, possibly under the influence of Li Sze, the prime minister of

books. We decided that it should all be copied out on prepared bamboo slips.

"¹ *Hsien Ch'ing* was a native of Chao.² His given name was K'uang. At the time King Hsuen³ and King Wei⁴ of Ts'i gathered the worthy scholars of the empire at Ts'i-hsia,⁵ and honoured and favoured them, such as T'ou Yen, T'ien P'ien, Shun Yu-k'un, etc. They were very numerous and

Ts'ia Shih Hwangti, who instigated the burning, and who was a disciple of Hsüntze. At least Liu Hsiang had a sufficient number of copies of Hsüntze's writings so as to be able to fix the text fairly accurately—though from the present form of the text, which leaves much to be desired, either Liu Hsiang and his helpers did their work carelessly, or else the text, in being copied and recopied down to the time of Yang Liang (A.D. 918), suffered greatly. The latter is very probable; we have evidence in Book VI that additions were made to the text subsequent to Liu Hsiang's edition. At any rate, Liu Hsiang seems to have prepared the first complete edition of Hsüntze's works, and his edition is substantially what we have now.

Liu Hsiang probably included among his 32 books some that were not genuine; internal evidence shows that this is so. But in the main the books that we have now under the name of Hsüntze are genuine.

Another possibility was that these 32 books or sections were what we now find as sections of books, such as in Book IX, where they can be separated out with their original titles, which seem to have been given by Hsüntze himself. But the plain statement that there were 280 duplicate books, leaving 32 (the present number of books), seems to rule out such a supposition. Either Hsüntze himself compiled these sections into books or his immediate disciples did so.

¹ Liu Hsiang quotes liberally from the *Historical Record*; to indicate the large extent of his dependence upon the *Historical Record* his quotations have been placed in italics. This is the meaning of all the italics in this particular translation.

² For explanation of places, etc., see notes to the translation of the section from the *Historical Record*.

³ 342-324 B.C.

⁴ 376-343 B.C.

⁵ A place in the state of Ts'i, near the capital (present Shantung).

were styled Ranking Great Prefects. All of them were praised by that generation. All wrote books criticizing the times. At the time Hsun Ch'ing had the Hsin-ts'ai degree,¹ was fifty years of age, and first came to travel and study. All the philosophers attacked the methods of the early Kings. Hsun Ch'ing was good at the Odes,² Rites,³ Changes,⁴ and the Spring and Autumn.⁵ At the time of King Hsiang⁶ of Ts'i Hsun Ch'ing was most important as a learned scholar. Ts'i was still repairing the breaks in the ranks of the Ranking Great Prefects, and Hsun Ch'ing thrice offered the wins. Someone in Ts'i possibly slandered Hsun Ch'ing, so Hsun Ch'ing went to Ts'u. The prime minister of Ts'u, Ch'uin-shen,⁷ made him the magistrate of Lan-ling.⁸

"Someone said to Prince Ch'uin-shen, T'ang⁹ began his career in a place of 70 li¹⁰ in size; King Wen¹¹ began in a place of 100 li. Hsun Ch'ing is a Worthy; now you have given him a place of 100 li; is he not dangerous to Ts'u? Prince Ch'uin-shen thanked and had him¹² resign. Hsun Ch'ing proceeded to Chao. Afterwards a certain stranger said to

¹ B.A.

² One of the Five Classics.

³ Probably the I-Li.

⁴ One of the Five Classics, the Book of Changes.

⁵ History of the state of Lu, written by Confucius.

⁶ 283-265 B.C.

⁷ Assassinated 287 B.C.

⁸ A prefectural city in Southern Shantung. Lu, in whose territory this city was, was only annexed by Ts'u in 249 B.C.

⁹ Founder of the Shang dynasty.

¹⁰ A Chinese "li" is one-third of an English mile.

¹¹ Founder of the Chou dynasty.

¹² Hsuntze.

Prince Ch'uin-shen: When Yi-yin left Hsia¹ and entered the service of Yin,² Yin ruled and Hsia was destroyed. When Kuan-chung³ left Lu and entered the service of Ts'i, Lu became weak and Ts'i became strong. Hence where a Worthy is, the prince is honoured and the state is at peace. Now Hsun Ch'ing is the greatest Worthy in the empire. Will not the state which he left be in danger? Prince Ch'uin-shen sent people with a present to invite Hsun Ch'ing to come. Hsun Ch'ing sent a writing to Prince Ch'uin-shen criticizing Ts'u; because it was a poem he sent it to Prince Ch'uin-shen. Prince Ch'uin-shen disliked it, and a second time was resolved to get rid of Hsun Ch'ing. Nevertheless Hsun Ch'ing came, and again became the governor of Lan-ling. *When Prince Ch'uin-shen died, Hsun Ch'ing lost his position.*

"Because his home was at Lan-ling, Li Sze, who later became the prime minister of Ts'in, was his disciple. Also Han Fei, called Hantze and Fou Ch'in-pek all studied under Hsun Ch'ing, and became famous scholars.

"While Hsun Ch'ing was receiving invitations from the nobles, he received audience from King Chao⁴ of Ts'in. King Chao at the time enjoyed fighting and killing, but Hsuntze argued with him according to the methods of the three Kings, so the prime minister of Ts'in, Yin Hou, could not employ him. He went to Chao, and debated military affairs with Hsun Pin before King Hsiao-cheng.⁵ Hsun Pin advocated

¹ The Hsia dynasty.

² The succeeding Shang dynasty.

³ The famous prime minister of Duke Huan of Ts'i, who raised his master to the position of the recognized leader of all the feudal states.

⁴ 300-251 B.C.

⁵ 265-245 B.C.

armies which suddenly altered their movements and used deceitful stratagems. Hsun Ch'ing said that the armies of a King would hardly do that, yet could not be opposed. Finally he could not be used in official position.

"The teaching of Hsun Ch'ing was to observe the rules of proper conduct (*Li*) and justice (*Yi*); his actions accorded to the plumb-line¹; and he was satisfied with poverty and low position. Mencius, also a great scholar, considered man's nature as good. Hsun Ch'ing came more than a hundred years after Mencius. Hsun Ch'ing considered man's nature to be evil, hence wrote the book, 'The Nature of Man is Evil,' to combat Mencius. Su Ts'in² and Chang Yi³ persuaded the nobles to follow false doctrines (*Tao*) and thought that their greatness and honour were apparent. Hsuntze retired and laughed at them, saying: He who does not succeed by their doctrines (*Tao*) will certainly not fail by their doctrines (*Tao*).⁴ With⁵ the rise of the Han Dynasty, the minister of Kiang Tu, Tung Chung-shu, also a great scholar, wrote a book praising Hsun Ch'ing.⁶

"Hsun Ch'ing died without having been given high position by his generation; he grew old at Lan-ling. *He belonged to a generation of evil and foul governments, of dying states and evil princes, who did not follow the great Way (Tao), but attended to magic and prayers, and believed in omens and luck. It was a generation of low scholars and worthless fellows such as Chuang*

¹ i.e. upright.

² Died 317 B.C.

³ Died 310 B.C. These were two adventurers who wielded great power among the Warring States.

⁴ I.e., their doctrines were worthless.

⁵ to ⁶ This sentence may be a later gloss.

Chou, etc., and also of specious and disorderly customs. Therefore he put forth and exhibited in order the prosperity and decay that come from putting in practice the Confucian and Mician doctrines and virtues. He wrote several tens of thousands of words and died; then was buried at Lan-ling.

"Chao¹ also produced Kung Hsun-hung, who discoursed on hardness and whiteness, likeness and similarity, and that a philosopher should retire from the world. Wei² produced Li K'uei who used up his land and strength for salvation. Ts'u produced Shih-tse, Chang Lu-tse, Ya-tse, all of whom wrote books. They attacked the methods of the early Kings, and none of them followed the teachings of Confucius. Only Meng Ko³ and Hsun Ch'ing were able to know Confucius.

"Lan-ling had many good scholars, which was from Hsun Ch'ing's influence. Old men even to-day⁴ praise him, saying: The people of Lan-ling like to have 'Ch'ing' for an appellation,⁵ all from imitation of Hsun Ch'ing.

"Mencius, Hsun Ch'ing, and Mr. Tung⁶ all minimize the five Lords Protector, because they thought the disciples of

¹ The state of Chao. Lin Hsiang is quoting from the spurious part of the *Historical Record* which immediately follows the account of Hsüntse.

² A small ancient state, occupying southern Shensi and northern Honan.

³ Mencius.

⁴ Probably Lin Hsiang either had been to Lan-ling or had talked with those who had been there.

⁵ A Chinese gentleman has a surname, a given name, and also an appellation, which is a kind of second given name.

⁶ Tung Chung-shu, the greatest Confucian of the Han period.

Confucius were only immature menials¹; all of them despise the five Lords Protector.

"If a prince could have used Hsun Ch'ing,² he would probably have ruled as King.³ But to the end of his days none used him. But the princes of the six states injured and destroyed each other; the state of Ts'in caused great disorder⁴ and was at last destroyed.⁵ In looking at Hsun Ch'ing's writings we see that he sets forth the Way (*Tao*) of the Kings as very easy to pursue⁶; but an evil generation could not use his teachings. It is sorrowful and most distressing. Alas! To let such a man die in a side lane,⁷ and his accomplishments go unseen in the world! How sad! I could rain tears!

"I have compared his writings with what has been handed down, and they can be considered as a canon. They have been carefully recorded in order. I, Hsiang, unclear and dying, hand these words to Your Majesty.

"I, Hsiang, High Vice-Commissioner of the Water of the capital and Banqueting Official, transcribe the writings of Hsun Ch'ing from those which I have collated and compared."

By comparison of these two accounts, it is evident that Liu Hsiang is presenting no original material, but merely quoting from Sze-ma Ch'ien's *Historical Record*, from

¹ Taken from the opening sentence of Hsüntze, Book VII, cf. *W.H.*

² In high position, as prime minister.

³ Emperor.

⁴ A reminiscence of the "Glass", *W.H.*, after Bk. XXIII.

⁵ End of Ts'in dynasty, 206 B.C.

⁶ A quotation from Book XX, *W.H.*, xx, 5.

⁷ At home, without official position.

his reading of Hsüntze's works, and elaborating what he had thus learned. The one paragraph which introduces anything at all new, the one speaking of Hsüntze's influence on the people of Lan-ling, could easily have been learned from some visitor at the court. The paragraph relating Hsüntze's dismissal and recall is apparently apocryphal.

Stranger yet is the chronology of Hsüntze's life; according to Liu Hsiang's account, Hsüntze came to Ts'i-hsia in the reigns of Kings Hsuen and Wei, when he was 50 years of age, i.e., between 378 and 324 B.C. Hence Hsüntze was born at the latest in 374 B.C. and possibly as early as 428 B.C. Hsüntze was most important in the reign of King Hsiang, 283-265 B.C., which would make him at least between 91 and 109 years old. He died after the assassination of Prince Ch'uin-shen, which occurred in 237 B.C. when Hsüntze would have been at least 137 years old! Probably Liu Hsiang had not compared the dates he was giving, but was merely putting together all that he could find or recollect about Hsüntze, otherwise he would never have made him live to such an age! We can give very little weight to Liu Hsiang's account.

That conclusion leaves us with the account of Sze-ma Ch'ien as the only early account of Hsüntze's life. The first date that we have is that Hsüntze came to Ts'i when 50 years of age, and was most important in the time of King Siang of Ts'i. King Siang reigned 283-265 B.C., so we can set the time of Hsüntze's coming to Ts'i during the last years of that reign. If, however, we take the translation in page 26, note 8, which is preferred by Professor Hu (cf. *Hu*, p. 303 ff.), Hsüntze came to Ts'i after King Siang, probably in the reign of his successor, King Chien, 264-221 B.C., which would bring the

date of his birth to about 300 B.C. However, the translation I have given is the most natural one in the opinion of competent Chinese scholars, in spite of the assertion to the contrary by Professor Hu, and is the meaning that has been drawn from this passage by every important biographer from the time of Liu Hsiang down. Only Professor Hu has punctuated thus differently. He seems to have done so because he supposes Hsüntze must have been 50 years old at the accession of King Siang, which would date his birth at 333 B.C. and thus make him live almost a century to the time of his death. More probably he became important soon after coming to Ts'i in the latter years of King Siang's reign, for he was already quite mature. We may thus conclude that Hsüntze was born about 320 B.C.

The next thing we read is that Hsüntze left Ts'i and went to Ts'u, where he was given office. But we know that he went to different courts from remarks in his own writings, and these travels probably occurred between the time that he left Ts'i and before he got to Ts'u.

In Book XVI we read that he saw King Chao of Ts'in and Yin Hou. King Chao reigned 306-251 B.C. Yin Hou was prime minister during the first years of the reign of King Hsiao Chen of Chao, 265-246 B.C. In Book XV we find Hsüntze discussing military affairs with King Hsiao Chen of Chao. Thus we would be able to date Hsüntze's travels as occurring between 265 and 251 B.C., when he was about 55 to 60 years old. We must not forget, however, that it is quite possible that he made his journeys before coming to Ts'i, provided we accept Professor Hu's reading of the account in the *Historical Record*.

In Ts'u, Hsüntze was given office by Prince Ch'uin-shen as magistrate of Lan-ling. Sze-ma Ch'ien's *Historical Record* in its historical tables (年表) states that this occurred in 255 B.C. We know that in 255 B.C. Ts'u made conquests in the state of Lu, in whose territory this town lay. We also know that Prince Ch'uin-shen was ennobled by King K'ao-lieh of Ts'u who reigned 262-238 B.C. These facts corroborate the statement in the *Historical Record*. At that time Hsüntze would have been 65 years old, not too old for a hale and hearty man. No one but a man who in his own person resisted the decaying effects of time could have written as he did about old age. (Cf. *W.H.*, xviii, 9 f.)

We may probably throw out Liu Hsiang's account of Hsüntze's being slandered and dismissed twice, the second time in Ts'u, and his leaving Lan-ling only to be recalled on the basis of a theoretical argument that the possession of a Worthy raises a state to lordship over the empire. Prince Ch'uin-shen was too much a man of the world for such an argument to appeal to him; he would have seen that the correct conclusion was that he should resign and Hsüntze should become prime minister in his stead! If Hsüntze had been dismissed and recalled, he would probably have found his former place occupied, and have been appointed to another post. This story looks too much like an attempt to magnify Hsüntze to deserve the name of history.

For 18 years Hsüntze continued in office, and upon the assassination of Prince Ch'uin-shen in 237 B.C. he suffered in the change of administration. He would be then about 83 years old, and consequently it was natural for him to retire in the city where he had lived so long and where he

was honoured. When he died we do not know, possibly it was around 235 B.C.

The dates of Mencius' life according to Legge (who is followed by most other scholars) were 371-289 B.C., and so he lived to an age of 84 years—consequently Hsüntze's life was not too long for those days. Hsüntze was thus a younger contemporary of Mencius.

Hsüntze was born about the same year that Aristotle died; the golden age of China lasted longer than that of Greece.

CHAPTER III

THE WRITINGS OF HSÜNTZE

Hsüntze's personal disciples were few,¹ nothing like the Disciples. crowds that surrounded Confucius and Mencius. Possibly philosophy had gone out of popularity; possibly he lacked the attractive personality of those two reformers: the philosophic logical temperament is rarely combined with popular persuasiveness. Philosophy did not seem so necessary in his time as in former days; in his time position was gained through persuasiveness and cleverness, rather than through solid knowledge; the new, not the old, was sought for.

Consequently Hsüntze was forced to adopt the alternative Writing. of transmitting his teachings by writing them down, rather than by training disciples. This process was congenial to his logical mind, and we find him insisting upon the necessity of following one subject of discourse through a thousand turnings.² Consequently we can get a better grasp of the Confucian teaching by reading Hsüntze than any other ancient writer.

It is interesting to compare the three great Confucians, Confucius, Mencius, and Hsüntze in respect of their writings. Confucius never wrote any account of his teachings. The only account of his philosophy that we have is a series of brief sayings written down by his disciples, the *Analecta*. He himself composed only a history of his native state, Lu, but it is

Literary
Character—
Confucius.

¹ Cf. W.H., "The Gloss," 24.

² W.H., xxiii, 2.

dry, terse, even wooden. Later generations admired it extravagantly for its subtleties, for the way in which he expressed a judgment upon a prince by leaving off a honorific.¹ The only piece of connected discourse we find in Confucius' writings is some of the speeches in the *Book of History*, which was edited by him. Even that is broken up and discrete. The aim seems to have been to give a suggestion of what should be said, rather than to state it in its fulness.

Mencius.

When we come to Mencius, we find discourse that is still scattered. The book that is known by his name may have been composed by Mencius himself; such is the tradition: though more probably it was composed by his disciples under his supervision. Its character emphasizes the fact that written connected discourse had not yet been mastered. The substance of Mencius' writings is conversation, but it is broken up; it is an "incoherent account of anecdotes and a series of dialogues, reproducing the sage's remarks on all possible details of individual, family, and official life".²

Hsüntze.

In Hsüntze's writings all this is changed. Instead of this discrete scattered utterance, we find continuous development of a theme through a whole chapter, with long involved sentences; or short essays on a given subject. We find a topic broken up into sub-heads, and each sub-head developed in order—we find a master of the essentials of composition. While there may not be the vividness of illustration and brilliance of exposition found in Mencius, yet there is a cogency of argument, a closeness of reasoning, and an analytic power which shows a mind of the first order.

¹ Cf. W.H., ix, 16, and notes, where Hsüntze makes use of this method, also p. 204 f. of this work. ² Hirth, *Ancient History of China*, p. 202.

The reason for the difference and development in style in contrast to that of his two great predecessors is found in the fact that connected written composition had been developed by the non-Confucian writers, particularly Micius. He had been forced to fight his way against the attacks of the Confucians, and so had developed this powerful instrument; Hsuntze, learned in all the literature of his day, adopted it as his own, and made it part of the Confucian tradition. Orthodox China owes the connected composition to Hsuntze.

Hsuntze's interests were as wide as the literature of the day. He did not escape the narrowness of the orthodox Confucian tradition—science, mathematics, and the handicrafts did not interest him. His business, as a ruler, was to be "expert in the principles of life, not expert in things".¹ But within that field he was interested in everything. Theory of government, psychology, accurate definition of words, education, a host of practical problems in the field of government, such as free trade, taxation, agriculture, sericulture, preservation of natural resources, closed seasons for fishing, forestry—with all these he concerned himself in addition to the usual philosophical subjects. His world grasp was as wide as possible in those days; he speaks of the products of the countries bordering on the four seas which were supposed to bound the continent in the four directions, and wants these products to come to China.² He speaks of the different aboriginal tribes on the frontiers of China.³ He had studied the teachings of all the different philosophers, and dealt with their teachings. In all probability he was the most learned man of his time.

¹ *CL W.H.*, xxi, 9.

² *W.H.*, ix, 10.

³ *W.H.*, xviii, 7.

His Style.

His style is difficult for a foreigner to judge. Much of his work is in poetic form, with lines of four and five characters and rhyme. No attempt to indicate this poetic character has been made in the translation. This kind of composition is found in the classics and Lao-tze, and has been common from his time down to the present. The balanced structure characteristic of Hebrew poetry is very common in Hsüntze, one half of a sentence repeating in other words the meaning of the first half. Such a structure aids the translator very materially in discovering the meaning of difficult passages. Often this parallel structure is carried much farther than individual sentences, and becomes a repetitiousness that repeats most of one sentence in order to emphasize a new element in the next sentence. A term often becomes a formula. Hsüntze often proceeds by defining a number of terms and making them formulae for a further synthesis.¹ In the main he is terse and sententious, quotable and quoted.

Difficulty.

The difficulty of his writings varies considerably. In some, for instance Book XXIII, where he seems to wish to make his exposition plain to everyone, he is quite simple; but in other books he is very difficult. The Chinese written language, because of its lack of exact expressions for the relational categories, particularly for tenses and modes, and the absence of a certain differentiation between the active and passive voice, is well suited for terse and effective literary expression, but ill-suited for exact philosophical and logical discourses. Indeed, some have gone so far as to say that the Chinese written language could not be used for those purposes. Hsüntze, however, is logical and makes fine distinctions. He

¹ The first four pages of Book XVII are a good example.

makes the language do his bidding. It is another mark of his genius, but it makes some of his passages very difficult to understand.¹

Just in what form he left the text we do not know. The headings given to some sections, such as those in Book IX, we know to be original, because he quotes one of them in another book.² In all probability many or most of the titles to the books are also original, for we find most of the books are unified compositions. There have been also many additions and interpolations in the text; a writer of such prominence as Hsüntze could not escape such forgeries. Only passages that seemed to be genuine have been translated, but it is never possible to be quite sure, and every translator of an ancient writing invariably finds that he must be dogmatic. Not quite all of his genuine writings are translated; some, particularly his arguments on political subjects, did not seem sufficiently interesting to be worth translating.

About two hundred years after the death of Hsüntze, in the general revival of literature and philosophy in the Han period, Liu Hsiang,³ by imperial command, undertook to fix the text of Hsüntze's works. Between the time of Hsüntze and that of Liu Hsiang great changes had taken place in calligraphy. The hair pencil had been invented, although paper was not yet known. The scripts known as the Lesser Seal, the Li Shu, and the Grass Character had been invented. Consequently it was necessary to rewrite ancient texts to make them legible. Liu Hsiang did not find any complete

¹ Particularly Books XXI and XXII.

² Cf. *W.H.*, xi, 2, and note.

³ Lived 80-9 a.c. He was one of the prominent scholars of the time. See note 2, p. 28.

editions of Hsüntze's works¹; he had them in the form of sections or books. When written on bamboo strips, the ancient writing material, one book was all that could be handled at one time. It is noteworthy that he had enough to make more than ten complete sets of Hsüntze's works, so that he had ample material to establish a correct text. Evidently Hsüntze's writings had not suffered in the "Burning of the Books" by the First Emperor. Liu Hsiang collated this material, fixed thirty-two books, the present number, and published them with a preface under the title, *A New Edition of Hsün Ch'ing's Works*. During the Han dynasty, Hsüntze exercised a profound influence on philosophic thought, and his teachings became absorbed, in large measure, into the orthodox stream of Confucian thought.

Yang Liang. The text apparently remained in this condition until the time of the next great revival of learning, which came in the T'ang dynasty. That period searched into antiquity, and an official of the period set about preparing a commentary. A commentary on Mencius had already been published, and consequently he was widely read and appreciated, but Hsüntze's writings "contained doublets, were torn, tattered, with parts missing, and showed mistakes from inaccurate copying",² so that even those who wished to study Hsüntze found him unattractive and difficult and desisted from their study. This, the first commentary, with a slight rearrangement of the text, was published in A.D. 818. Its author was Yang Liang, of whom we know nothing except that he wrote this commentary. It was a very good commentary indeed, and is the foundation of all subsequent

¹ Cf. note 4, p. 28.

² Quoted from Yang Liang's preface.

comment, even being quoted in the K'ang-hsi Dictionary. The publication of that commentary¹ marks an epoch in the

¹ This commentary covers all but two books of Hsüntze's works (which may have been lost in Yang Liang's copy; cf. *W.H.*, xx, 1, note 1). The order of books then established, which is that of all editions since, is as follows:

Vol.	I.	Book	I.	An Encouragement to Study.
		"	II.	Self-cultivation.
"	II.	"	III.	On Not Being Careless.
		"	IV.	On Honour and Shame.
"	III.	"	V.	Against Physiognomy.
		"	VI.	Against the Twelve Philosophers.
		"	VII.	The Confucians.
"	IV.	"	VIII.	The Model Confucian.
"	V.	"	IX.	Kingly Government.
"	VI.	"	X.	A Rich Country.
"	VII.	"	XI.	Kings and Lords Protector.
"	VIII.	"	XII.	The Way of the Prince.
"	IX.	"	XIII.	The Way of the Minister.
		"	XIV.	Obtaining Good Officials.
"	X.	"	XV.	A Debate on Military Affairs.
"	XI.	"	XVI.	A Strong Country.
		"	XVII.	Concerning Heaven.
"	XII.	"	XVIII.	On the Correction of Errors.
"	XIII.	"	XIX.	On the Rules of Proper Conduct.
"	XIV.	"	XX.	On Music.
"	XV.	"	XXI.	The Removal of Prejudices.
"	XVI.	"	XXII.	On the Rectification of Terms.
"	XVII.	"	XXIII.	The Nature of Man is Evil.
		"	XXIV.	The Emperor.
"	XVIII.	"	XXV.	The Perfect Prime Minister.
		"	XXVI.	Poems. (Four riddles on the subjects: Lé, Wisdom, Clouds, and the Silk- worm.)
"	XIX.	"	XXVII.	Scattered Sayings. (Probably col- lected by Hsüntze's disciples.)
"	XX.	"	XXVIII.	Placed at the Right. (A hypothetical dialogue of Confucius.)
		"	XXIX.	The Master's Doctrine. (Supposed sayings of Confucius.)

understanding of Hsüntze. It was at this period that Han Yü praised Hsüntze.¹

Other Com-
mentators.

But the difficulties in Hsüntze were too many for any single commentator to solve all of them, and succeeding generations of scholars have done their best to clear up the many difficulties in the text. Especially in the Manchu period some of the greatest scholars of the day published elucidations or commentaries on Hsüntze, culminating in the work of Wang Hsien-ch'ien, who in 1891 published a fine edition of Hsüntze in which he sums up all the work of his predecessors in elucidating the text of Hsüntze, together with his additions, the edition which has been the basis of this translation.² In textual criticism the work is so well done that there is nothing to be desired, but in literary criticism hardly a beginning is made.

- Vol. XX Book XXX. Following the Rule. (Supposed sayings of Tzengtze and Confucius.)
 „ XXXI. Duke Ai. (A conversation with Confucius.)
 „ XXXII. Yao Asked. (It begins with a conversation between Yao and Shun.)

It is seen that the arrangement of the books is modelled after that of the Analects in that the titles of the first and last books are the same as those in the Analects. In general the material in the first nineteen volumes is mostly genuine, though there are interpolations; the material in the last volume is mostly spurious.

¹ Cf. the Preface.

² 荀子集解. A photographic reprint is published by the Commercial Press, Shanghai. The first edition may still be purchased in the city where it was published, Chungsha, Hunan. The Commercial Press also publishes a photographic reprint of a beautifully written edition of Hsüntze's works, printed in A.D. 1181, which is a copy of a preceding edition of A.D. 1068. But for purposes of textual criticism the edition of Wang Hsien-ch'ien, which collates this Sung dynasty edition with others, is preferable.

In Japanese there is a commentary by a Japanese scholar, Chiu Pao-ai,¹ and there is an edition giving both the comments in Wang Hsien-ch'ien's and Chiu Pao-ai's editions in volume fifteen of *The Great Schools of Chinese Literature*.² There is also a translation into the Japanese script and other works. But there has been no translation into any other language with the exception of only a few books.³

¹ Entitled 荀子增注

² Entitled 漢文大系, and published in Tokyo.

³ The only other translations which I have been able to find are as follows:—

Legge, *Chinese Classics*, vol. ii, contains a translation of one book of Hsüntze (spelled Seun) in ch. ii, app. i, "That the Nature is evil."

Evan Morgan, *Week's Styles and Chinese Ideals*, contains a free rendering of three books of Hsüntze (spelled Hsün Ch'ing), but without any account of his importance or significance. To him I am indebted for many an apt rendering in my translation of those three books.

J. J. L. Duyvendak gives a translation of the very difficult Book XXIII in the *T'oung Pao*, xxiij, pp. 221-54 with which I have also compared my translation. I have to thank Dr. B. Lanter of the Field Museum, for calling my attention to this article.

L. Wiegner's summary of Hsüntze's teaching in his *Histoire des croyances religieuses et des opinions philosophiques en Chine* contains quotations. It is the fullest exposition of Hsüntze outside of mine, but is very prejudiced and misleading.

O. Franke, makes quotations from part of Book XXIII in the *T'oung Pao*, série II, vol. vii, pp. 320-31.

CHAPTER IV

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS

The philosophy of Hsüntze is founded on two fundamental conceptions, a certain conception of human nature, and a particular interpretation of history. We shall consider the conception of human nature first.

Sociality.

Hsüntze analyzed the difference between animals and man and reached a different conclusion from that current in Western philosophy.

"Water and fire have essences, but not life; herbs and trees have life, but no knowledge; birds and beasts have knowledge, but no sense of what are rights (*Yi*). Man has an essence, life, knowledge, and in addition has a sense of human rights (*Yi*); hence he is the highest being on earth. His strength is not equal to that of the bull; his running is not equal to that of the horse; yet the bull and horse are used by him. How is that? Men are able to form social organizations; the former are not able to form social organizations."¹

Hence the essential element in human nature is the power of forming social organizations or sociality. To us, dominated by the conception, current in Western thought since the Greeks, that rationality is what separates animals from human beings, Hsüntze's conception seems alien and one-sided. Animals also form social organizations. How much Hsüntze knew about the habits of gregarious animals and insects,

¹ *W.H.*, ix, 11; cf. the whole paragraph.

such as wild cattle or bees, we do not know; living the artificial life of a city magistrate in the heart of a highly civilized country it is doubtful if he knew much natural history at first hand. The Confucian philosopher did not seek to do any observing of nature at first hand, any more than did the early mediaeval thinkers of Europe. He was too much obsessed with the ideal expressed by Laotze, "to sit in one's chamber and see the four seas," i.e., of extracting philosophy from a conceptual interpretation of the world and of human nature. Science did not exist in Hsüntze's day; there was no such strong scientific current in Chinese thought such as permeated the thought of the Greeks.

Yet perhaps Hsüntze did not go far astray in locating the essence of man in his sociality. After all there is no hard and fast distinction between animals and men. Animals do find their way out of difficulties, sometimes by a process that suggests very strongly the reasoning process. They do have knowledge, as Hsüntze asserts. And the moral judgment is such an uncommon event in human life, so overlaid by habitual and customary action, so infrequent, that it is difficult to make it the fundamental characteristic of humanity. Indeed, the most striking characteristic of human life is just what Hsüntze says—the forming of social organizations for the sake of living. Language, government, institutions, ethics, all arise out of social phenomena, and are modified by them. Houses, the control of nature, the amenities of life, all depend on social co-operation. Looked at from the point of view of a practical man of affairs, sociality is indeed one of the fundamental aspects of human life, and as good a distinction as any other, if not a better one.

This point of view naturally suggests the dictum of Aristotle that man is a political animal. In many respects this thought of these two great thinkers was the same. In the beginning Aristotle designated the whole of practical philosophy as Politics, and divided that into the two sciences of Ethics and Politics (now taken in the narrow sense). But in the orientation of their thought these two thinkers were different. For Hsüntze did not have the universal interest that distinguished the Stagirite. Hsüntze was first of all a practical man, not a theoretical philosopher, and he was seeking to formulate what was necessary for life. Confucianism did not have the Greek ideal of perfection, either in art or in thought, and Hsüntze's thought misses the conceptual completion that characterizes Aristotle's philosophy. His is rather a practical philosophy, and is only formulated with a sufficient completeness to meet the needs of life and thought of his day. The difference between the two is that between a magistrate and a professional philosopher, and this difference indicates the difference of orientation of the philosophies of Confucianism and of Greece.

The dictum that sociality is most characteristic of man is indeed characteristic of Chinese life. The Chinese, perhaps better than any other great ancient race, worked out the technique of living together in peace. While they did not solve the problem of a stable political organization, yet their social organization has been singularly stable and successful. To-day they present the spectacle of a great nation torn by internecine warfare, and yet calmly carrying on the activities of business, education, literature, and agriculture, almost undisturbed and undivided by political dissensions

and wars. It is their social organization, expressed in the family, clan, and local government that has enabled them to survive as a nation in spite of repeated conquest and division.

This attitude towards human nature and life indicates the point of orientation of Hsüntze's philosophy. It is pre-eminently a practical philosophy. From this view-point, theoretical problems, such as epistemology and metaphysics, are shoved into the background. Political philosophy becomes the culmination and goal of philosophy, to which all else must be subservient. The ethical problem becomes a social problem, of adjustment to others, in which class rights and class divisions, rules of proper conduct, become the guiding elements.

Most important of all, it leads to a dynamic view of human nature. "The presence or absence of desire is one of the elements of human nature."¹ "The capacity for desires is received from Nature."² Now there are two elements in desire as a fundamental human capacity; there is desire in the sense of an impulse to seek for certain *objects*,³ and there is desire in the sense of a *seeking* or a purpose. It is of the purposive direction of life that Hsüntze is thinking when he said, "The emotional nature is the essence of human nature."⁴

Hsüntze's ethics bears out this emphasis, it is the ethics of human beings who are acting, willing, purposing, desiring, hating, and not a realm of eternal, unearthly moral judgments.

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 11. This emphasis on desire is not due to Buddhist influence, which did not enter China until later, but is part of the legacy of Lao-tse to Chinese philosophy.

² *W.H.*, xxi, 12.

³ Dealt with especially in *Ch.* XI.

⁴ *W.H.*, xxi, 12.

Unprejudiced by the classical Greek conception of Nature or the realm of Ideas as something eternal, immutable, above man, to which man should conform, Hsüntze was free to see man as he actually is, to deal with human nature as a living, acting entity. In this respect Hsüntze is very modern, and has anticipated the fundamental thesis of the instrumentalist epistemology.

In contrast to this theory we may place that of Plato that plants have appetites; animals have will in addition to appetite; and men have, besides these two functions, the rational principle. This is the source whence proceeded the sharp division of human nature into reason and emotion, which is expressed so clearly in Spinoza's eternal world of mathematically demonstrable principles, while in the world of appearances, emotion brings confusion and unclearness. In Hsüntze there is no such thing as a purely cognitive relation; such a world as that of much of Western thought is entirely foreign to him. Nor does the divorce of speculative and practical philosophy, of metaphysics and ethics, exist for him or for Confucian thought. Moral concepts are *ipso facto* metaphysical concepts, and vice versa. We find Hsüntze raising *Li*, which in human life is the rules of proper conduct, an ethical concept, to the status of a metaphysical concept. "*Li* is that whereby Heaven and Earth unite, . . . whereby the stars move in their courses, . . . whereby all things prosper, whereby love and hatred are tempered."¹ This fact is also illustrated in the connotation of the word *Min*,² which means both "wise" and "virtuous". It was this

¹ W.H., xix, 7.

² 明

same *motif* that was behind Mencius' emphatic rejection of Kao-tze's theory that human nature was morally indifferent, like water in a whirlpool, which went neither up nor down, but round and round.¹ To the Confucians, human nature, as a metaphysical concept, had to possess ethical qualities, and must be either good or bad, never indifferent. The same thing is true of the philosophy of the Sung school and of Chu Hsi; moral concepts are also cosmological concepts. The Confucian did not dichotomize human nature, neither did he dichotomize his philosophy.

Hsüntze also says that one of the fundamental characteristics of man is that he "makes distinctions". "When he is hungry he desires to eat; when he is cold he desires to be warm; when he is tired he desires to rest; he likes what is helpful and dislikes what is injurious." These ways of acting are innate and universal. "The yellow-haired ape also has two feet and no feathers; but in contrast the superior man sips his soup and carves his slices of meat. . . . The birds and beasts have fathers and sons, but not the affection between father and son; they are female and male, but they do not have the proper separation between males and females."² The point of this statement is shown in the last sentence. What Hsüntze means by "making distinctions" includes cognitive distinctions, such as between white and black, but what he wants to emphasize are the ethical distinctions between superior and inferior, father and son; it is these distinctions which issue in proper conduct and which make social intercourse and society possible. Making distinctions is one of the elements of sociality. What it means we shall

Making Distinctions.

¹ Mencius, VI, 7, i, ii.

² W. H., v, 5.

see more clearly when we come to discuss the concept of *Li*, or the rules of proper conduct.¹

History.

The other fundamental element in Hsüntze's philosophy was his interpretation of history. This interpretation was not original with him, but was inherited from all his predecessors and from the Classics. Up to that time there had been only three dynasties in Chinese history; each had begun with a wise and virtuous ruler; the dynasty had gradually degenerated and culminated in a tyrant emperor who was the incarnation of everything evil; whereupon a feudal noble, distinguished for his virtue and benevolent rule, had gathered the righteous forces of the empire, and had overthrown this tyrant almost without a battle, for people's hearts were already turned away from the tyrant and towards this virtuous noble; thus a new dynasty was established, not by force, but by the lack of virtue of the existing dynasty and the existence of great virtue in the new monarch. This theory was for Hsüntze not an interpretation of history, but a fact of history, established by historical evidence and contained in the records themselves. It had been accepted by Confucius, Mencius, Micius, and all Confucians. Chuangtze and his school attacked it, and we find in Hsüntze answers to their attacks.² The truth is that probably neither King Wu nor T'ang were as good and virtuous as they were made out to be,³

¹ See Ch. VIII.

² *W.H.*, xviii, 2-12.

³ In fact, we find it stated by historians that after Chou had committed suicide, King Wu shot arrows into his dead body, and descended from his chariot to cut off Chou's head.

nor were Chi¹ or Chou² as bad as they were made out to be. We find hints that instead of Chou's army turning on itself and running away, there was a stubborn resistance and seas of blood were shed,³ and that at first the Chou dynasty was none too secure in its position.⁴ This theory of the wickedness of the preceding dynasty was a natural statement for any conquering prince to make; the Assyrian kings who most excelled in massacre and plunder descanted on the wickedness of those who presumed to oppose them, and vaunted their own righteousness. Thus there are indications enough to make men like Chuangtze sceptical. But when a theory such as this one that the Chou dynasty conquered because of its virtue and of the vice of the preceding dynasty was once believed, it was natural to extend this theory to the first monarch of the preceding dynasties, and thus we get the Confucian interpretation of history.

But historical criticism did not exist for Hsüntze; and the fact of desolating power for such a theory, the conquest of the empire, not by virtue, but by sheer force, in the person

¹ Who may be a mythical character modelled after the figure of Chou.

² Who was probably villified by the Chou conquerors in order to make their position secure.

³ *Book of History*, V, iii, 9, "Blood flowed till it floated the pestles about." So much blood could hardly result from an army turning on itself; it probably remains from another account of a great battle between the two forces. With this would correspond the account of the size of Chou's army, etc.

⁴ The Viscount of Chi would not serve under the new dynasty, although the present account is that he had been mistreated and imprisoned by Chou; instead he fled to Corea and was only won over to the new dynasty by presents and a shew. At the illness of King Wu, his brother, the Duke of Chou, offered to sacrifice his life for that of the King because of the danger to the dynasty if King Wu should die leaving only a minor heir.

of Ts'in Shih Hwangti, was to come after Hsüntze's death. That conquest proved the fallacy of the theory that vice is necessarily defeated and virtue necessarily conquers in the contest for the emperor's throne. In Hsüntze's time this fact had not yet displaced the ideal, and he could accept an easy optimism on the victory of good over evil as a law of history. The universe was righteous in its very constitution, and needed no God or spiritual beings to insure the supremacy of good over evil. The ultimate conquest of good was not a faith, but a fact. Even after the victory of force in the person of Ts'in Shih Hwangti showed that this theory was not necessarily true, the Confucians continued to believe it on the authority of their great teachers and of the Classics. Such is human nature.

Yet Hsüntze was not so blind as not to see that the facts were not as simple as the theory, and we find in him suggestions of a discussion of the problem of evil.¹ Nevertheless this theory of history remained one of the foundation stones of his philosophy. It is sufficient rebuttal to the statement that Hsüntze was a pessimist to point out that he wholeheartedly accepted so optimistic a doctrine as this one. Optimism seems innate in human nature, and we find similar interpretations of history in other ancient nations, as for example, in the *Books of Chronicles*. The fact that Hsüntze accepted this view of history does not detract from his greatness. Had he not held such a view, he would probably have created one, for idealism is the source of moral power. The acceptance of this world-view redeems him from the charge of materialism.

¹ Cf. Ch. XVI.

CHAPTER V

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY AND SUPERSTITION

We have seen that the predominant characteristic of Hsüntze's philosophy is that it is practical rather than theoretical, that he was interested in man as part of a social order rather than in cosmological speculations. This characteristic comes to fruition in Hsüntze's rejection of all speculation that has no practical purpose in human life. ^{Rejection of Speculation.} "Although the Way of Heaven be deep, this man will not reflect on it; although it be great, he will not use his ability for its investigation; although it be mysterious, he will not scrutinize it—this is what is meant by refraining from contesting with Heaven."¹ "Only the Sage does not seek to know Heaven."² Still more emphatic was his reaction against the epistemological speculations of the Neo-Micians and others. "If any affair is beneficial to the right, then establish it; but if it is of no benefit to the right, do away with it. This is what is meant by doing things properly. If any teaching is of benefit to the right, carry it out; if it is of no benefit to the right, reject it. This is what is meant by dealing rightly with teachings. . . . But as for making realities and unrealities interchange places, separations of whiteness and hardness, likenesses and unlikenesses—a cultivated ear cannot hear such things; a cultivated eye cannot see such

¹ *W.H.*, xvii, 13.

² *Ibid.*

things ; a scholar practised in dialectic cannot speak of such things : although he had the wisdom of a Sage, he would not be able to explain them briefly. Ignorance of them will not injure a superior man ; knowing them will not prevent anyone from becoming a small-minded man. Ignorance of them will not prevent a workman or artisan from being skilled ; ignorance of them will not prevent a superior man from ruling well. If a king or duke prize them, it will confuse the laws ; if the people prize them, it will confuse their business."¹ Speculation is wasting time ; it is giving up that which is most characteristic of man—his social organization and social life, in seeking to know that which is not in his power. Thus Hsüntze rejects speculative philosophy for moral and political philosophy.

In so far he is expressing a fundamental trait of the Chinese. They are pre-eminently a practical people. Not that there is no speculative tendency in their nature ; quite the contrary is the fact. All of the major problems of philosophy, speculative as well as practical, emerged in ancient Chinese thought. Chuangtze raised the problem of appearance and reality, doubting whether he was the butterfly he dreamed he was when asleep or the man he found himself to be when awake. Micius and the Neo-Micians raised the problems of logic, inductive and deductive, and the problem of knowledge. But the Confucian school rejected these problems as idle speculations, as confusion of words, as unpractical. Their attitude was similar to that of Socrates, who restricted philosophy to moral philosophy. Such is the common attitude of the man in the street. If one contrasts with that the

¹ F.F., viii, 7.

philosophy of India, speculative and theoretical to the last degree, one can get something of an index of the difference between the practical common-sense Chinese, who emphasize history, and the theoretical religious Hindu, who utterly neglected the recording of the earthly events of even his most holy men.

This rejection of speculation involved the rejection of belief in any spirits or non-human agencies. Such agencies would be essentially uncontrollable by men, and what Hsüntze sought was that men should work to develop the infinite capacities that lay in human nature instead of relying upon any higher power. "How can wishing that things may come to pass be as good as taking what one has and bringing things to pass? Therefore if a person neglects what man can do and seeks for what Heaven does, he fails to understand the nature of things."¹ This is essentially the position of Positivism, not in the sense that everything is derived from sense-data, but in the rejection of metaphysical speculation. In many ways Hsüntze's attitude is nearer that of Socrates in his concentration upon practical philosophical problems.

But there were a number of obstacles to a Confucian taking that position. The ancient religion of China was an animism with belief in hosts of spirits, especially the service and worship of the spirits of the dead. There was divination, prayer for rain, the *Book of Changes*, now one of the Five Classics, which is itself a system of divination, and there was the doctrine of fate. But above all there was the belief in Heaven, which had become, especially to some of the more

¹ *H.F.*, xvii, 18.

thoughtful Confucianists, a belief in an over-ruling Providence who was personalized into almost the figure of the God of a monotheistic religion. If Hsüntze was to remain a Confucianist, within the orthodox field, he must accept these, for they were all to be found in the Classics, the Bible of Confucianism. Yet they were all inconsistent with a positivistic position. Hence Hsüntze set about to reinterpret them.

Heaven.

The two greatest metaphysical concepts of ancient Confucianism were Heaven and Tao. In the two oldest Classics, the *Odes* and the *History*, Heaven is often personalized into an anthropomorphic Deity to whom men prayed, and to whom appeal was made to avert calamities, bring prosperity, etc. Sometimes Heaven is capricious as are other gods, more often Heaven is thought of as morally just and invariable. The emperor was first of all the Son of Heaven, and as *Pontifex Maximus* had the sole right to worship Heaven, the supreme power in heaven, as he himself was the supreme power on earth. However, the term Heaven by no means had this meaning exclusively. Heaven originally referred to the visible firmament, and the conception of Heaven as a Deity was a development of the original nature worship of the Chinese. By extension the term Heaven came to refer to one of the two great powers of nature, Heaven and Earth. Heaven referred particularly to astronomical and weather phenomena. Heaven and Earth interacted to produce the Ten-thousand-Things.¹ Heaven had these two connotations in ancient Chinese thought.

With Confucius, Heaven has still the connotation of an over-ruling Providence; and Confucius relied upon Heaven for protection.² But he refused to attribute any efficacy

¹ Cf. W. H. "A Sketch of Chinese History".

² *Analekts*, IX, v.

to prayer,¹ and in general his attitude is expressed in the famous saying, "Respect spiritual beings, but keep aloof from them."² He put the emphasis upon human conduct rather than upon worship of spiritual beings. Mencius took a similar attitude. Confucius did not deny the existence of Heaven as a personalized Deity, but in his practical attitude, he was taking the first step towards depersonalizing Heaven.

This emphasis upon man rather than upon Heaven comes to more explicitness in writing of one of Confucius' disciples, the *Doctrine of the Mean*. There in the midst of an exaltation of sincerity as the greatest virtue, comes the assertion that man can form a triad with Heaven and Earth through sincerity.³ This implies not only an exaltation of man, but a lowering of the conception of Heaven and Earth.

Thus the trend was towards an impersonal conception of Heaven or God as Law. This attitude had already been taken by Laotze, the older contemporary of Confucius, in the *Tao Teh Ching*, the only unorthodox writing which has exercised great influence in Confucian circles. Laotze equated Heaven with *Tao*, and made Heaven the impersonal, ineffable Law or *Tao*.

The concept *Tao*⁴ originally meant "road" or "path". *Tao*. But it came to be used metaphorically as the way or course of life and conduct, and hence could refer to evil as well as good ways of conduct. More often it is *the Way*, meaning the right Way, and so came to have the meaning of virtue or virtuous conduct. As virtuous conduct is expressed in the Confucian teaching, it came to denote the Confucian

¹ *Analects*, VII, xxxiv.

² *Doctrine of the Mean*, XXII, xxvi, 5.

³ *Analects*, VI, xi.

⁴ 道

doctrine. It not only had an ethical meaning, but as all other Chinese philosophical concepts, a metaphysical meaning as well. It meant the Way of Heaven, the Way Heaven follows and the Way it approves, natural and moral law. In addition this word is used as a verb meaning "to conduct by their proper courses", and "to speak". In the translation I have tried to indicate the varying connotation of this word by varying translations, indicating the continuity by using the Chinese transliteration, (*Tao*), thus enabling the reader to discover for himself the chameleon-like connotation of this term.

Hsüntze completes the process of depersonalizing Heaven by taking over Lao-tze's conception of *Tao* as universal Law, and making Law the meaning of the Confucian concept of Heaven. Of the influence of Lao-tze upon Hsüntze we have other indications too, particularly in the book "Concerning Heaven". These are indicated in the notes *ad locum*.

Heaven, according to Hsüntze, is unvarying Law. Nature undergoes her changes, vegetation grows and bears fruit; these are said to be the acts of spirits, but in reality they are merely the operation of visible Law.¹ There is no spiritual principle in the universe. "If the right Way of life (*Tao*) is cultivated and not opposed, then Heaven cannot send misfortune; flood and drought cannot cause a famine; extreme cold or heat cannot cause suffering; supernatural powers cannot cause calamity." But if man neglects his duty and "rebels against the right Way of life (*Tao*), and acts unseemly, then Heaven cannot make him fortunate".² Thus Heaven comes to mean very nearly the same as

¹ *W.H.*, xvii, 13.

² *W.H.*, xvii, 12.

our popular concept of Nature. In this phase of his philosophy, Hsüntze has affinities with the New England Transcendentalists.

Of course, this is metaphysics, but it is not metaphysics for its own sake: Hsüntze only enters into this problem because he finds it necessary to do so in order to clear the way for that in which he is fundamentally interested.

When the influence of spiritual agencies upon human life is thus eliminated, man is cast upon his own resources, and the necessity is evident of every man devoting his full attention to self-culture in order to bring about moral and physical advances. If there is a spiritual power in Heaven, then men will depend on Heaven and neglect their own duties; hence Hsüntze feels it is a great advantage to do without belief in a God. He eliminated God to make room for man's accomplishment. As Heaven was interpreted to mean impersonal Law, so Tao is interpreted to mean human virtuous conduct. "The Way (*Tao*) is not (primarily) the Way (*Tao*) of Heaven; it is not the Way (*Tao*) of Earth: it is the way (*Tao*) man acts, the way the superior man acts."¹ Thus Heaven and *Tao* are both interpreted in human terms, and the responsibility for everything that had been placed upon Heaven is now located upon the shoulders of men. Prosperity and misfortune come from man's own actions²; good and bad government are the results of human conduct; fame and progress come from one's own efforts, and are not

Self-dependence.

¹ *W.H.*, viii, 8.

² Echoed in Tao's Commentary on the *Spring and Autumn*. When asked about a fall of meteorites, it is said, "This is an act of the Yin and Yang, not the source of good or bad fortune. Good and bad fortune come from men." Duke Hsi, 16th year.

the gift of God. There is a naive optimism in such a doctrine as this, implying as it does, that virtue is always rewarded and evil always punished, but we must remember that for Hsüntze this moral characteristic of the Universal Law was a legitimate inference from the facts of history. How much he wavers in this belief we shall see in a later chapter, but he never loses it entirely. Law is moral Law, a force which makes for righteousness, in the sense that it rewards virtue and punishes vice according to its own nature. This doctrine redeems Hsüntze from the imputation of materialism.

Hsüntze has this conception of Heaven as Law in common with present day Confucianism, though the present doctrine is not due directly to his influence. Hsüntze was too profound for later scholars, and consequently he was largely neglected. So the Sung School and Chu Hsi had again to make the synthesis of Heaven and Law, under the influence of Lao-tze and of Hsüntze, and so Hsüntze had this doctrine in common with his greatest detractor.

Spirits.

Having disposed of any personal God, the way was clear to dispose of all other spiritual forces and superstitions. The religion of ancient China was a primitive animism which offered little scope for idealization. The belief in spirits was then as now the foundation of much superstition. Confucius was too full of reverence for the past to deny the reality of spirits, though he would not converse about them. He simply neglected them. Mencius only once mentions spirits, thus showing how far he had escaped from any superstitious belief in them. He says that the spirits of the land and grain are second in importance to the people.¹ On the

¹ *Menc.*, VII, II, xiv, 1. Cf. also p. 142 f.

other hand in the *Doctrine of the Mean* it says that the spirits, "like overflowing water, seem to be over the heads, and on the right and left of their worshippers."¹ Likewise Micius believed in the reality of spirits as an empirical fact, and taught that they assisted men in virtuous actions. Lao-tze's attitude to spirits is not clear, but he implies that it is not spirits which injure men, but men who injure each other.² Among these various tendencies, Confucianism represented the agnostic attitude towards spiritual beings. So we are not surprised when we find that Hsiintze categorically denied the existence of spirits and made fun of their worship. He was merely making a denial where Confucius was agnostic. He was the first Confucian thinker to deny the reality of spirits. He noted the fact of various illusions, and then said that if anyone thinks he saw a spirit or ghost, it is because his judgment was unclear, because he was suddenly startled or confused. "South of the mouth of the Hsia river there was a man called Chuan Shuh-liang. In disposition he was stupid and very fearful. When the moon was bright, he was walking in the dark. He bent down his head and saw his shadow, and thought it was a devil following him. He looked up and saw his hair and thought it was a standing ogre. He turned around and ran. When he got to his house he lost his breath and died. Wasn't that too bad?"³

Likewise he ridicules the worship of spirits. "When a person has been affected by dampness and has contracted rheumatism, and when the rheumatic beats the drum and

¹ D.M., VI, 3.

² Tao Teh Ching, Sect. 60. The only other reference to spirits is in sect. 39.

³ W.H., xxi, 14.

boils a suckling pig (for sacrifice), then there will necessarily result the waste coming from a worn-out drum and a lost pig, but he will not have the happiness of recovery from his sickness."¹

For two thousand years this ridicule of spirits has been part of Confucian literature. Who can say how great was its influence?

Prayer.

Likewise prayer is disposed of. Why pray for rain? It will rain anyway whether you pray or not. The falling of stars, curious sounds made by kitchen utensils, as when the kettle sings, eclipses of the sun or moon, unseasonable rain or wind, strange stars seen in groups, are all natural events, though rare. "We may marvel at them, but we should not fear them."² These are not ominous signs; it is only human ominous signs that matter; such as poor agricultural methods, evil government, and immorality. These are the ominous signs truly to be feared.³

Fortune-telling.

Hsüntze wrote a book especially to attack one form of fortune-telling, that by physiognomy. Fortune-telling has always been popular in China. These physiognomists probably professed to tell a person's past and future by his physical features, the shape of his head and body, his height and figure, or any physical peculiarity. Of course, a clever man can tell character to some degree from the features: Mencius said that a man's character may be told by the pupil of his eye.⁴ But these professors seem to have gone further than that, and some princes seem to have been making the physiognomy of a man the criterion as to whether he should be given office

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 14.

² *W.H.*, xvii, 17.

³ *W.H.*, xvii, 16.

⁴ *Menc.*, IV, I, xv.

or not. Confucius had protested against a man's ancestry being considered a bar against employment, saying that because an ox's dam was unfit for sacrifice, it did not prejudice him from being chosen, if he was free from blemish. Likewise Hsüntze protested against considering only a person's features, and not his scholarship and his purposes. He urged that this practise is a recent thing and that it did not exist in ancient times, so that a student to-day should not consider it. It is an appeal of the conservative prejudice against anything new—an argument quite valid in Confucian circles. But he backed it up by more empirical evidence. He gathered together, from his knowledge of history, every cripple, hunchback, or dwarf of note, and every notable who had any striking physical peculiarity, to show that figure has nothing to do with ability. He told of men who were extremely thin and long-faced, of those who were bald and those who were unusually hairy. Even Confucius was included in the list, but unfortunately the character that was used to describe him is not used elsewhere, and so we do not know its exact meaning. It is taken to mean either that Confucius was unusually hairy in his face, or that his face was like a "rumped square". As examples of men of fine build and athletic figure there are given Ch'ie and Chou, the two most detested tyrants of ancient times, and in a spirit of irony Hsüntze pictures the kind of men these physiognomists would choose, as being "clever fellows" with whom any silly girl would be glad to elope, but who will probably end their days in crime and be executed! Their trouble was narrow knowledge and low ideas. Then should a student consider a man's heart or his physiognomy? So drastically did Hsüntze

condemn superstition when it was not supported by the Classics.

Divination.

But divination was one of the recognized means of deciding matters of state. It is approved in the Classics, and was a regular method of determining all governmental matters. Belonging to the governmental class which held by the old, as Hsüntze did, he could not attack divination too severely. Had he attempted to abolish divination, he would have been declared unorthodox. While Confucius set no store by divination, yet the author of the *Doctrine of the Mean* believed in it as sincerely as in the existence of spirits.¹ As a government official, Hsüntze did not dare to antagonize the people by discontinuing its use. So he probably did as many others have done—continued to go through the forms, while recognizing their falsity. He declares that it is only glossing over the matter.² The people think it is supernatural, but the prince knows it is glossing over the matter. Such a semi-esoteric teaching—the people left in superstition, while the wise are freed from it—is inevitably the result when a philosophy or religion progresses, while not daring to change outwardly. It was present in the ancient Egyptian religion in a much more extreme form. Confucianism made no attempt to hide its teachings, but the illiteracy of the people and the difficult character of the written language effectually prevented the common people from knowing of these sceptical attacks on what they considered to be true. The fact that Hsüntze only mentions the matter of divination once seems to point to the fact that there was already considerable scepticism as to the value of divination in ancient

¹ D.M., XXIV, 1.

² W.E., xvii, 18.

China. In the *Book of History* itself we find the statement, "Divination, when fortunate, may not be repeated,"¹ which itself indicates a not wholly credulous attitude.

Connected with divination was the *Book of Changes*, which *The Book of Changes.* is fundamentally a system of divination, though now overlaid with moral and metaphysical teaching. It is now one of the Five Classics, and formed one of the foundations of the Sung school reconstruction of Confucian philosophy. But except for a single mention by Confucius, stating that he wished he had more years to give to the study of this Book,² there is absolutely no mention of it in literature prior to the third century B.C. In view of Confucius' generally agnostic attitude to spirits, and his refusal to discourse upon the supernatural, a good deal of suspicion may be thrown upon this single passage, as inconsistent with his general attitude. It may have been inserted later to validate the inclusion of the *Book of Changes* among the Classics. Confucius urged his disciples to study the *Odes*, the *History*, and the *Rites*,³ but never the *Book of Changes*. In all of his copious references and quotations from other literature, Mencius does not mention it at all. More striking is the fact that Hsüntze, who thrice mentions the Classics by name,⁴ and who was probably responsible for this canon, omits the *Book of Changes* entirely. The Five Classics according to him are the *Rites*, the *Music*, the *Odes*, the *History*, and the *Spring and Autumn*. The present canon is the same, except that the *Book of Music* is lost and in its place is put the *Book of Changes*. Our present

¹ *The Book of History*, II, 3, 18.

² *An.*, VII, xvii.

³ *An.*, VII, xvi.

⁴ *W.H.*, i, 8; iv, 12; viii, 13.

Book of Rites is a later composition than the time of Hsüntze,¹ so we are not sure just what composition is referred to by Hsüntze as the *Book of Rites*. It may have been the *I-Li*, or it may have been Book I of the present *Book of Rites*, since in one case where Mencius quotes from the *Book of Rites*, the quotation is found in Book I of our present collection.² Similarly we may guess that parts, at least, of the lost *Book of Music* are found in Book XVII of the present *Book of Rites*, which is entitled, *The Book (or Record) of Music*, since Hsüntze quotes from it.³ But the omission of reference to the *Book of Changes* is very strange. Either it was not considered worthy of being quoted, as a superstitious work, or it was a later fabrication. Possibly the loss of the *Book of Music* induced later scholars to include the *Book of Changes* as one of the Classics, on the basis of the reference in the *Analects*, to make up the full number of *five* Classics, or possibly the *Book of Music* was lost in order to substitute for it the *Book of Changes*, and the verse in the *Analects* inserted to justify that procedure.

Ancestor Worship.

A more difficult problem was presented by the worship of the spirits of ancestors. This was the original religion of China, and had a tremendous hold upon the people. But having already disproved the existence of all spirits, the way was open for the reinterpretation of these ceremonies. What that reinterpretation was, we shall see in Chapter VIII. This reinterpretation did not involve any denial of personal immortality, for that belief had not yet arisen in its

¹ Cf. the Preface.

² Menc., II. II, 3, found in *Lü-Ki*, I, 1, iii, (3), 14.

³ Cf. *W.H.*, Book XX, and notes thereupon.

full force. The survival of the spirit or spirits of the dead was conceived as a vague shadowy existence, more after the fashion of the Hebrew Sheol or the Greek Hades than the Christian Heaven, and so there was probably little desire or demand for continued existence after death.

There is one other concept which might refer to a spiritual Destiny. power in the universe, that of "Ming",¹ translated, Heaven's Decree, or Destiny, or Fate. This concept might be interpreted fatalistically; we find statements that Ch'ie and Chou relied upon the Decree of Heaven as having given the rule of the empire to their house, and hence no change of dynasty was possible. But in classical Confucianism there is no fatalistic conception of Destiny. Confucius rarely spoke of Destiny,² and Mencius interpreted Destiny as depending upon human action. "He who has a true idea of Destiny will not stand beneath an overhanging wall."³ Calamity and happiness in all cases are of men's own seeking.⁴ He twice quoted with approval the saying from the *Book of History* that calamities sent by Heaven may be avoided, but from calamities brought on by oneself there is no escape.⁵ Hsüntze had a similar conception. His definition of Destiny was that it is "what one meets at the moment".⁶ Duke Huan became Lord Protector by destiny, not by chance, because he deserved the honour.⁷ Hsüntze's fundamental attitude on this matter was the idealistic conception that he found written in history, that human wrongdoing brought calamity, and virtue brought prosperity.⁸

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¹ *An.*, XI, 1.

² *Menc.*, VII, 1, 11, 2.

² *Menc.*, II, 1, 14, 6.

³ *Hist.*, IV, v, 11, 3; *Menc.*, II, 1, 14, 0, and IV, 1, 11, 5.

⁴ *W.H.*, xxi, 2.

⁵ *W.H.*, vii, 24.

⁶ *W.H.*, i, 4.

Hsüntze reinterpreted Confucianism so that there was no conception of any spiritual power in the universe left in its teaching. This attitude was undoubtedly a reaction against the popular religion of the day—animistic belief in and worship of spirits, especially the spirits of ancestors. That they could not be relied upon for help and that worship of them was of no value for ethical life was apparent to him, and he is to be commended for frankly eliminating them. That likewise he should interpret the supreme principle of the universe in terms of Law and make it into universal impersonal Law, was no more than continuing the development away from an anthropomorphic and capricious God started by Confucius. Hsüntze's interest was not religious in the narrow sense of the word. He was not interested in emphasizing men's dependence upon higher powers, but rather men's dependence upon themselves. He was a philosopher and a moral teacher; the sense of dependence does not even find utterance in him. His dependence was upon self; through self-development all things could be gained. He was convinced that virtue was rewarded and vice punished in this life, and that was sufficient religion for him. His efforts and attention were directed solely to the cultivation of virtue and good government on this earth. Yet we cannot say that Hsüntze was irreligious. For the conviction that virtue is rewarded and vice punished is one of the fundamental elements in religion, and the fact that he stuck to this conviction in spite of all the discouraging evidences to the contrary which were found in his own life and in contemporary history¹ shows that his was more than an idle optimism. It was a deep conviction, though the

¹ Cf. Chap. XVI.

fact that he felt it was substantiated by history prevented him from feeling the need of any deeper metaphysical foundation for his conviction.

This combination of religious scepticism with ethical fervour has been characteristic of Confucianism all through the ages. Hsüntze brought to a logical conclusion the movement in this direction which had been started by Confucius. In so far he might be said to be more consistently Confucian than Confucius himself. Undoubtedly the existence of this sceptical strain of thought in one of the greatest of ancient Confucianists has done much to mould later Chinese thought.

Hsüntze's attitude towards science is similar to that Science, towards speculation. Science in Hsüntze's day was non-existent as such. It is a remarkable fact that although China has given to the world perhaps a larger number of the fundamental inventions of life¹ than any other single nation, educated men there have rarely countenanced any systematic investigation into the laws of the physical world. Perhaps the reason was that such investigation as there was, was rather of alchemy, magic, seeking for the draught of immortality, such as characterized European science during the Middle Ages, than legitimate science. In Hsüntze's own day, the cause of science was championed by the unorthodox Neo-Micians, which was enough to condemn it in the eyes of an orthodox Confucian. Such being the case, we would not expect Hsüntze to approve of scientific investigation as it then existed.

In the *Great Learning*, there is indeed one reference to the "investigation of things", or the "distinction of things",²

¹ To mention only a few—silk, paper, printing, the compass, gun-powder, porcelain.

² *G.L.*, Text 4, 5.

as being necessary to the gaining of knowledge. But this phrase is enigmatical and the chapter of the commentary (which forms the body of the Great Learning) on that subject is lost, so that we cannot tell what was really meant by it.

Hsüntze did not deny the possibility of attaining scientific knowledge, but he denied its advisability. A student always wishes to attain complete knowledge. Unless he could get complete knowledge he could be called a failure or a stupid. But in the realm of the investigation of nature, in a life-time, indeed in a myriad years, he could not reach complete knowledge, so even when old he would still be stupid. Hence such study is vain. But studying the Way of the Kings is quite different. Here the student can attain complete knowledge, and he can become the culmination of the world.¹ In this doctrine Hsüntze shows that he belongs to the class of the "tender-minded", who need a completed theory of the universe, rather than to the "tough-minded", to whom a pluralistic universe has no terrors. His emphasis upon authority where fallible humanity cannot see its way bears out this fact.

Mental
Philosophy.

But there is one exception that Hsüntze found it necessary to make, namely the study of human nature. Mental philosophy has always gone along with theoretical and moral philosophy, and Hsüntze was no exception. In this department he made considerable contributions to Chinese thought, and remarkably acute observations. This sort of investigation Hsüntze found fundamental to his philosophy. But neither he nor any other ancient Chinese pursued

¹ W.H., xxi, 14 f.

psychology in a scientific experimental manner; they were "armchair-philosophers", who discovered only what they could find within themselves.

This limitation of philosophy has become the definition of the scope of philosophy for the Confucians, even for Chu Hsi and the Sung school, and since Confucianism became the sole philosophy of China, it has become the definition of the limits of philosophy in general.

Hsüntze's universe was a static universe of the sort common in medieval thought, where there was no real progress to be made. Among the speculations of the day, the brilliant Chuangtze had hit upon a theory very similar to that of biological evolution. Life had original forms (ova?) which, after getting into water, became minute (amœbic?) forms of life. Then coming to the border between land and water, it developed into a low form of life. Next it came upon dry land and developed into a land animal. Then life developed into a series of other forms, and finally into man. Man at death again dissolves into these minute original forms of life.¹ Of such speculations Hsüntze would have nothing. Still more did he reject a deduction from this conception of evolution, namely, that ancient and present times were different in nature, and so principles deduced from ancient history could not be applied to the present. Such a doctrine would have destroyed the Confucian authority, which was based upon the ancient Classics. Naturally Hsüntze attacked it. The terms "horse" and "ox" meant the same in ancient days as to-day; human nature is the same as it always was; ancient and present times are the same.²

¹ *Hu*, p. 250 ff.

² *Cl. IV.H.*, v, 7.

Hsüntze began by rejecting metaphysics and ended by getting into metaphysics. But that was not the only way in which the problems inherent in thought revenged themselves on him. We shall see later how he got into the problem of knowledge twice, once in the problem of how to gain ethical knowledge and again through dealing with the nature of terms, and so got into the problem of logical theory as well.¹ The fact that he did not refuse to follow a problem wherever it led him shows his true greatness. But through it all he continued to have the Confucian attitude of attacking no problem which did not show its practical significance to him. Ancient Chinese philosophy may be compared with ancient Greek thought. Both were the beginnings of human thought about the deeper problems of life. Perhaps the reason that Greek thought was so rich in discovering the problems lay in the fact that the Greek world went to pieces. The reason that Chinese thought did not go as far as the Greek was that the Chinese world did not go entirely to pieces; politically it was disrupted, but the social life of the people, the family and the clan, remained undisturbed through it all.

¹ Cf. Chaps. VII and XIII.

CHAPTER VI

HUMAN NATURE

We have seen that to a Confucian there was no separation between moral and metaphysical concepts, and hence that human nature must be either good or bad, and also that to Hsüntze desire was a fundamental characteristic of human nature. Hence it is very natural that he should conclude that human nature is fundamentally evil. Gautama, who also made desire fundamental to human nature, arrived at a similar conclusion. But he had grown up in the Hindu metaphysics, and so distinguished the evil in human nature, which was desire, from human nature itself and sought a way to remove it. With Hsüntze this doctrine did not mean that human nature was totally depraved and without any hope, as in the teaching of Calvin, but rather just the opposite; because human nature tended to evil, each man must all the more work to develop his own nature towards the right. Human nature merely tends to evil; it has an infinite capacity for development in the direction of good as well.

In ancient Chinese thought there was a great deal of admiration for what is natural, just as there was in Greek thought. Lao-tze, Confucius, Mencius, Chuangtze, and Mencius all exalted the natural. Lao-tze's mysticism rested upon the natural *Tao* or Way of the Universe, to the extent of emphasizing inaction, human inability to do anything worth while. Against this attitude Hsüntze reacted violently.

Human Nature is Evil.

Ancient Admiration for the Natural.

Confucianism stressed self-development. Every individual must bend all his energies to his own development, and then there are no limits to what he might attain. One of the reasons that Hsüntze adopted the doctrine that human nature is evil was that such a teaching would compel human beings to activity in order to gain virtue.

In addition there was doubtless the effect of the social and political outlook of the day. Hsüntze lived in the most troubled period towards the end of the time of the "Warring States". There was no emperor in China; the rulers of the various states oppressed their own people and sought by force or deceit to grasp whatever of their neighbours' territory they could get. The disciple of Hsüntze who wrote the *Gloss*¹ did not paint the situation too darkly. Looking at his contemporaries, Hsüntze could well say, "Man's passions are far from beautiful!"² It was a time of pessimism, when worthy men went into retirement. That Hsüntze never wavered from his optimistic view of the universe, only conceding to human nature a tendency to evil, shows his real greatness.

Confucius never mentioned the problem of human nature; the problem had not arisen as to what was the character of human nature.³ Since Hsüntze has been declared unorthodox almost solely because of his teaching that human nature is evil, this dictum must be based upon other grounds than that of conformity or non-conformity with the teaching of Confucius. Hsüntze was only condemned because Mencius

¹ *W.H.*, "Gloss."

² *W.H.*, xxiii, 8.

³ There may be a hint of the doctrine that man is originally good in *An.*, VI, xvii, but in view of *An.*, VI, xvi, such a conclusion is doubtful.

was made the true interpreter of Confucius. Measured by the standard of Confucius' own teaching, Hsüntze was just as orthodox as Mencius.

But in view of the general admiration for what was natural, ^{Mencius' Teaching.} it was inevitable that the doctrine that human nature was good should come to expression. This teaching was first hinted at in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, where it is said that the superior man reverences his virtue and his nature.¹ Such a statement could only be made on the supposition that his nature was good. Either on the basis of this statement, or independently, Mencius set forth his famous dictum that human nature is good. Man's nature tends to good as water tends to flow downwards.² It does not need to be forced.³ The great man is he who does not lose his child's heart.⁴ The evil in human nature is not because of their original powers,⁵ but because their nature has become corrupted.⁶

Of course, Mencius' teaching that human nature is good, taken strictly, is just as much a partial statement of the truth as Hsüntze's teaching that it is evil, but there is this much truth to it; if a person is to respect his own personality, that personality must be good. Consequently men have always preferred to think of their "real selves" as good, rather than evil. Hsüntze would probably have replied that what he meant was not that everyone's character was evil, but that one element, namely original nature, was evil, and that man could build virtue into his character so that it could

¹ D.M., XXVI, 6.

² Menc., VI, i, 2.

³ Menc., VI, i, vi, 6.

⁴ Menc., VI, i, 3, 3.

⁵ Menc., IV, II, xii.

⁶ Menc., VI, i, viii, 2, 3.

become positively good, even totally good, and hence man could still admire the goodness in his own character, even though it was his own creation.

Hsüntze's
Teaching.

To Hsüntze, Mencius' account of human nature did not seem to present the facts, and in opposition he developed his own theory. "The nature of man is evil; his goodness is only acquired training."¹ In support of this contention he alleged a number of facts, viz., that there are evil tendencies in human nature, such as strife, rapacity, the desires of the ear and eye, etc., and that these seem to be innate; that the civilizing influence of teachers, laws, and the virtues are necessary; that character development is through the overcoming of contrary impulses, so that instead of rushing in to satisfy his hunger, the courteous man yields to others; that certain virtues, such as courtesy, proper conduct, and refinement, are obviously the result of training; that in the states, such as the state of Ts'in, which are simpler and where the people follow their feelings more than in the cultivated districts of central China, the people are ruder and less refined. In the doubtful sections of Book XXIII of his *Works* there is added the fact of the influence of one's friends upon character. Hsüntze went so far as to speculate what would be the result if the authority of the prince and the influence of the codes of conduct were removed, and said that the whole country would be in turmoil, in the same condition as Hobbes' State of Nature. In going this far he seemed to contradict his statement that the power of forming social organizations is one of the fundamental elements in human character. But Hsüntze had no theory of any State

¹ *W.H.*, xxiii, I.

of Nature; he was merely taking a view of what would happen if men followed their evil nature alone; there is no real contradiction here. By these and other arguments, Hsüntze endeavoured to prove that human nature is evil. Goodness is like the skill of a carpenter; it is the result of training. Hsüntze never raised the question as to whether this training presupposed the capacity to receive it; he merely saw that the training was received.

In reply to Mencius, Hsüntze made some very searching criticisms. He showed that according to Mencius' own statement, that human nature is originally good, and that evil is the corruption of that original goodness, Mencius would have to admit that everyone has already corrupted their original nature, and that hence as there was no time when men did not have evil desires, etc.; human nature was already corrupt at birth! Secondly he showed that according to Mencius' statement that virtue was just the development of innate impulses, there would be no use for the Sage-Kings or for any standards of conduct at all, such as those embodied in the concepts of *Lí* and *Yí* (proper conduct and justice). Here he made a criticism which must have cut very deep. For traditional standards of conduct are the very essence of Confucianism, and yet Mencius' inner source of virtue would logically eliminate all authority. A third criticism was that Mencius did not give any evidence for his assertions on the subject of human nature.

His Criticism
of Mencius.

Hsüntze also met the objection to his teaching, that the existing standards of conduct must have come from the original nature of someone, hence human nature cannot be evil. This Hsüntze denied. Just as a potter has first to acquire

skill, and then only is able to produce a piece of pottery, so the Sage-Kings had first to reform their nature and then only could bring forth *Li* and *Yi*. *Li* and *Yi* are the products of the acquired training of the Sage.

Later
Discussions.

Such was the doctrine for which Hsüntze was condemned, and for which he is best known. Again and again the subject of "Nature" was given out at the examinations of candidates for office, and again and again the arguments of Hsüntze and Mencius were set forth. The discussion of nature did not stop with these two thinkers. In the Han dynasty, Yang Hsiung¹ proposed a mediating theory, that human nature is both good and bad, but he thereby lost the foundation for ethical theory for which purpose these two theories of human nature were propounded. In the T'ang dynasty, the most famous litterateur, Han Yu,² proposed another theory, that men's natures are of different grades, and their character depends on which grade they are. But in the Sung school, Chu Hsi, who made his interpretation the orthodox one, used the word "nature"³ (which Mencius and Hsüntze referred to human nature) with a different connotation; it now referred to the Nature of the Universe, and became a cosmological concept; and in the Universe there is only one Nature. Under these circumstances, the statement that "the nature is evil" meant to Chu Hsi that "Nature is evil" or "the Universe is evil", and naturally he rejected that statement as erroneous. In addition, the term which Hsüntze used for "artificial training",⁴ came to be taken

¹ 53 B.C.-A.D. 18.

² 768-824 A.D. Cf. Legge, *Mencius*, p. 92 ff., for a translation of his argument. It is hinted at in Mencius' writings.

³ 性 ⁴ 偽

as equivalent of another similar word meaning "evil";¹ and so Hsüntze's statement that "The nature of man is evil; his goodness is acquired training",² came to mean "Nature (which is also man's nature) is evil; its (apparent) goodness is evil"; and so the condemnation of Hsüntze was a natural result. The evaluation of this doctrine will be deferred until the next chapter.

But there was another important feature of Hsüntze's conception of human nature, namely, its infinite improvable-The Infinite
Improvability
of Human
Nature. Confucianism was chiefly interested in the ethical development of human beings. Coupled with this interest there was a conviction of the essential equality of human nature.³ This conviction had appeared in Mencius, and similarly it is expressed by Hsüntze. Mencius held that all men were alike in their original capacity; the Sage is the same in kind as the man on the street.⁴ The classical expression of this teaching is the saying "All men may be Yao and Shun",⁵ which does not seem to have been original with Mencius, but a popular proverb. Men become a Yao or Sage by doing the actions of Yao; or they become a Ch'ie (we should say a Nero) by doing the actions of Ch'ie.

Hsüntze took up this expression and accepted its teaching. The man on the street, just as much as the Sage, has the capacity to know virtue; he has the ability to carry it out; and he has the means of doing so; consequently he can become a Yao or Shun.⁶ The small-minded man and the superior man have the same abilities.⁷ The teaching that human

¹ 惡 ² 人之性惡其善者偽也. Cf. *W.H.*, xxiii, 1.

³ Cf. p. 11. ⁴ *Menc.*, VI, 1, vii, 2. Cf. also III, 1, 1; VI, 11, 2.

⁵ *Menc.*, VI, 11, 1, 5.

⁶ *W.H.*, xxiii, 7 f.

⁷ *W.H.*, ix, 17.

nature is fundamentally evil does not mean that men must necessarily be evil; if there is a righteous emperor on the throne, his subjects will be influenced to be good, but if there is a Ch'ie on the throne, men will be evil.¹ These doctrines of the continuity of moral influence and that the people necessarily follow the example of the ruler were teachings which found large place in Confucius and Mencius, and which were accepted by Hsüntze.

Every man's original nature is the same; everyone has the means of becoming perfectly virtuous: why, as a matter of fact, do not men become perfect? Hsüntze answered that it is because they do not take the opportunity, just as a merchant and farmer might theoretically exchange professions, but practically do not do so.²

This teaching is very modern. It is the nearest that Confucianism came to the Christian teaching of the infinite worth of every individual. It shows the fundamental democracy of Chinese thought—that there is no fundamental inequality between human beings, such as Aristotle alleges in the defence of slavery. At the same time Chinese thought does recognize an inequality in humanity as it has actually developed,³ but this inequality is not an aristocratic inequality, rather a moral inequality, due to different degrees of moral development. Thus Hsüntze in remarkable fashion combined in his doctrine of human nature an extremely idealistic teaching of human equality with a practical recognition of the facts of human life.

¹ W.H., IV, 21.

² W.H., XXIII, 8.

³ Cf. Chap. XIV.

CHAPTER VII

THE BASIS OF ETHICS

The Confucians have never been uncertain of the content of their ethics. It is summed up in the Way of the Kings, that code of conduct and government formulated by the ancient Sage-Kings. As Han Yü¹ wrote, "What I call *the Way*² . . . Yao transmitted it to Shun; Shun transmitted it to Yu; Yu transmitted it to T'ang; T'ang transmitted it to King Wen, King Wu, and Duke Chou. Wen, Wu, and Duke Chou transmitted it to Confucius. Confucius transmitted it to Mencius."³ The Confucians were primarily the conservers of the cultural heritage of the race, and as such have contributed greatly to the stability of this remarkable people. Confucius spoke of himself as "A transmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients"⁴, and to an extent not always realized even by his own countrymen, that was true. He did not seek to create anything new; he merely re-edited the ancient records of his race, and thus imbued them with his own spirit. For him history was the vehicle of moral instruction; besides his editing of the ancient works, his sole original composition was a history of his native state, ever since extravagantly admired for the way in which he combined moral lessons with history. Learned in the traditions of his race, he passed

The Content
of Ethics.

¹ A.D. 768-824.

² Or "Doctrine", lit. 道

³ From his famous essay, 原道 or *The Original Way*.

⁴ *Ana.*, VII, i.

them on to his pupils by word of mouth, and they saw everything through the medium of his remarkable personality. His emphasis was not upon his own writings, but upon the ancient Classics, the ancient heroes, and ancient ways. The code of conduct that he advocated was not anything new, but only making plain what was implied in the teaching of the Classics. Hsüntze himself regarded Confucius, not as an originator, but as the man who knew the whole of the Way of the Kings, and who was able to carry it out.¹ Confucius' ethics is a dogmatic ethics, and dogmatism and authoritarianism have characterized Confucianism ever since.

But the tendency of the age, just as in ancient Greece after the time of Solon, was away from dogmatism. New teachings were in the air, which tended to discard the heritage of the past. Yangtze ridiculed the ancient Kings; Micius wanted to do away with music, an essential part of the Confucian practices, and to curtail the observances of burial ceremony; indeed he wanted to establish a new religion; Chuangtze and his followers ridiculed the orthodox Confucian school, and endeavoured to throw doubt on all their teachings. More important was the fact that Micius based his teaching on a single principle—that of utility. This led to the demand that other schools should similarly rationalize their teachings, and deduce them from a single principle. The Confucians could not remain stationary in such a time of philosophic development. They had to reformulate the ancient doctrines; they had to reinterpret the ancient customs; they had to systematize and develop their teachings to meet these attacks; and they were forced to counter-attack their opponents.

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 5 f.

This meant that they had to attempt to give a reason for their dogmatic statements. The problem crystallized in the form of seeking to know how the ancient Sage-Kings arrived at the truth they promulgated. Granted that we must accept their authority, how did they arrive at the truth, and can we similarly independently arrive at such truth? Even for orthodox Confucians this became a problem.

In the *Analects* we do not find Confucius dealing with this problem; but in the first part of the *Great Learning* we find put into his mouth a statement in answer to it.¹

"The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the empire," first proceeded to the investigation of things or the distinction of things; then to the extension or completion of their knowledge; then to sincerity of thought or veracity of intention; then to rectification of their hearts; then to cultivation of their persons; then to regulation or management of their families; then to the well ordering of their states; then they could make the whole empire happy. This was the objective process. The inner psychological process for each individual was as follows:² first, determination of the goal; second, determination of the object of pursuit; third, unperturbedness, or the quality of being unmoved by passion; fourth, tranquil repose; fifth, careful deliberation or reflection; and sixth, the attainment of the goal. These psychological steps may be thought of as prerequisites to the objective steps in the attainment of virtue.

Note that here we have to do, not with a process of gaining speculative or theoretical truth, but solely with moral truth. The problem is how to know virtue, not how to know

How Reach Truth?

The Great Learning.

It is Moral Truth.

¹ *G.L.*, I, 4, 5, 6.

² *G.L.*, I, 1, 2.

philosophic or scientific truth. With the Confucians, as with Socrates, the problem of knowledge was a problem of ethical knowledge first and foremost. Truth is not speculative but practical. The Confucians were first of all practical men; they were government officers, and many or most of them held high government position. They needed primarily to know how to live and to govern. We have seen already how they rejected all that was speculation, and not for any practical purpose.¹

Mencius.

In his teaching as to the nature of ethics, Mencius took a position, which if logically carried out, would have taken him completely out of the stream of orthodox Confucian thought. For Mencius taught that ethics was nothing but the development of natural feeling. Human nature was good, and if we only develop the natural feelings, we shall reach virtue.

"The feeling of commiseration is essential to man; the feeling of shame and dislike is essential to man; the feeling of modesty and complaisance is essential to man; and the feeling of approving and disapproving is essential to man. The feeling of commiseration is the principle of benevolence (or fellow-feeling, *Jen*). The feeling of shame and dislike is the principle of justice (or righteousness, *Yi*). The feeling of modesty and complaisance (declining and yielding) is the principle of propriety (or the rules of proper conduct, *Li*). The feeling of approving and disapproving is the principle of wisdom. Men have these four principles, just as they have their four limbs. . . . Let them have their complete development, and they will suffice to provide for all within the country."²

¹ Cf. p. 83.

² *Menc.*, II, 1, vi, 4, 5, 7.

Since every man necessarily has these four feelings in the constitution of his own nature, he needs only to develop them, and then he will have knowledge of virtue. The logical conclusion is that if this is true, then there is no use for authority or the Sages. Each man can discover truth for himself anew, and himself be the judge of what is right. Had Mencius been a little bolder and less inclined to follow in the path already marked out, he might have seen the implication of his own teaching, and have broken through the crust of Confucian authoritarianism, with the result of starting a new philosophical school, which, like that of Micius, sought to reform the ancient teaching. But the crust was too strong for him. To have done so would have been to discard a great deal of the inherited culture of the race, and the Confucians were primarily conservers of this culture, not innovators. Mencius did not draw this conclusion; and the principle of authority has been one of the chief characteristics of Confucianism all through the ages.

Hsüntze saw clearly that such was the implication of Mencius' doctrine of human nature :—

Hsüntze's
Criticism of
Mencius.

"Now, if we sincerely consider the nature of man, is it firmly established in true principles and just government? If so, then what use are the Sage-Kings? What use are the rules of proper conduct (*Li*) and justice (*Yi*)? Although there were Sage-Kings, what could they add to true principles and just government?"¹

If Mencius' account of human nature and the source of ethical knowledge be true, then we should dispense with the Way of the Sage-Kings, and its authority, which

¹ *W.L.*, xxiii, 5.

would mean that we should dispense with Confucianism entirely.

Consequently Hsüntze reacted against this side of Mencius' teaching, although he followed Mencius in the main, and took the other alternative, that human nature is evil, *in order to insure that the principle of authority should be fundamental for his teaching*. Thus Hsüntze, in this respect, was much more Confucian than Mencius.

Authority.

In his teaching as to the way of knowing what to do, Hsüntze returned to the Confucian attitude that it could best be learned by studying the Way of the Kings. This meant a study of the Classics, the *Odes*, the *History*, the *Rites*, the *Music*, and the *Spring and Autumn*, of which Confucius was the transmitter and of which the Confucians were the expounders.

How did the
Sages find
the Truth?

But Hsüntze realized that authority was no explanation of the origin of any doctrine, and as he did not believe in a personal God, merely in an impersonal Nature, he could not have any teaching that the truth is obtained by revelation. Right doctrine is received from the Sages, the great worthies who established the customs and usages of the people at the beginning of civilization. But how did they get that truth? In answer to this question, Hsüntze developed an empirical way of knowing truth. Indeed, a knowledge of the right is essential to do the right. Without knowledge of the right the mind "cannot will to do the right, and can only will to act contrary to the right."¹ There are three steps; first, knowing the right; second, willing the right; and third, doing the right. Confucianism did not recognize that there was any further problem after the first one, the problem of

¹ W.H., xxi, 6.

how to know the right, was solved. It assumed, just as Socrates did, that if a person knew the right, he would do the right.

"How can a person know the right? By the mind. How does the mind know? By emptiness, unity or concentration, and unperturbedness."¹

In these few words, Hsüntze summed up his distinctive doctrine of how to know the right, or the *Tao*.

The right can only be known through the mind, for the mind is the ruler of the body and of the actions. The Mind.

"The mind is the ruler of the body, and the master of the spirit. It gives commands and all parts of the body obey. It itself makes prohibitions; it itself gives commands; it itself makes decisions; it itself makes choices; it itself uses actions; it itself stops action."²

It is to be noted that Hsüntze was quite modern in his psychology. He had and used the category of "will", but by it he meant rather the mind than a faculty of the mind; nevertheless he refrained from dividing up the mind into faculties, and clearly stated that it is the whole mind which makes decisions, not a faculty of will or any other faculty. Will, for him, was but the whole mind viewed from one aspect.

The remainder of Hsüntze's discussion of the method of gaining knowledge is a psychological analysis of a whole mind, and "emptiness, concentration, and unperturbedness" are but three qualities of the action of that mind which are necessary prerequisites to correct action.³

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 7.

² *W.H.*, xxi, 8.

³ In discussing these subjective qualities, we must remember that we are dealing with a translation of a language where words are perhaps more fluent than in any other and where different and contradictory

Emptiness.

The first of these psychological conditions for the apprehension of truth, emptiness,¹ was not used in that sense previously in Confucian writings.² It is reminiscent of Lao-tze, and in view of the influence of Lao-tze upon Hsüntze, we are tempted to assert that Hsüntze got at least the suggestion of this factor from Lao-tze, from whom we take two quotations:—

"The government of the Sage consists in emptying the people's minds and filling their bellies."³

"Press on to the state of absolute emptiness; preserve complete unperturbedness."⁴

What did Hsüntze mean by "emptiness"? He meant that quality of the mind's receptivity which enables it to be free from preconceived notions.

"That which does not allow what is already stored away (in the mind) to injure that which is about to be received, is called the mind's emptiness."⁵

"The mouth can exert itself forcibly and make the silent speak; . . . the mind cannot exert itself forcibly and change one perception."⁶

It is freedom from prejudice. It reminds us of the way meanings of one and the same term are current. Hence we cannot base a sure interpretation upon only one case of any particular use of a term. Fortunately Hsüntze is a voluminous writer, and usually uses a term repeatedly, and so we can gather its meaning from the context. Chinese is an awkward medium for expressing psychological analyses, especially as Hsüntze had to create his psychology and psychological terminology; but he made the language serve his purpose.

¹ 虛

² It may be that essentially the same thing is meant in the *Great Learning*, ch. viii, where it is stated that partiality prevents knowledge of truth.

³ *Tao Te King*, sect. 3.

⁴ *Tao Te King*, sect. 16.

⁵ *W.H.*, xxi, 7.

⁶ *W.H.*, xxi, 8.

that Bacon endeavoured to prepare the way for knowledge of truth by removing first the "Idols" of the tribe, of the cave, of the forum, and of the theatre.

This was a negative condition; the next is positive. It has been translated "unity" or "concentration", because the original, which is the usual word for "one",¹ here has both meanings. It is only by combining the two English concepts of "unity" and "concentration" that Hsüntze's full meaning can be grasped. In fact they are not two different concepts when used psychologically; for unity of mind is concentration of aim.

Unity or Concentration.

Hsüntze seems to have taken the suggestion for this condition of knowledge from the *Doctrines of the Mean*.

"The duties of universal obligation are five, and the virtues, wherewith they are practised, are three. The duties are those between sovereign and minister, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, friend and friend. Those five are the duties of universal obligation. Knowledge, benevolence, and courage, these three, are the virtues universally binding. And the means by which they carry these duties into practice is unity."²

Hsüntze worked out this suggestion in an original manner.

"The mind always has a multiplicity (of objects), yet there is that which may be called a unity. . . . To perceive more than one thing at the same time is plurality. Yet it has that

¹ 壹

² D.H., XX, 3; cf. *ibid.*, 15. The last word, "unity," is translated "sincerity" by Chu Hsi, and "singleness" by Legge. This variation of translation illustrates the difficulty of translating a word which is only used once with a particular denotation.

which may be called a unity. That which does not allow that impression to harm this impression is called the mind's unity."¹

"The mind's objects are confused and extensive"—a manifold; "its essence is a unity"²—the unity of apperception. But Hsüntze did not tell how this manifold becomes a unity; he did not carry the analysis that far.

Yet Hsüntze meant more by this condition of knowledge than Kant's unity of apperception; for him it was a unity of mind as well; it was a purposeful unity, concentration. Mencius had emphasized the fact that concentration is essential to learning. Hsüntze likewise said:

"A person cannot be of two sorts, so the wise man picks one sort and concentrates on it."³

The farmer concentrates on his farm, but he could hardly arrive at the status of a Sage by so doing; similarly the merchant, workman, labourer, or man of another class. But the scholar concentrates on the principles of life, and so becomes able to judge and comprehend the principles of all things, and to exercise the function of the Sage—he is able to rule others. Such was the secret of the greatness of Shun and many others, such as the inventor of writing, Ts'ang Chieh, or Shun's minister of agriculture, Hou Tsi, who became the god of agriculture, and Shun's Director of Music, K'uei, as well as the famous archer, Yi, the great driver, Ch'ao Fu, etc. The superior man concentrates on the principles of life (the *Tao*), and then he can be correct and not make any mistakes. This is what is meant by specialization, or singleness of heart. It is specialization on the general principles of life, and this

¹ W.H., xxi, 7.

² W.H., xxi, 9.

³ W.H., *ibid.*

emphasis reminds us that for Hsüntze, more than for Plato, the ruler should be a philosopher. Plato's conception of philosophy was so inclusive that he came to realize that in actual practise the ruler would rarely be a philosopher, and so in the *Laws* he constructed a second best system of government; the Confucians defined philosophy more narrowly, as little more than practical philosophy, and never wavered from the ideal that the ruler should be an adept in philosophy; the classical education of the Chinese was grounded in their ancient philosophy, and the examinations which have picked out men for government service for two thousand years have consisted in examinations on the ancient philosophy of the Confucians, so that while it is too much to say that Chinese government officials have been philosophers, yet they have all been grounded in philosophy, and all the great Confucian philosophers (with unimportant exceptions) have been government officials; even when they preferred a private life, like Chu Hsi, they have recognized that their duty was to the state.

The third condition for the knowledge of truth is unperturbedness, or passionlessness.¹ This word had had a wider use than the preceding ones. In the *Analects* it is used once: Unperturbed-
ness.

"The wise are active; the virtuous are tranquil (unperturbed). The wise are joyful; the virtuous are long-lived."²

Again, it is used in the *Great Learning*, in a passage which we quoted previously:

"The point where to rest being known, the object of pursuit is then only determined; and, that being determined, then only can a person be unperturbed. When this calm

¹ 靜.

² *An.*, VI, xxi.

unperturbedness is attained, then only can there be tranquil repose." ¹

The same thing is meant, though a different term is used, in the *Doctrine of the Mean* :—

"When pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy are not exhibited, this is called the state of equilibrium. When they are exhibited, but all in their due degree, this is called the state of harmony. This equilibrium is the greatest foundation for character in the universe; this harmony is the best way in the universe for attaining to the path of duty (*Tao*)."²

Mencius also referred to it, though in different terms, when he spoke of his own mind as unperturbable.³ While the statement in the *Great Learning* alone would have been enough to bring this conception to Hsüntze's attention, yet it is interesting to find it also used by Laotze.

"Press on to the state of absolute emptiness; preserve complete unperturbedness. . . . All things thrive and increase, then each returns again to the root."⁴ This return to the root may be called quiescence.⁵ Quiescence is submitting to fate. Submitting to fate is called order. Knowing the order is called wisdom."⁶

"Motion conquers cold. Quietude (unperturbedness) ⁷ conquers heat. Purity and quietude are the world's standard."⁸

Hsüntze was probably influenced by both Laotze and the Confucians in picking this condition of knowledge.

¹ *G.L.*, Text, 2.

² *D.M.*, I, 4.

³ *Menc.*, II, 1, 3, 1.

⁴ The simile is that of vegetable life.

⁵ The same word above translated "unperturbedness".

⁶ Or "being illumined". *Tao Teh Ching*, sect. 18.

⁷ The Chinese commentary interprets it as quietude of spirit.

⁸ *Tao Teh Ching*, sect. 45; cf. also sect. 37, 71, etc.

It means essentially unperturbedness, passionlessness, the state of being unmoved by emotion.

"The mind is always in motion, yet there is that which may be called quiescence or unperturbedness. . . . That which does not permit dreams (or unrealities) to disturb one's knowledge is called the mind's unperturbedness."¹

To illustrate his point Hsüntze quoted a verse from the *Book of Odes* describing the agitation of a wife whose mind constantly turns to her absent husband, concluding :

"When the mind is split, it possesses no knowledge ; when it is upset, it is not quickwitted ; when it is wandering, it is in doubt. But when it is not so, it can be used to help investigate and all things can be embraced and known."²

Unperturbedness consists in the absence of emotion, or lack of distraction. It reminds us of Spinoza's famous teaching that emotion obscures thought. Hsüntze insisted upon it more than upon the other conditions and used his striking illustration of a tub of muddy water :

"The mind of man is like a tub of muddy river water : place it upright and do not jar it, and the muddiness will sink to the bottom, and the clear water will be on top ; then it will be clear enough to mirror the beard and eyebrows, and to show the condition of the complexion. But if a little wind crosses its surface, the mud at the bottom rises and the clear water at the top is disturbed, until a person cannot see in it whether he is standing upright ! The mind is like that. . . . If a little thing leads the mind astray, then the man's aplomb

¹ W.H., xxi, 7.

² W.H., xxi, 9.

is changed and his mind is turned upside down ; then he is not able to decide matters in general." ¹

The control of passion or desire is one of the features of Hsüntze's psychological teaching we shall have to consider later.² It can only be obtained through the Confucian Way. He who is master of his desires is a Sage.

These are the three conditions for the knowledge of truth : lack of prejudice, unity of mind or concentration on the *Tao*, and freedom from passion. Of these, the first and third are negative, and only the second is positive. The mind must be freed from prejudice and passion, and concentrated on the problem of truth. It is only by the utilization of all the power of the mind, and in the absence of any hindering conditions, that truth can be obtained.

Only the Sage
Fulfills these
Conditions.

But who can measure up to these conditions of knowledge ? Not the anchorite who leaves the world to be free from its distractions—in ancient China there were many such—that is anxiety, and not subtle knowledge ; not even Mencius attained to this point, for he was afraid of disgrace and was forced to divorce his wife ; even the famous disciple of Confucius, who was so eager for knowledge that he stayed awake nights to study by placing a hot coal so that it would burn him if he should nod, did not attain to that condition, for he merely repressed himself and failed to attain to the point of

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 10 f. It is noteworthy, as indicating the influence of Lao-tzu upon Hsüntze, that this striking illustration was perhaps suggested to him by a line in the *Tao Te Ching*, in which the same Chinese characters are used as here by Hsüntze : " Who is there that can take the turbid water, and by quiescence, make it gradually clear ? " *Tao Te Ching*, sect. 15.

² Chap. XI.

being moved by love of thinking only.¹ Only the Sage can overcome these limitations and satisfy the conditions of the knowledge of truth. The Sage is the genius, who can transcend the limitations of ordinary life, and to him we must look for truth.

Granted that such a man can follow this threefold path of emptiness, concentration, and unperturbedness, there is no limit to what knowledge he can attain.

"He who makes his mind empty, unified, and unperturbed can be said to follow right principle and to be illustrious in virtue. There is nothing visible which does not disclose its qualities to him; there is nothing that he sees which he cannot discuss; and in discussing he never errs. . . . He understands the whole of heaven and earth. . . . He is very great, . . . very splendid, brilliant, equal with the sun and moon; his greatness fills the whole world."²

Undoubtedly Hsüntze correctly analyzed the formal *psychological* conditions for the knowledge of truth. Yet we are far from putting the confidence in this method that he did. After all, such a teaching as this supposes that truth can be gained by "sitting in one's chamber, and seeing the world"³; it is the rationalistic ideal of philosophy which discovers eternal truths by pure thought starting from concepts. We shall see later⁴ that even to Hsüntze this method of knowledge was insufficient, and in the analysis of another problem, that of terms and language, he outlined a different method of gaining truth.

Since only the Sage can satisfy the conditions of knowledge, Authority.

¹ Cf. *W.H.*, xxi, 13.

² *W.H.*, xxi, 8.

³ *W.H.*, xxi, 74.

⁴ Chap. XIII.

men must depend on his authority. For ordinary men authority, not inner sense, is the guide of life. Even Plato, in the *Republic*, left for the masses no virtue founded on knowledge, but only the conventional morality of society. Yet we must distinguish the kind of authority that Hsüntze sets up from the authority of tradition. The logic of tradition is, "What is, is right," but what Hsüntze said was, "What the expert says, is right." Do we not in actual practice to-day depend upon authority in most matters? Science has progressed so far that no single individual can understand more than one field, and in all other fields he has to accept the authority of the expert. Most remarkably is this true in sciences which have become extremely technical, such as higher mathematics or the doctrine of relativity, where only a few men in the whole world can be said to understand the matter. The logic of knowledge to-day is, "If you can satisfy the conditions of knowledge, you may know; but if you cannot, you must take the authority of the man who has satisfied the conditions"; and that is essentially the position that Hsüntze took. The chief difference between his teaching and our belief is that we hold a higher opinion of the probability that the ordinary man will reach moral truth than he did, and feel that the man on the street must make his decisions in matters of ethics for himself, which is often an ideal rather than an actuality. Even for the educated man, the authority of the group is still the determining factor in most of his actions.

Hsüntze did not seem to have seen the implication of his doctrine that if anyone who can make his mind empty, concentrated, and unperturbed can gain the truth, hence there

must be a realm of objective truth, so that different individuals would come to the same conclusion. Probably the impossibility of the people whom he knew reaching truth in any other way than through authority prevented him from giving the matter much thought. For an authoritative doctrine the problem of an objective realm of truth is not so pressing as for a doctrine of inner knowledge of the right. Mencius recognised it; he says that the Sages have only apprehended before me that of which my mind approves along with other men.¹ But for Heintze there was the fact that the Sages seemed to have spoken unanimously, and so he did not ask what was implied in his teaching of the way to get truth.

While Heintze did have this method whereby any individual can gain truth, yet it is only the Sage who can follow it. The situation is similar to that in regard to the teaching that the man of the street can become a Yu.² He admitted the possibility, but in reality it was only rarely that a Sage did really arise, so much so that the number of Sages could be counted on the fingers!

This emphasis upon authority had been very strong in Confucianism. Its Bible had been the literary treasures of the race; its aim was to conserve the wisdom of the past. Confucius had spoken of himself as "loving antiquity and diligent in seeking (knowledge) therein."³ He had said that "to devote oneself to irregular (unorthodox) speculations is decidedly harmful."⁴ He summed up the teaching of the Odes in one phrase which may be translated, "Not leaving

Authority in
Confucianism

¹ Menc., VI, 1, vii.

² An., VII, xix.

³ Cf. p. 83.

⁴ An. II, xvi.

the one path,"¹ i.e., no unorthodoxy. Even Mencius said, "The superior man simply reverts to the unchanging standard (the Classics). . . . If the masses are elevated (thereby) there will be no vice or depravity."² "The compass and square are the utmost of squareness and roundness; the Sages are the utmost exhibition of human relationships."³ This was exactly what Hsüntze taught, "The Sage fulfills all human duties; the righteous King fulfills all ideals of government."⁴

For all the Confucians, the authority of the Classics and the Sages has been a fundamental doctrine. When Confucianism became recognized by the State as the official religion, its authoritarianism showed itself in going to the extreme of banishing other philosophies from the memory of men. But Mencius, with his teaching that morals spring from innate human feelings, and therefore human nature is originally good, departed from this fundamental Confucian emphasis; Hsüntze, by holding that human nature was evil, gave the principle of authority a firm basis. In its emphasis upon authority, Confucianism followed Hsüntze rather than Mencius, although it rejected his logical basis for that authoritarianism. Even Chu Hsi, the greatest opponent of Hsüntze, held to authoritarianism in ethics. His teaching as to the way to a moral life (which is what is meant in Confucian teaching by "study")

¹ *An.*, II, 3. The futility of tying the meaning of a passage to a single translation is well shown in this phrase, which in the original consists of only two characters, 無邪. Legge translates, "Have no depraved thoughts," and Soothill, "With undivided thoughts," and others similarly; but a Chinese reading the passage would recognize that the second character is regularly used for "unorthodoxy" and even if the phrase had not that denotation here, yet it would certainly have that connotation.

² *Menc.*, VII, II, xxxvii, 13.

³ *Menc.*, IV, I, ii, 1.

⁴ *W.H.*, xxi, 15.

is, "Empty your heart and follow the Law."¹ Hsüntze himself suffered from the strong sentiment of reverence for authority that he had strengthened, because he happened to be declared unorthodox! Mencius' greatest contribution to Confucian teaching was his doctrine of human nature, and of the innate basis of ethics²; but it was just at this point that Hsüntze was truer to the spirit of Confucianism.

We can now see better the bearings of Hsüntze's teaching that human nature is evil. Hsüntze was not interested in condemning human nature as evil and low, depraved and of itself unable to do anything; rather the opposite. He held that human nature had infinite capabilities. But the Confucians stressed the importance of education and training. If human nature is good, there is logically little need for education or training; Rousseau's method of letting the child develop without training is the logical method to use: but if human nature is originally evil, education and training become absolutely necessary. Again, on the supposition of a good nature, authority is out of place; whereas if the nature of man is evil, authority is logically necessary. But the

Original
Nature is
Evil.

¹ L. Winger, *Texts Philosophiques*, p. 190. Chu Hsi also emphasized emptiness, unity, and quiescence. He said, "The heart is rarely pure (存). It is often in error. . . . When the heart is practiced, it is pure; when it is allowed to go its own way, then it falls into error. Close it against evil, preserve its unity. Only do not allow an evil spirit (氣) to enter; hold your resolution within. Reverence does not consist in sitting alone in solitude, without hearing, seeing, or thinking. It merely consists in a respectful fear, not daring to give oneself rein." *Ibid.*, pp. 190-1. In his teaching that the heart tends to evil if not trained and held in, Chu Hsi came very near to Hsüntze's doctrine that human nature is evil.

² The philosophy of Wang Yang Ming was the legitimate successor of this phase of Mencius' teachings rather than that of Chu Hsi.

logical consequences have never been very important for men, however imperative they have seemed to philosophers ; and so subsequent Confucianism accepted Hsüntze's emphasis upon education and authority, but rejected the logical basis he had laid for it, in favour of the more attractive doctrine of the goodness of human nature. In the west we are not so repelled from the teaching that human nature is bad. Hebrew and Christian theologians have gone much farther than did Hsüntze ; and Hobbes, had he passed a moral judgment upon men in the state of nature, would have agreed ; compared with their teaching, that of Hsüntze seems very mild. Authority and the teaching that human nature is fundamentally evil seem to belong together ; we find the combination in Catholic and Reformation Protestant theology and in Hobbes¹ as well as in Hsüntze.

Follow the
Later Kings.

Merely to set up the principle of authority is not sufficient ; there are too many chances for variation through different interpretations of what sort of action is sanctioned by authority. The Catholic theologians faced this difficulty, and finding the authority of the Bible too easily twisted to different meanings, added that of the Fathers, then that of the Council, to define what the Bible and the Fathers sought ; and finally in the Pope they found a definite authority that could pronounce infallible judgments on any question when he spoke *ex cathedra*. There was, however, a long process of development before such definiteness in the ultimate court of

¹ For Hobbes, morality only arose after the social contract had been made and hence he could not pass a moral judgment upon man in the state of Nature ; but his description of human nature is such that practically it is the same as evil, though he can only call it brutish.

appeal was reached. Hsüntze felt a similar urge to define more closely what was meant by the authority of the Sage-Kings, for Micius had based some of his teachings on the authority of the Sage-Kings too, and other interpretations had arisen different from that of the Confucians.

The *Book of History* says, "Study the perfect pattern of Mencius, the former Kings."¹ Mencius had followed this precept, and had endeavoured to build his philosophy upon the basis of what the ancient Kings, Yu, T'ang, and Wu had done. His disciples questioned him repeatedly as to the practices of these Kings. But the records were too vague, and others contradicted him. Who was to be believed? The author of the *Doctrine of the Mean* who wrote before Mencius, had also seen this problem.

"However excellent may have been the regulations of those former times, they cannot be attested. Not being attested, they cannot command credence, and not being credited, the people will not follow them. . . . Therefore the ruling principles (*Tao*) of a ruler are rooted in his own character, and attested by the people. They may be tested by the three Kings, and will be found to be without mistake; they may be set up before Heaven and Earth, exhibited before the spirits, and will be found to be without uncertainty."² Doctrine of the Mean.

His solution is different from that of Hsüntze; he seems to teach that the perfect ruler will instinctively reach the same principles and ways of action as the Sages. But elsewhere there was a different strain of thought. In speaking of the rules of etiquette and formal rites, Confucius had said " (The founders of the) Chou (dynasty) had the advantage

¹ *Hist.*, IV, viii, iii, 8.

² *D.M.*, XXIX, 2, 3.

of surveying the two proceeding dynasties. . . . I follow Chou."¹ This saying was quoted in the *Doctrine of the Mean*.² Hsüntze made this suggestion of Confucius into a principle, "Follow the later Kings."

Hsüntze.

"Principles (*Tao*) should not depart from those of the three dynasties,³ methods should not differ from those of the later Kings."⁴

When rules of conduct or rites are preserved too long, they are lost, hence we must look for the traces of the Sage-Kings where they are most clear, i.e., in the later Kings, the distinguished kings of the dynasty under which we are living.⁵ The ancient and the present are alike; by examining the present we can know the ancient best. This is Hsüntze's famous doctrine of "following the later Kings".

In this teaching, Hsüntze has followed Confucius, merely generalizing Confucius' teaching on rites to include all principles of morality. It was merely making the authorities more definite. It ruled out the theorizing about what Yao, Shun, and Yu did, when history did not speak clearly. They were supposed to have reigned two thousand years before the time of Hsüntze, and little definite was known about them. In their place it substituted the authority of King Wen, King Wu, and Duke Chou, who lived only nine hundred years before the time of Hsüntze, and thus there was much that was still left indefinite. Generalized, this principle is, "Follow the illustrious Kings of the dynasty under which you live," a principle which would have restricted all progress to the

¹ *An.*, III, xiv.

² *D.H.*, XXVIII, 5.

³ Of Hsia, Shang, and Chou.

⁴ *W.H.*, ix, 8.

⁵ Cf. *W.H.*, v. 6 f., for the development of this thought.

initiative of a new Sage, who, becoming king, founded a new dynasty. But Hsüntze did not have the idea of progress, and even for him all general principles were enunciated by the ancient Kings. It was only the details which were fixed by the later Kings.

Thus Hsüntze defined a Way of conduct, which should be definite and clear. "The Way (*Tao*) is never unclear."¹ Yet many people had departed from the Way, and the Confucian philosophy was being attacked from so many sides; hence there arose the problem of explaining that fact.

Confucius had spoken of six things that prejudiced or beclouded² men, leading them astray from virtue. This saying Hsüntze took for a text, and wrote a book on the removal of prejudices. "Everything that men suffer is from being prejudiced by one false thing; and so the great principles are hidden from them."³ Ill-government and calamity is the result of following wrong principles of government; crime and misfortune is the result of following wrong principles of action; wrong philosophical views are the result of being prejudiced by one aspect of life to the disregard of the whole. So prejudice is the source of evil. This statement was a development of what Confucius taught; "To devote oneself to irregular⁴ speculations is decidedly harmful."⁵ Hsüntze's attitude was the same as that of the other great exponent of authority in thought, the Catholic Church, which holds that study of other theologies and philosophies is harmful and should be discouraged. The result of following an unorthodox school of thought is that even though the individual be

Error in
Ethical
Knowledge.

¹ *W.H.*, xvii, 20.

² Or "blinded". *As.*, XVII, vii.

³ *W.H.*, xxi, 1.

⁴ Unorthodox. ⁵ *As.*, II, xvi.

sincerely in search of truth, yet he is misled. He errs in thinking that he can himself judge what is right or wrong, and in addition others mislead him. The result is that he does not pay attention to the right Way of life (which is the Confucian Way), and in this situation although the right Way be as plain as white or black, or as obvious as a drum beat thunderously beside his ear, his attention is distracted, and he cannot perceive the truth.

Unorthodoxy
Leads Astray.

What then can lead men astray? Anything unorthodox.

"Desire can bring prejudice; hate can bring prejudice; the beginning can bring prejudice; the end can bring prejudice; distance can bring prejudice; nearness can bring prejudice; the profound can bring prejudice; the superficial can bring prejudice; the ancient can bring prejudice; the present can bring prejudice. Everything that is unorthodox cannot help from bringing prejudice."¹

Probably Hsüntze had some doctrine or individual in mind for each of these items; Sungtze with his doctrine of desire; the Neo-Micians with their speculations on space and time; Micius basing his unorthodox teaching on the ancient Sages, and others about whom we do not know anything.

Hsüntze illustrated this process of being prejudiced by examples from ancient history and contemporary philosophers. Ch'ie and Chou, evil monarchs of previous dynasties, were led astray by evil ministers or concubines, and so were rejected by the people and perished. Their successors, T'ang and King Wen, profited by observing the wickedness of Ch'ie and Chou, and so made their minds the rulers of their actions,

¹ W.H., xxi, 2.

and hence could continuously employ virtuous prime ministers, so they received the approbation of the whole empire. Similarly he instanced certain government officials and six philosophers, Micus, Sungtze, Shentze, Shengtze, Hueitze, and Chuangtze, each of whom were prejudiced by one thing. "Those who have partial knowledge perceive one aspect of the Way, but they cannot know its totality. So they think it sufficient, and gloss things over."¹ But Confucius was not prejudiced; he possessed all virtue and scholarship; hence he possessed the whole of the Way, and could carry it out. The Sage is not prejudiced by any of the matters mentioned above, and so can judge rightly, and know the truth.

Thus Hsüntze's basis for ethics is fundamentally that of Conclusion. the acceptance of authority. It is one of the most consistently worked out doctrines of authority that we have. It differs from the chief doctrine of authority in the Western world, that of the Catholic theology, chiefly because Hsüntze, from the nature of his metaphysical presuppositions, could not have any doctrine of inspiration. He had to work out a philosophical basis for authority in morals without any doctrine of inspiration to give him the ethical standards that he wished to inculcate. This he did by postulating that correctness of judgment is so difficult to acquire that only the Sage's judgment can be relied upon. Thus his doctrine of authority is the authority of the expert. Much as we of the West dislike the idea of authority, especially in morals, yet we must recognize that in practice most of our opinions and much of our action

¹ W.H., xxi, 5.

are founded on the statements of authorities. We have merely opened the way to verification a little wider than did Hsüntze. Yet his emphasis upon authority as the guide of life seems to be destined to be the fact for most people and most actions. We shall next turn to the content of Confucian ethics as developed by Hsüntze, expressed in various concepts.

CHAPTER VIII

LI AND JEN, OR THE RULES OF PROPER CONDUCT AND BENEVOLENCE

The content of the Confucian ethics can best be discussed by grouping it around the various ethical concepts, *Li*, *Jen*, *Yi*, *Chung*, and *Hsin*.¹ Each of these virtues has been made to include the whole of virtuous action, at different times, and by different writers, but in general the term which includes all the rest is that of *Tao*, the Way of the Sage, or of the Sage-Kings.² *Tao* includes not alone all the ethics but also the whole of the Confucian teaching, which fact indicates how thoroughly ethical is the Confucian philosophy.

The great struggle in ancient ethical philosophy was that of inner morality as against outer morality. The same struggle occurred in Greece, but outward morality was soon vanquished, and the task of Socrates and other philosophers was to construct a new set of moral standards. In China

Struggle of
Inner and
Outer
Morality.

¹ The meanings of some of these terms are in dispute, and there is no exact equivalent in English for any of them. The connotation of these terms is so different from that of any Western ethical concepts, that I have used the Chinese transliteration. They will be discussed and elucidated in this and the following chapter. Roughly *Jen* (仁) means benevolence or humanity. *Li* (禮) is propriety, rites, or the rules of proper conduct. *Yi* (義) is right, justice, or righteousness. *Chung* (忠) is sincerity, consciousness, loyalty. *Hsin* (信) is veracity or faithfulness.

² D.M., XXVII, 3.

the situation was very different. At the time when philosophy first became self-conscious, in the sixth century B.C., China was already ancient in her own eyes, and she had already developed a high civilization and a literature of her own. The Chinese have always been very tenacious of the past; their histories are many and voluminous. They were proud of their past, and of the heroic figures prominent in their annals. Their family system¹ and religion² both favoured dependence upon authority. In the struggle that ensued when progress was made, we find that in China, as in all other ancient nations, outward morality won the battle against inward morality. Until the impact of Western civilization upon China in the last century, custom and customary morality have governed Chinese thinking and action in fundamental matters. Yet there has been a good deal of liberty in many directions, especially under the more liberal non-Chinese emperors.

Jen and Li.

In ancient China this struggle of inner against outer morality was not made explicit, especially within the stream of the orthodox or Confucian thought. Yet it was the reality which underlay much of the philosophical discussion. The concept of *Jen* or benevolence became the protagonist for inner morality and *Li* or ceremony the protagonist for outward morality.³ Reading through the Confucian writings in the light of this view point we can see how in each writer these

¹ Cf. pp. 3-6.

² Cf. pp. 2 f.

³ In some schools, especially that of Tsentze, the concept of *Hsiao* (孝) or filial piety, took the place of *Li*. One member of the larger collection of Thirteen Classics is the *Classic of Filial Piety*, probably composed in the school of Tsentze. *Hsiao* is emphasized by Confucius and Mencius; for Hsüntze it was included as one of the constitutive elements of *Li*.

two motifs of internal and external morality swayed the Confucians back and forth.

As culture developed it was inevitable that there should be an attack upon customary morality; since people in China, just as in ancient Greece, came to criticize and evaluate their moral ideas.¹ This attack centred upon the concept of *Li*, the Confucian usages and ceremonies, which were held in high esteem.

This concept, *Li*, is one of the most important in Chinese *Li* ethics.² The character for this term³ is composed of two parts: the character "to worship" or "to indicate" and the character for "sacrificial vessel".⁴

The inference as to its earliest significance is plain—it meant religious rites. Even to-day, in spite of the great philosophic development of all concepts, the main content of this concept is still that of religious ritual.

¹ Cf. W.H., "A Sketch of Chinese History."

² *Li* may be translated by religion, ceremony, deportment, decorum, propriety, formality, politeness, courtesy, etiquette, good form, good behaviour, good manners, or as I prefer, the rules of proper conduct. In ancient China there were no dictionaries; there was no Hobbes to distinguish between different meanings of the same word; hence a good deal of Chinese philosophizing unconsciously centred around a few concepts, and the philosophers probably had no ideas that they were varying their meanings as long as they used the same word; consequently the concept became as broad as the meaning of the word. But the translator quickly finds that the same translation will not fit everywhere, because of the change in meaning, and then he is at a loss to choose between an idiomatic translation, and an attempt to indicate that the original uses the same word in different passages by an unvarying translation.

³ Since Chinese characters are in a measure pictorial language we can go back to extremely ancient times by investigating these symbols.

⁴ 示 + 壺 = 禮.

As Ritual.

The primitive religion of the Chinese was probably that of the worship of ancestors.¹ In the *Li-Ki* or *Book of Rites*, now one of the Five Classics, we find a remarkable amount of space given to the rites for the departed, and rules for the treatment of the corpse, including details of washing, dressing the corpse, calling the spirit to return, the kind of coffin to be used, the character of the funeral, the articles to be buried with the corpse, the hearse-coverings, the sacrifices to the spirits of the ancestors—each given with great elaboration of detail. The patriarchal family system naturally brought about reverence for the head of the family when dead as well as when alive, and these observances for the dead became an integral part of Confucian ethics.

Chinese religion also included worship of the powers of nature, Heaven, Earth, and other deities. This was amalgamated to the worship of ancestors by making one ancestor or another the representative or equal of some nature spirit. Thus the emperor made his first ancestor (or all his ancestors) the representative of Heaven, and so at the same time he worshipped Heaven with the high progenitor of his clan.² These ceremonies of worship were probably the original content of the concept of *Li*. The importance of the ceremonial element of the concept may be seen in the fact that out of six times that this word is used in our oldest source, the *Book of Odes*, it has this ceremonial significance four times, and only twice a moral significance; similarly in the *Book of History* its meaning is ceremonial nine times and only four

¹ Cf. De Groot, *The Religious System of China*, for details of this side of Chinese religion.

² Cf. *W.H.*, xix, 20.

times moral. The definition of this term in our oldest dictionary, the *Shuo Wen*, is that "*Li* is conduct whereby to worship the spirits and obtain happiness. It comes from 'to worship' and '*Li*, a sacrificial vessel', which also gives its pronunciation". Thus the original meaning of the term was "religious rites".

But the concept was soon broadened. There were the ^{As Custom or Law.} "Five Rites", which were the festive rites (for happy occasions), sorrowful rites (observances for the dead), military rites, guest rites, and marriage rites; there were the "Six Rites", capping (when a boy came to maturity), marriage, funeral and sacrificial rites, district wine drinking, and audience rites; and there were the "Nine Rites", capping, marriage, court rites, rites of inviting a man to take office, funeral rites, sacrificial rites, rites of guest and host, district wine drinking, and military rites. The term came to include all social, habitual, customarily acknowledged practices. Thus *Li* became very important in government, and partook of the nature of law. But it was distinguished from law in that *Li* was customary and law was promulgated. *Li* commanded positive action and law was prohibitory; the violation of law was punishable by the state, whereas violation of *Li* was visited only with social disapproval. *Li* was for the aristocrats; while law did not apply to them; as the *Li-Ki* says, "*Li* does not go down to the common people; punishment does not reach up to the Great Prefects." Except for these three matters, *Li* and law were alike; *Li* was a means of training in virtue and of avoiding evil; it was prophylactic: law was the cure for evil. Every virtuous pattern, every virtue-producing habit, every custom

that made for social happiness and peace, was included in *Li*.¹

As Social
Ceremonies.

Hsüntze spoke of the content of *Li* as "mourning rites, sacrificial rites, court ceremonies, and methods of courtesy".² These mourning and sacrificial rites were regulated by custom and by the philosophers in great detail. A reading of Hsüntze's book "On the Rules of Proper Conduct" or of some of the chapters of the *Li-Ki* will give a vivid idea of what was included in this concept. But while the chief ceremonial content of the term was that of religious rites, especially those for the dead, it was not limited to these. The Chinese are an artistic people among whom histrionic power is extremely common. Their calligraphy is a high art. But for the literati, there was no vehicle of expression for the artistic impulse outside of calligraphy and literature. Sculpture, acting and architecture were trades for the masses only. This artistic impulse and histrionic power found expression through elaborate rituals of courtesy and the ceremonials of social life. Probably these ceremonials were first developed in the petty courts. Every early civilization has developed its court ceremonials, but the Chinese extended them to the courtesies of ordinary life. Among these court ceremonials, those for guests of state were important. Ancient China consisted of a large group of petty feudal states, and so there were many opportunities for the development of this guest-ceremonial. Court ceremonials were also developed, and this court ceremonial, with its elaborate formalities, spread into ordinary life among the literati. In ancient China there was only one occupation

¹ Hu, p. 135 ff.

² W.H., ix, 11.

for a gentleman—political service. The chief families could trace their descent from some ruling family, or from the ruling family of a defunct state; and as originally there were many hundred of these states, which were absorbed by each other until only seven were left, these families were so numerous that a democracy grew up among the class of gentlemen. Instead of a limited number of noble families, as in ancient Rome, there were hundreds, and as more and more of China came to be included in the civilized region the number of noble families was constantly increasing. Hence the gentleman class was large. Confucius traced his ancestry to the ruling family of the state of Sung, who traced their ancestry to the imperial dynasty of Shang. Mencius' ancestry was traced to the ruling house of the state of Lu, which was founded by the illustrious Duke of Chou. Hsüntze's ancestry is traced by some to the ruling family of the extinct state of Hsin.¹ Among so many noble families a democracy naturally developed. These gentlemen, when not supervising their estates, would spend their time at one or other of the many petty courts, or seek employment in the state, until state employment became the sole legitimate occupation for a gentleman—a condition which continued in China until the time of the republic. At these petty courts were probably developed the elaborate formalities of social life, so common still, of which a good example is given in the section describing the District Gathering,² and all the minutæ of social life in an age unhurried by clocks or modern machinery. These ceremonies were referred to as "declining and yielding", i.e. declining an honour or yielding the precedence to others,

¹ 荀子² Cf. *W.H.*, xx, 5 ff.

which still form the essence of what the Chinese mean by courtesy.

**As Military
Ceremonies.**

Likewise military ceremonials were developed, giving pomp and circumstance to military movements. The civilized Chinese rather overawed their more barbaric neighbours by a display of chariots, drums, pennons, etc., than outfought them. The story is told of Yu that he fought against some barbarian tribes to the south, the Miao, but without success; until a minister advised him to cease fighting, return home, and display his virtue—so efficient was this display of virtue, which probably was the pomp of civilization, that within two months the leader of the Miao came to render homage!¹

**As Festive
Ceremonies.**

Festive ceremonies, which included marriage, were also developed. We read that the emperor Shun, on his tours through the empire, regulated the five *Li* or Rites.² These ceremonies were sometimes thought of as established by Heaven, and so divine as well as human.³

As Right.

It was easy to extend such a concept as this to give it a moral significance. Since the ceremonies were what was right to do in any circumstances, *Li* came to have the meaning of right, in which sense it is still commonly used. We find it used with this meaning in the *Book of Odes* in a poem which we can date from astronomical data in the year 755 B.C., the earliest certain date in Chinese history, "It is right (*Li*) that I act thus."

**As External
Morality.**

Similarly the concept was broadened still more to mean external morality—all the usages and acts which distinguish the moral man. It is used in this sense in an ode which is referred to the time of King Wen,⁴ which says that a man

¹ *Hist.*, II, ii, iii, 20, 21.

² *Hist.*, IV, ii, 8, 9; and II, iii, 6.

³ *Hist.*, II, i, 8.

⁴ 1184 B.C.

without *Li* is not as good as a rat; he had better die. In the *Book of History* a repentant emperor says, "I was violating all the rules of right and proper conduct (*Li*)—the result must have been speedy ruin to my person."¹ Again, the moralizing historian of that book says, "Families which for generations have enjoyed places of emolument, seldom observe the rules of proper conduct (*Li*). They become dissolute, and do violence to virtue, setting themselves in positive opposition to the Way (*Tao*) of Heaven."² In this broader sense *Li* came to include all the observances of morality, and in some cases the feelings proper to those observances as well, especially taboos prohibiting marriage with those of the same surname,³ the practise of filial piety, avoiding the use of the name of a deceased parent or emperor, the rewarding of meritorious state servants,⁴ etc. Confucius said, "While parents live, serve them with *Li*; when they are dead, bury them with *Li*, and sacrifice to them with *Li*."⁵ By some, filial piety was considered to be the most important virtue, but in the above quotation, Confucius includes it in *Li*, and so too does the *Classic of Filial Piety* itself.⁶ Since religious and court ceremonies were accompanied with music, music and *Li* came to be used together as a pair of moral terms, and the term music came to possess much of the moral connotation of the word *Li*. Thus the term *Li* was developed in such fashion that it became one of the chief moral concepts of the Chinese, expressing particularly outer and customary morality.

¹ *Hist.*, IV, v, 11, 3.

² *Ann.*, VIII, xxx.

³ *Ann.*, II, v, 3.

⁴ *Hist.*, V, xxiv, 9.

⁵ *Hist.*, V, xlii, 15.

⁶ *Classic of Filial Piety*, ch. xii.

As Correct
Form.

On the other hand, the term was attenuated to mean "correct form". We are told that Confucius at the ancestral temple asked minutely about everything, because this was correct form (*Li*).¹

Since rites and music emanated from the emperor alone, and the nobles might not change them, *Li* became a general term for civil ordinances.² On the other hand, it became courtesy. Mencius said that "declining and yielding" is the essence of *Li*.³ Confucius declared that the true observance of *Li* was so great that if he should treat a prince with perfect *Li*, he would be taken for a sycophant!⁴ All these meanings which we have illustrated were included in the concept *Li*.

Its Values.

It is easy to see the values that clustered around this concept. There were all the values that go with the care of the honoured dead—those feelings of loss and affectionate care for loved ones that sometimes caused a philosopher who had spurned the idea of *Li* to turn around and observe all its ordinances when his own parent died—some of the strongest feelings in the human breast. There were the religious values, the service of the gods, which was the way to gain happiness, and more particularly the worship of ancestors, who were considered to be beneficent beings still exercising great influence upon the fortunes of their descendants, to whom one could go for advice, and from whom one could get aid, who were still members of the family circle, and were represented therein by the ancestral tablet, inhabited by the spirit of the departed, and who must be

¹ *An.*, III, xv.

² *Menc.*, II, II, vi, 5.

³ Cf. *An.*, XVI, ii; *D.M.*, XXVIII, 4.

⁴ *An.*, III, xviii.

propitiated and served, or else they would send calamity. In nobler minds all the love for parents and feelings of filial piety became concentrated into *Li*, for these deceased persons must still be supplied with the necessities of life, and this can only be done by their descendants. The greatest calamity that can befall a house is for its line to become extinct, so that no one can serve the spirits of its ancestors. Hence the desire of every adult for sons to carry on the line (daughters belong to the family into which they marry), to serve him when dead, and the consequent almost unrestricted increase in population. This sentiment that someone must provide for the dead was so strong that when the house of Chou supplanted that of Shang on the imperial throne, it enfeoffed one of the scions of the house of Shang as Duke of the state of Sung, in order that he might have the resources necessary to carry on the ancestral sacrifices to the emperors of the Shang dynasty. Superstition added strength to the natural feelings of veneration and filial love. These ceremonies were crystallized custom, and were deeply embedded in the "mores" of the people: *Li* was upheld by the full strength of custom and "mores". Again, these ceremonies and actions were felt to be right, and the strength of the moral feelings was added to the other values. These rules for action under so many diverse circumstances represented the values of the civilization developed at the original centres of Chinese culture, and one of the first things adopted by a newly civilized tribe was the *Li*, the usages and ceremonials of the educated and cultured people. Thus *Li* represented, in addition to the foregoing, the values of civilization, and for the Confucians, who were the conservers of

the heritage of the race, it was fundamental. Of the thirteen books which comprise the ancient wider collection of classics, four¹ are devoted to the subject of *Lî*. Is it any wonder that the concept of *Lî* has been through all ages one of the strongest influences in the morals and practical life of the people, and has maintained itself as such to the present day?

Attacks upon
Lî.

Lî was the expression of outer morality; it prescribed certain acts to be performed, and without giving any reason except that they must be done. Consequently we find a virulent attack upon *Lî*. But so many values had gathered about it, that it was felt to be intensely valuable and indispensable. At the same time there came an attack upon the costly burial rites in favour of a spare simplicity. Another attack came from the decay of belief in spirits on the part of the more educated people, which belief was originally the heart of many of the observances of *Lî*. We shall try to trace these three strands of thought through the ancient period of Chinese philosophy to Hsüntze, who exalted and rationalized *Lî* as never before, and established it firmly against all attacks, to be one of the foundation principles of subsequent Chinese morals.

Laotze's
Attack.

While the Confucians themselves were not always consistent in upholding *Lî*, the most virulent attack came from the non-Confucian philosophies. Laotze never mentions the term, so alien is it to his philosophy. Troubled by the increasing complexity of life and the laxity of morals he advocated a return to the simple days of yore, when people of one valley looked over the rim of the hills to a neighbouring village in the next valley, heard their cocks crow, but never

¹ *The I-Lî, Chou-Lî, Lî-Ki, and Classic of Filial Piety.*

went there; when writing was unknown and records were kept by knotted ropes. For him the great virtue was inaction, passivity, or quietism, the following of nature. With such an attitude we should not expect him to speak of *Li*. For *Li* had developed *pari passu* with the development of civilization; although its spirit of following custom came from primitive days, yet in his time it represented rather the product of culture and of what he thought was effeminate civilization than the primitive simplicity he wanted. As Lao-tze disbelieved in any personal Spirit or spirits, and postulated instead the *Tao*, impersonal Law which rules alike in nature and in human affairs, he had no place for the worship of the spirits of ancestors.

His great disciple, Chuangtze, attacked *Li* along with Confucianism in general. Here are some of his sayings: "Real mourning grieves in silence." "Our emotions are dependent upon the original purity within, and it matters not what ceremonies may be employed." "Ceremonial (*Li*) is the invention of man. Our original purity is given to us by Nature." "The true Sage should model himself upon Nature and hold his original purity in esteem; he should be independent of human exigencies. Fools, however, reverse this." Thus for Chuangtze morality was inner, not outer morality, and he abominated the Confucian conformity to an external standard. Of burial ceremonies he would have nothing; death to him is a natural event, and sorrow at death is no more sensible than at the change of seasons.

Chuangtze's
Attack.

"When Chuangtze was about to die, his disciples expressed a wish to give him a splendid funeral. But Chuangtze said, 'With Heaven and Earth for my coffin and shell; with

the sun, moon, and stars as my burial regalia ; and with all creation to escort me to the grave—are not my funeral paraphernalia ready at hand ? ”¹

Micius’
Attack.

Micius, even more than Chuangtze, rejected all external morality. He explicitly reduced everything to one principle, that of utility. That which was useful he accepted ; that which was not beneficial he rejected. In thus reducing moral philosophy to one criterion, he cut away the foundation for all customary morality of which *Li* was the refined expression. Indeed the reason for his divergence from the Confucians was just his reaction against the excessive ceremonialism that Confucius and his disciples practised. In morals Micius discovered that utility justified universal love, and it became the fundamental principle of his ethics ; even filial piety must be founded on mutual love. He also fixed his attention upon the expensive funeral rites which formed an essential part of the observance of *Li*, and advocated instead a spare simplicity.

The Con-
fucian
Defence.

Thus both of the two great philosophical schools opposed to Confucianism attacked *Li*. It remained for the Confucians, as the conservors of the racial heritage, to defend it.

Confucius.

Confucius was not primarily a philosopher, but rather a moral reformer, a practical man, intensely interested in human life rather than in philosophy, and in reforming the political and social conditions of his day. In his temperament there was little of the mystical, and the report of his interview with the mystical Laotze (which may not be authentic) was that he was mystified by the Old Philosopher, and compared him to a dragon in the clouds. He was almost

¹ Giles, *Gems of Chinese Literature*, p. 26.

congenitally interested in ceremonial observances; tradition is that as a child he played at sacrificial rites and that he was very learned in all rites and observances of every sort. To an American student of his sayings, he appears most of all as a fine gentleman of the old school, precise, almost prim in some of his actions, yet of sterling character, and immensely learned.

While Confucius never formulated clearly the problem of external versus internal morality, yet he was not satisfied with the moral standards of the day, and so brought forward a principle which at that time was new in Chinese thought.

This was the principle of *Jen*¹ or benevolence, which he made equally important with that of *Lí*. In his teaching, *Jen* became the symbol of inward morality, and we can see how in his mind the principle of inward morality was unconsciously struggling with that of outward morality.

In the *Odes* this word is used very infrequently, only six times (*Lí* is used nine times) and each time in adulation of the ruler, in the phrase, "admirable and kind."² Use of *Jen*.

In the *History* it is used with the same meaning, and again only of the ruler. It indicates their attitude to their inferiors; it is the benevolence or kindness of the superior.³

The character is composed of the two characters for "man" and "two". Thus it means the right relationship of one man to his fellows; in other words a man of *Jen* considers others as well as himself. Its synonyms are benevolence, Its Meaning.

¹ 仁

² 美且仁

³ It is used once of King T'ang, once of the ruler, twice of his ministers and once of Duke Chou (I regard Medhurst's translation of *Hist.*, V, vi, 8, as preferable to that of Legge).

kindness, humanity, humaneness, generosity, altruism, charity, etc.¹ Confucius himself defined it as "Love your fellow-men".² In another place he declared that "The man of *Jen* is one who desiring to maintain himself sustains another, and desiring to develop himself develops others. To be able from one's own self to draw a parallel for the treatment of others—that may be called the rule of *Jen*."³ In other words, *Jen* is the carrying out of the golden rule. It is the highest of the virtues,⁴ and the definition of the Superior man.⁵ But *Jen* is not love in the sense that we use the term. When Confucius was confronted with Laotze's dictum of rewarding enmity with kindness, his practical character came out in his response:—

"Someone asked: 'What do you think about the principle of rewarding enmity with kindness?'"

"'With what, then, would you reward kindness?' asked the Master. 'Reward enmity with just treatment, and kindness with kindness.'" ⁶

Confucius made much of the natural and social relationships of father and son, of prince and minister, of older and younger brother, of husband and wife, and of friend and friend, and in each case except the last there is a separate virtue distinguishing the relationship, and the attitude of the superior is different from that of the inferior.⁷ While Confucianism was democratic in that it postulated for every man the capability of rising to the highest position by his

¹ Soothill, *Analekts*, p. 104.

² *An.*, VI, xxviii.

³ *An.*, IV, v, 2 and 3.

⁴ *Jen* is the kindly, condescending love of the superior for the inferior. Cf. *W.H.*, xi, 14.

⁵ 愛人. *An.*, XII, xxii.

⁶ *An.*, IV, vi, 1.

⁷ *An.*, XIV, xxxvi.

own efforts, yet it stressed the stratification of society, and the differentiation of duties and attitudes due to that stratification. It was a democratic aristocracy of merit that was its ideal. By *Jen* Confucius meant the ideal attitude of the superior to the inferior; not the love of equals, but rather the benevolence of the prince or paterfamilias, kindness rather than love.

But he was not consistent in his use of the term. As the highest of the virtues, *Jen* came to include the whole of virtue, and to be equivalent to Virtue itself, and so to include other elements than love; he defined it as respect, magnanimity, sincerity, earnestness, and kindness,¹ and even applied it to all, not merely the superior.

In Confucius' use of this concept he was getting away from the ethics of authority. *Jen* was a general principle just as was the golden rule; it was not a code of actions already decided upon, for whose use only casuistry was required; it was a principle which each individual would have to apply for himself. In so far it was the opposite of *Li*, and it is not surprising that Confucius was asked again and again to define it—to state what it meant in concrete situations, so that people could know it just as they knew the code prescribed by *Li*. *Jen* was a principle whose consistent application would have carried Confucius into a break with the old order of things in favour of the right of the individual to decide matters for himself.

But Confucius did not see whither this new principle was leading him, and he was extremely unwilling to break with the past. He did not see clearly what was implied in

¹ *Ans.*, XVII, vi.

Jen, and in defining it, defined *Jen* by *Li*, in a famous passage:—

“When Yen Yuan (his favourite disciple) asked the meaning of *Jen*, the Master replied: ‘*Jen* is the denial of self and response to *Li*. Deny yourself one day and respond to *Li*, and everybody will accord that you are *Jen*. For has *Jen* its source in oneself, or is it derived from others?’

“‘May I beg the main features?’ asked Yen Yuan.

“The Master answered: ‘If it is not *Li*, do not look; if not *Li*, do not listen; if not *Li*, do not speak; if not *Li*, do not move.’”¹

Thus Confucius confused his principle of liberty with the traditional principle of authority. Indeed we find him emphasizing *Li* equally as much as *Jen*:—

“The subjects on which the Master most frequently discoursed were—the *Odes*, the *History*, and *Li*—on all these he constantly dwelt.”²

“The Master said: ‘Let the character be formed by the Poets, established by *Li*, and perfected by music.’”³

The love of *Li* is one of the essentials of character.⁴ Reverence (courtesy), caution, bravery, and frankness must all be controlled by *Li*.⁵ He told his son to study the *Odes* and the *Book of Rites (Li)*.⁶ There is one passage in which Confucius assented to the proposition of a disciple that morals are first and *Li* is secondary, but in that passage, *Li* seems to mean only manners, rather than *Li* in its full sense.⁷ Elsewhere he said that although a man have all

¹ *An.*, XII, i.

² *An.*, VII, xvii.

³ *An.*, VII, viii.

⁴ *An.*, I, xv, i.

⁵ *An.*, VIII, ii.

⁶ *An.*, XVI, xiii.

⁷ *An.*, III, viii; cf. Soothill's translation of this passage.

other virtues, including *Jen*, if he does not act according to *Lí*, he is lacking.¹ He could hardly have said more than that!

Altogether *Lí* is mentioned in the *Analects* forty-one times, and *Jen* fifty-four times.² When we remember that *Jen* was the new thing, which would be likely to be discussed much more frequently than *Lí*, which was already understood, and when we remember Confucius' own fondness for the proprieties and ceremonies, we realize that he emphasized *Lí* equally as much as *Jen*, if not more. In his thought, external and inner morality were correlative and unreconciled elements.

It would not be necessary to spend so much time showing how Confucius stressed both *Lí* and *Jen*, had not one prominent interpreter of the Confucian philosophy³ confused Confucius' teaching with that of Mencius, and ascribed to Confucius the attitude that *Jen* is the supreme virtue. Not even Mencius neglected *Lí*; it was too firmly embedded in the Confucian tradition, and too much a bulwark against the attack of the unorthodox schools. Confucius never claimed to be an originator, but only a transmitter of the best in the heritage of the past. As transmitting the past, he found in *Lí* a fundamental principle. However, he felt that the present generation, though they called themselves cultured, yet lacked the real spirit of *Lí* and music, and he followed the

¹ *Ana.*, XV, xxxii.

² Cf. the index of Chinese characters to Goodhill's edition of the *Analects* for a complete list of these references.

³ Suzuki, *History of Ancient Chinese Philosophy*. He followed the interpretation of Chu Hsi, who harmonized the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, and interpreted them as wholly consistent with each other.

ancients.¹ While he sometimes stressed the spirit of *Li* rather than the form,² yet he said explicitly that he cared for the correctness of the ceremony itself.³ With Confucius *Li* became far more than rites, it became the rules of proper conduct; nevertheless it did not lose its traditional authoritarian character. Confucius never succeeded in bringing together the inner morality he was advocating and the outward morality he was stressing.

The Great
Learning.

In the *Great Learning*, which is a commentary by Tsentze on a saying of Confucius,⁴ there is no advance beyond the equivocal position of Confucius. One quotation will suffice:

"There is filial piety⁵;—therewith the prince should be served. There is reverence for elders—therewith elders and superiors should be served. There is *Jen*—therewith the multitude should be treated."⁶

Doctrine of
the Mean.

The *Doctrine of the Mean* enunciates the famous definition of *Jen* as "fellow-feeling", which is repeated by Mencius.⁷ In this work both external and inner virtue are likewise emphasized. While among the list of three virtues given therein, *Jen* finds a place,⁸ yet *Li* is equally emphasized.⁹ The superior man "exerts an honest, generous earnestness in the esteem and practice of *Li*."¹⁰ This work makes another of the Confucian virtues, *Ch'eng* or sincerity,¹¹ fundamental and glorified sincerity as the sum and substance of all virtue.

¹ *An.*, XI, I.

² *An.*, III, iv.

³ *An.*, III, xvii, 2.

⁴ Cf. p. 87.

⁵ Filial piety and reverence for elders are two of the constituent elements of *Li*.

⁶ *G.L.*, IX, i.

⁷ *D.M.*, xx, 5: repeated in *Menc.*, VI, ii, xvi.

⁸ *D.M.*, xx, 8.

⁹ *D.M.*, xxvii, 3.

¹⁰ *D.M.*, xxvii, 7.

¹¹ 誠

We have seen that Mencius clearly took the position that *Mencius*. virtue was inner, not outer morality.¹ Virtue must be the natural development of the nature of man; it cannot be anything external.² He made *Li* the expression of the feelings of modesty and complaisance. Logically there would be no place for *Li* in a system of inner morality, for he could not infer all the observances of *Li* from these inner feelings; there was too much of the customary and irrational included in *Li*. Logically he should have eliminated *Li* altogether, and stressed *Jen* and the other inner virtues. Sometimes he seemed to do this. To King Hwei of Liang he said "not profit, but *Jen* and righteousness are my only topics,"³ and when asked what should be the business of the unemployed scholar, replied that it was "to exalt his aim" by "setting it simply on benevolence and righteousness"; and in the Chinese text it is clearly implied that he should set his aim on benevolence and righteousness "and nothing more."⁴ Throughout his teaching Mencius stressed the inner virtues more than the outer. Yet he could not emancipate himself from the dominance of customary morality: to have done so would have meant to break with Confucianism, and Mencius saw too many values in Confucianism to break with it. In one saying he went so far as to subordinate everything else to *Li*:

"The richest fruit of *Jen* is serving one's parents (filial piety, which is an element in *Li*); the next fruit of *Yi* (justice or righteousness) is obeying one's older brother (the virtue of brotherly obedience, another element of *Li*);

¹ Cf. p. 88 f.

² *Menc.*, I, 1, i, 3.

³ Cf. *Menc.*, II, 1, B, 15.

⁴ *Menc.*, VII, 1, xxxiii.

the richest fruit of wisdom is knowing those things; the richest fruit of music is rejoicing in them."¹

In his practice and teaching he tended to emphasize the ritual aspect of *Lí*. He gave his own mother a splendid funeral, so splendid as to be criticized for the expense he lavished upon it.² He got the prince of Lu to observe the three years of mourning for his father, a practice which the Confucians stressed.³ He taught that the care of parents is not as important as their obsequies.⁴ He insisted upon the performance of certain rites as essential to even a Sage becoming Emperor,⁵ and as necessary in receiving presents.⁶ He approved the forester who preferred death rather than to go to his prince when summoned by the wrong signal, and said that he should have died rather than presume to go.⁷ So far did the customary morality of Confucianism carry him from his original premises.

HSÜNTZE.

It was only in Hsüntze that the typically Confucian principle of authority and of external morality came to its logically pre-eminent place. We have seen that this was not the only element in Confucius' own teaching; that he did not wholly follow the authoritarian ethics; but the other was the side of his ethics which he had in common with the non-Confucians, and when Confucianism recognized just what was the character of the attack made upon it, it came to clearness also as to what was its own distinctive position—reliance upon the authority of the Sages and Classics and an authoritarian ethics.

¹ *Menc.*, IV, 1, xxvii.

² *Menc.*, III, 1, ii.

³ *Menc.*, V, 1, vi, 3.

⁷ *Menc.*, V, 11, vii, 3, 7.

² *Menc.*, II, 11, vii.

⁴ *Menc.*, IV, 11, xlii.

⁶ *Menc.*, V, 11, vi.

Consequently, to Hsüntze, *Li* is the chief virtue, and really the whole of virtue, including every other. Frequently in his writings he combines another with it to emphasize one aspect of the whole; usually, it is *Li* and *Yi*, or *Li* and music, sometimes *Li* alone; but *Li* is so developed that it includes within itself the constituent elements of these other virtues too.

"Of the things that are in heaven there are none brighter than the sun and moon . . . of the things that are human there are none brighter than the rule of proper conduct (*Li*) and justice (*Yi*). . . . The destiny of men is from Heaven; the destiny of a country is from observing the rules of proper conduct (*Li*). . . . The principles of proper conduct (*Li*) have remained unchanged through the time of all the Kings. They are sufficient to permeate the Way of life (*Tao*). One king fell and another rose; that which conformed to these principles permeated them all. When these principles permeate a government, there can be no misgovernment and disorder. He who does not know how to make them permeate his actions does not know how to alter his actions to suit changing conditions. When they permeate the whole of a person's conduct, he can never fail. Ill-government and calamity are born of their lack; good government comes from exhausting their minute. . . . The one who governs the people tests their virtue. . . . That which he tests it by are the rules of proper conduct (*Li*)."¹ "The rules of proper conduct (*Li*) are that whereby a person's character is corrected; a teacher is that whereby the rules of proper conduct are corrected. . . . When a person's emotions are naturally in

¹ *W.H.*, xvii, 18-20.

accordance with the rules of proper conduct (*Li*), and his knowledge is equal to that of his teaching, then he is a Sage."¹

For Hsüntze, the *Tao*, the Confucian Way and ethics, is *Li*, and *Li* is the *Tao*. This conception of conduct as conformity to an external standard is the logical outcome of Hsüntze's teaching of the necessity of authority in ethics. Virtue is a rule to force human nature, which is fundamentally evil, into right ways. If man's nature is originally evil, though he have the capability of developing to the utmost heights of Sagehood, can he discover what is good and right? For this he needs an external standard, which he can find only in *Li*, the rules showing what conduct is right and proper, established by the Sages of old, especially those who created the fundamental elements of civilization and culture. Without such a standard, morality cannot develop. Thus Hsüntze gains both an external authoritarian doctrine of virtue, and at the same time shows the absolute necessity of the cultivation of virtue for right conduct.

Thus *Li*, which is standards of conduct and ceremonies to be performed, fits Hsüntze's conception of virtue much better than any other virtue, and so we are not surprised to find that he emphasized it almost to the complete exclusion of *Jen*.

"The principle of *Li* is truly deep. . . Its principle is truly great. . . Its principle is truly high. . . When the superior man has investigated into *Li*, he cannot be cheated as to what is false. . . *The rules of proper conduct (Li) are the utmost of human morality.* . . . The student who resolutely studies

¹ W.H., II, 22.

Li becomes a Sage ; without specially studying it, he becomes a directionless person."¹

In Hsüntze's teaching, *Jen* has almost disappeared. It ^{*Jen in Hsüntze.*} remains only as an attribute of the benevolent and kindly prince who seeks the welfare of his people ;² it has become characteristic of the Sage alone, who, because of his highly developed character can rise superior to the ordinary man, and can himself be the source of authority.³ For him, morals can proceed from within. Hsüntze's Sage is psychologically similar to Mencius' ordinary man. Thus Hsüntze does give inner morality a place in his teaching along with outer morality. But like a practical Confucian, he does not emphasize it, for few could rise to the high state of a Sage ; instead he emphasizes the kind of morality which is practical, which is for the people whom he was teaching, and for whom he was writing, who were only ordinary men.

In this conflict between inner and external morality, ^{*The Judgment of Posterity.*} how has posterity judged between the contestants ? Confucianism was so completely victorious that its opponents were forgotten until rediscovered in the recent revival of ancient philosophies. This victory was due chiefly to the inherent place of Confucianism as the orthodox teaching of the courts, to the fact that it preserved the values which had been worked out by the race, and to the fact that it accorded with the conservative tendency of the times. In its victory Confucianism became authoritarian, and thus Hsüntze came nearer to the ultimate attitude of posterity

¹ *W.H.*, xix, 7 f. ² *W.H.*, xv, 11 ; i, 10 ; and Book XV *passim*.

³ "The Sage founds his conduct upon *Jen* and *Yü*." *W.H.*, viii, 19.

than Mencius. We have already seen that in this matter of authority, Chu Hsi, the greatest enemy of Hsüntze, agreed with him.¹ At the same time the teaching of *Li* had a great development; the collection of writings on the subject of *Li*, contained in the present *Book of Rites* and in the larger collection entitled *The Ritual of the Senior Tai*,² were compiled; and the other collections of *Li*, the *Chou-Li* and the *I-Li* were stressed. In this Han period Hsüntze exerted a profound influence upon Confucianism. Part of his writings on *Li* were inserted in the present *Book of Rites*, in the Senior Tai's collection, and Sze-ma Ch'ien, in his chapter on *Li*, quoted Hsüntze extensively. The greatest scholar of the period, Tang Chung-shu, was profoundly influenced by Hsüntze. The fact that Hsüntze was later condemned because of his teaching about human nature does not alter his influence upon Confucianism, for at the time when that judgment was finally passed by Chu Hsi, Hsüntze's teaching had already passed into the orthodox stream of thought and even Chu Hsi himself had been influenced by it.

In the practice of the educated Chinese, *Li* has always held a high place, much higher than a study of the *Analects* and Mencius would lead one to suppose. The ceremonials of polite form, of measured and stately action, still occupy a high place in the esteem of the people, and in the matter of the importance of *Li*, Hsüntze is a much better guide to the present thought of the people than is Mencius. In so far as custom has ruled China, which might be said to be almost to the whole extent, Hsüntze's conception of Confucianism

¹ Note 1, p. 103.

² 大戴禮記

as authoritarian morality has been the actual practice of the people.

We fortunately have an excellent summary of Chinese Burial Rites, thought upon the subject of the second attack upon the Confucian concept of *Lǐ*, that upon the costly burial rites in favour of a spare simplicity (except that as in all other Western discussions, Hsüntze is ignored) in De Groot's valuable collection of materials.¹ Consequently we can deal with that matter more briefly, merely summarizing his account and supplementing it at points, while we refer the reader to De Groot for particulars.

The primitive Chinese method of burial seems to have been the burial of the dead in his house, and the abandonment of that house together with all the possessions of the dead as still belonging to the deceased. Among some of these primitive Chinese tribes, wives and subordinates of the deceased were also sacrificed. But of this period we know nothing; we can only infer. Naturally there could be little cultural advance with such customs. However, it is quite possible that customs varied in different parts of the country, and as intercourse developed, customs of different origin came to be syncretized and united in one code. At the early stage of culture, when a house was a dug-out in the loess and life was simple, the abandonment of the house and movables of the head of the family did not involve any very great loss. But when culture developed this practice began to cause serious loss. Quantities of timber were used to make heavy coffins, one inside another; woven

¹ *Religious System of China*, Book I, pt. III, ch. viii, "Reaction against the waste of wealth on burying the dead," vol. II, p. 659 ff.

fabrics were used to make grave clothes. Enormous quantities of articles of value and daily use were put into the graves for the use of the spirit. In the Han dynasty one-third of the revenues of the State were set aside for the purpose of preparing the grave and articles for burial with the reigning sovereign. This seems to have been a later exaggeration of the tendency which existed from primitive times to make the funeral as sumptuous and as costly as possible.

Immolation. The burial of the living with the dead does not seem to have been a common custom in ancient historic China. Instances of it occur, especially in connexion with the burial of sovereigns. One theory is that it was confined to the western and more barbaric state of Ts'in, but that theory is debatable. Among thinking men it seems to have been generally disapproved. Hsüntze writes, "Killing the living to send off the dead is murder."¹ In spite of this prevalent disapproval, the practice continued sporadically for many centuries, and such is the tenacity of custom in China that public suttees were still performed as late as within the last fifty years. This is a case where the sentiment of the philosophers was all on one side and popular practice largely on the other. To judge of China solely by its philosophical opinion is a mistake in this matter as well as in that of war. There has always been a feeling among the people that philosophy was not practical, and in practice sometimes even the orthodox teachings have been largely disregarded or modified in practical life, even though there was no philosophy to support the contrary stream of thought.

Confucius. Confucius himself protested against the extravagant

¹ W.H., xix, 18.

burial practices of the age. He buried his own son in a coffin without a wooden ornamented coffin cover or outer shell. When his favourite disciple, Yen Yuan, died, this disciple's father came to Confucius to beg him to give his carriage to sell to buy a coffin shell. Although Confucius was old and really had no use for his carriage, he refused, and forbade his disciples to give Yen Yuan a sumptuous funeral. However, Confucius' words must have been only a mild exhortation, for in spite of them, Yen Yuan was given a rich burial.¹ Evidently the sentiment even of a Confucius was too weak to stop the current of the times. Possibly here as elsewhere, he tried to cleave to the golden mean, and was but a lukewarm opponent of lavish funerals.

Serious opposition came from the non-Confucians. We *Micius*. have already quoted the reply that the naturalism of Chuangtze caused him to give to the proposition that he be given a lavish funeral.² But Chuangtze was a recluse, and his opinions on matters of practical life did not matter. It was rather Micius, who himself was a hard-working government official, and who founded a new religious-philosophical sect, who brought any great influence to bear upon this matter. Rich funerals "do not enrich the poor, nor increase the population, nor remove dangers, nor convert anarchy into good rule," hence they are not consistent with moral rectitude or filial devotion. He claimed that in ancient times burials were extremely simple, and advocated a spare simplicity in burials for the reason that anything else would

¹ The story of the carriage may be untrue, but Confucius' disapproval of a sumptuous burial is trustworthy.

² p. 123 f.

not be conducive to public welfare. By the end of the Chou period, the Mician philosophy had come to be of pretty nearly equal importance with the Confucian doctrine. But philosophers have always found it difficult or impossible to change the "mores" of the people, and in this case the philosophers themselves were divided. Reasonable though his arguments seem to us, they carried little weight to the people of those days.¹ When his philosophy perished in the Han period, his teaching on burials also disappeared.

Mencius.

The Confucians generally seem to have taken a moderate position between Micius and the advocates of lavishness. Mencius followed the tendency of the times in giving his mother so lavish a funeral that even some Confucians protested.² This could not have been a sumptuous burial according to later standards. Micius' position in opposing the performance of funeral rites and *Li* was especially vulnerable, as it went directly against the popular feeling, and Mencius made full use of this fact to attack Micius, alleging that he was lacking in filial piety.³ The Confucians, including Mencius, seem to have gradually introduced the custom of three years' mourning for parents and prince,⁴ and Mencius succeeded in getting the prince of the state of Lu to adopt it, together with the practice of the wearing of mourning garments, and the eating of thin rice gruel during mourning, a new custom for that locality,⁵ and he also opposed the shortening of the time of mourning.⁶

¹ Cf. the case of one follower of Micius who did not conform to his master's teaching in this matter, *Menc.*, III, I, v, 2.

² *Menc.*, II, II, vii.

³ *Menc.*, III, I, v, 2.

⁴ In *D.M.*, xviii, 3, it was as yet for the Emperor only.

⁵ *Menc.*, III, I, ii.

⁶ *Menc.*, VII, I, xxxix.

Hsüntze took the general Confucian position, and so Hsüntze attacked Micus. In a telling way he described the burial of people of various classes of society, from the Emperor down, until he came to the burial of a criminal, for whom only his wife and child should weep, whose coffin and grave-clothes should be simple and cheap, whose funeral should be simple, with no mourning period afterwards, ending, "This is called the greatest shame,"¹ and the kind of burial that Hsüntze was describing as fit for a criminal alone was what Micus advocated for everybody!

Hsüntze took a mean position between the extreme of Micus and the extravagance of some. But Hsüntze, no more than Mencius, advocated such a simplicity as Confucius had advised. Two and a half centuries had intervened, and cultural development and wealth had increased in the intervening period, so that Confucius might have called Hsüntze as well as Mencius extravagant.

"To serve the living without loyalty and faithfulness or without any sense of what is respectful or beautiful is what is meant by savagery. To care for the dead without loyalty and faithfulness or without any sense of what is respectful or beautiful is what is meant by shabby treatment. . . . Hence for the emperor the inner and outer coffins have seven thicknesses; for the great prefects three thicknesses, for the officers two thicknesses. Besides they each have more or less coverings of cloth laid over the corpse in its coffin, and presents, generously or stingily presented; they each have a great ornamented flabellum, adornments, and things of that sort, to reverence and beautify the dead, to cause

¹ *W.H.*, xix, 10 f.

their life and death, their end and previous life, to be alike. . . . This is the way of the early kings, the last thing that a faithful minister or a filial son can do."¹

He also speaks of months of preparation for the funeral, calling the relatives from far and near, of wooden and pottery articles, including musical instruments, for burial with the dead (but cheaply made, especially for that purpose), and of the hearse as buried with the coffin. Hsüntze followed the popular trend in matters of burial.

Later
Development

Posterity has agreed in the main with Hsüntze and the Confucians in this matter. Funerals, especially those of persons of social standing and wealth, have continued to be sumptuous; but the extravagant burial of wealth gradually ceased, and at the present time paper articles are burnt instead.

Belief in
Spirits.

A third and more subtle attack was made upon *Lî* from a different angle. All these elaborate burial ceremonies, the burial of articles with the dead, and sacrifice to the dead subsequently, imply that the dead still live as spirits, and are capable of receiving and using these articles. But as culture spread, in China as in ancient Greece, scepticism developed as to the existence of spirits. As a result there came to be the need of rationalizing these ceremonies, else they would no longer be performed, and the values expressed by *Lî* would be lost.

Laotze disbelieved in the existence of any individual spirits or spirit; Chuangtze followed him in this particular. Micius, on the other hand, believed in hosts of spirits which aid men in doing right. In the Confucian teaching, belief

¹ W.-H., xix, 6 f.

in spirits, and in Heaven or the Superior Ruler of All on High was embedded in the Classics, which were the Bible of the school. Confucius took an agnostic attitude to this matter: "Reverence the spirits but avoid them"; when asked about the future life, he replied, "We know not life, how can we know death?" Yet it is recorded that he sacrificed to his forefathers and spirits as if they were present.¹ He seemed to have felt that he had insufficient grounds for denying the belief in spirits, although he realized that they added nothing to moral life; yet he felt that the best thing to do was to continue the ceremonies prescribed by the ancients. In regard to the rationalizing of *Li*, he did little. In his time the necessity existed, for he complained of religious observances (*Li*) performed without reverence, and mourning conducted without grief.² Evidently some were treating *Li* as a mere form and neglecting the proper feelings which should go therewith.

We have seen how the less critical *Doctrine of the Mean* accepted the reality of spirits, while they dwindled in importance for Mencius.³ Spirits did not function in his philosophy. But as *Li* did not properly belong to his philosophy either, he did not feel the need of rationalizing it.

But for Hsüntze this problem became very important. He made *Li* central in his teaching, and yet categorically denied the existence of spirits.⁴ He was thus able to meet sceptics on their own ground, but he was also forced to seek a different basis for *Li* and to give it a thorough rational foundation. This is the theme of Book XIX, which was

¹ *An.*, III, xii.

² *An.*, III, xxvi.

³ p. 64 f.

⁴ Cf. p. 68.

Hsüntze's
Rationaliza-
tion of *Li*.

thought so valuable by ancient Chinese thinkers that parts of it were quoted in the *Li-Ki*, one of the Five Classics (though without giving credit to Hsüntze), in the *Ritual of the Senior Tai*, in Sze-ma Ch'ien's *Historical Record*, and elsewhere.

Li arises from the need of ordering and nourishing the nature of man, which is originally evil. Its purpose is twofold : to educate and nourish human nature, and to create the distinctions of superior and inferior, which are the basis of human society. It is thus not only a moral but also a social and political principle. It is the source of government and of strength. Without it the strongest city is unstable. It has three sources : Heaven and Earth brought it to birth ; our ancestors made it fit the situation ; human rulers and teachers formed it : hence *Li* serves these three. In ceremonial rites there are two elements : doing just as the ancients did, and following people's liking ; both of which are expressed in these rites. Thus water, raw fish, and an ancient kind of meat soup are sacrificed as being the most ancient foods and drink ; but wine and spirits, rice and millet are used (the sacrifice was accompanied by a feast in which the worshippers partook of a common feast) as showing that men's liking is also followed. But more important than this element is the fact that ceremonies are the expression of the æsthetic impulse. "All rites and rules of proper conduct begin in accumulating rules ; they are perfected in becoming beautiful and end in producing joy. Hence when they have reached perfection, men's emotion and sense of beauty are both fully expressed."¹ In a race the members

¹ *W.H.*, xix, 6 f.

of which all seem to possess good histrionic powers, it is natural that the sense of beauty should express itself in ordinary conduct, especially when denied other expression in large measure. Rites are the beautiful expression of emotion.

Hsüntze utilized this conception of *Li* in rationalizing the various uses of *Li*: in social intercourse, in funeral ceremonies, in mourning, and in sacrifices.

In social intercourse the man who knows *Li* can treat others properly: to superiors his conduct reaches the heights of ritual beauty; to inferiors his acts are simple; but in dealing with equals he makes his ceremonial conduct express his emotions, he relates them as inner and outer. No matter what a person does, whether it is walking, fast riding, or galloping, he should keep within the bounds of what is *Li* (proper). *Li* makes dignity, greatness, and illustriousness. In Social Intercourse.

Rites are to care for life and death, and so Hsüntze also considers those rites which care for death. The fundamental principle in funeral rites is that of treating the dead as in their life. This principle is used to rationalize all the details of funeral rites—a marvellous undertaking and carried out in considerable detail. The principle which he uses is not original with Hsüntze. Confucius stated that when parents are living they should be served by *Li*, and when dead they should be buried and sacrificed to according to the same principle¹; this statement may have been the basis for the assertion in the *Doctrine of the Mean* that King Wu and Duke Chou "served the dead as they would have served them alive; they served the departed as they would have served In Funeral Ceremonies.

¹ Ana., II, 8.

the living,"¹ which is the original of Hsüntze's principle. Funerals are the honouring of the dead as in their life, the indication of their rank when dead as when alive. In China death does not level all men. The ceremonies after death are the measured expression of sorrowful feelings. After the death a day must pass before the encoffining, and three days before the household goes into mourning—in order to allow for the proper preparation of all things; for the same reason a delay of some months is necessary before the burial. "For the three months' burial is for the sake of the living, to beautify the dead, not immediately leaving the dead in order to comfort the living. This is the meaning of the most exalted affectionate thoughts."²

The meaning of the details of the preparation of the corpse is given thus: "At every turn, beautify it; in every move, remove it farther away; with the lapse of time, return to the ordinary course of life."³ Death is of itself ugly and distasteful; if not beautified by ritual, the reverence for parents which should persist after death would disappear. The details of washing and dressing the corpse are in order to move gradually away from the scene of death, and funeral rites are to allow the emotions to find vent gradually and be allayed.

Li is human emotion expressed, harmonized, and beautified so as to become a pattern for all. It uses the features, the voice, food, garments, and dwellings, and gives each their appropriate means of expressing emotion. As a pattern, *Li* aids those whose expression of sorrow would be too little,

¹ *D.H.*, XIX, 6.² *W.H.*, xix, 11.³ *W.H.*, xix, 12.

and those whose expression of sorrow would be too violent, alike to reach a golden mean. By means of *Li*, the degenerate son is kept from becoming worse than a beast, and the over-sensitive man is prevented from injuring himself. *Li* is the beautifying of man's original nature by means of acquired characteristics which could not be acquired of themselves. Thus Hsüntze combines in a remarkable fashion the inner emotions and outward observances to make a harmonious whole of action.

Funeral rites are the beautifying of the dead by the living, treating the dead like the living, the absent like the present, making their end and their previous life alike. Hsüntze illustrates this principle by details of bathing, dressing the corpse, and even by the articles buried with the coffin—which he explains by saying that burial is like moving house, but the articles prepared are only cheap imitations, not finished, unusable, showing that they are for the sake of assuaging the feelings of the living, rather than for the use of the dead. Rites are the beautifying of joy, sorrow, reverence, and majesty. The tomb and tumulus is like a house; the coffin is like a carriage; the hearse coverings are like door curtains.

"Hence funeral ceremonies are for nothing else than to make plain the meaning of death and life, to send off the dead with sorrow and reverence, and at his end, to provide for storing his body away, for burial is reverently storing his body away. Sacrifice is reverently serving his spirit; engraving his eulogy is to hand it on to posterity. . . . Service of the living is beautifying their life; sending off the dead is beautifying their end; when the end and the previous life

are both attended to, the task of a filial son is completed ; the way of the sage is completed."¹

Three Years
of Mourning.

Hsüntze next takes up mourning ceremonies, and asks the question : why should a son mourn three years for his parents ? During this time he is supposed to live in a leap-to hut, wear coarse garments, eat only thin rice gruel, sit on fire-wood, and sleep on the earth while he thinks of and bemoans his lost one. This custom seems to have been introduced into educated China by the Confucians, as the appropriate expression of filial piety, though it would not have been originated by them had they not found the custom already established somewhere. It was not the custom among the ruling family of Lu,² but may have been taken from the customs of some other state, possibly that of Sung, where the ancient customs of the preceding dynasty were preserved, and from which Confucius' family sprang. We find Confucius advocating this three years of mourning,³ and attempting to rationalize it on the ground that because a child is carried in its parent's arms for three years,⁴ that length of time is right for mourning.⁵ In the *Doctrine of the Mean* we find it is extended to the prince as well as the parent, though in that book only the emperor is given three years of mourning, while inferior princes are given only one year.⁶

¹ *W.H.*, xix, 17 f.

² *Menc.*, III, 1, ii.

³ *An.*, XVII, xxi.

⁴ The period was not three full years as we count them, but was counted as all ages are in China : when it is "going on" to three years, i.e. 26 or 27 months. Babies in China are carried around by the mother or nurse until over two years old.

⁵ *An.*, XVII, xxi.

⁶ *D.M.*, XVIII, 2.

Hsüntze states that this three years or twenty-five months of mourning is to express the motions of sorrow in fit measure. "A bad wound remains for a long time; a severe hurt heals slowly; three years of mourning arises because ceremonies were established in accordance with the strength of the emotions. Therefore it is the extremity of the greatest distress,"¹ viz. sorrow for the loss of a parent.

"If one of the larger birds or beasts should lose its mate, after a month or season it would certainly return and go about its old haunts. Then it would certainly walk back and forth, howl, now move and now stop, embarrassed, and not knowing what to do, before it can leave the place. Even the small ones, such as the gray finch, will twitter a moment before it can leave the place."² How much more man, with his superior intelligence, should mourn his lost ones! Man's sorrow remains unexhausted even till death; for a cultivated gentleman, twenty-five months of mourning passes like a team of horses going over a crevice in the road. Others might think it too long; hence the early Kings and Sages established a mean period. In one year nature makes a complete mutation; to magnify it, the Kings doubled that period. The natural history of this argument may be faulty, but Hsüntze's argument is affecting. The period of mourning for other relatives is less, as they are less to a person than are his parents. "The three years of mourning is the most beautiful thing in human practices."³

Hsüntze extends the same period of mourning to the prince, for whom a minister should mourn three years. Why? Because a prince is more than father and mother. "A father

¹ *W.H.*, xix, 18.

² *Ibid.*

³ *W.H.*, xix, 10.

can beget a child, but he cannot feed it; a mother can feed it but cannot instruct it; the prince can both feed his people and is good at instructing them."¹

Why a period of three to seven months (depending on the rank of the deceased) after the encoffining to the burial? To enable everything to be prepared, "that it may be sufficiently well in hand so that it may be completed; that it may be completed well enough so as to permit it to be beautiful; that it may be beautiful enough so as to be perfect: to permit things to be wholly perfect is the right way (Tao)."²

Thus Hsüntze endeavoured to rationalize every detail of the existing funeral rites, and at the same time to legislate as to what was proper. That his influence in this direction was great can be seen from the existence of so many books of ritual among the Classics. Only in China would a philosopher have busied himself with the details of funeral rites.

Sacrifice to
the Departed.

Next Hsüntze took up the subject of sacrifice, which was sacrifice to the spirits of the departed ancestors, and was an integral part of *Li*. What is sacrifice? Man's memories, thoughts, and longings need expression; the impulse they give is extremely strong and needs relief. Because of the surge of this emotion, rites were established to honour the honoured prince and love the beloved parent; sacrifice is a beautiful series of actions to give expression and relief to human emotion. In this deep insight, Hsüntze comes near the Aristotelian doctrine of catharsis, but he relates it to a different set of emotions and a different method of relief. His teaching comes nearer to the Freudian doctrine of the

¹ *W. H.*, xix, 20.

² *Ibid.*

necessity of the expression of any deep-seated impulse. Music, mourning garments, "cleansing the temple, spreading out tables and mats, offering animals and grain, praying for blessings, as if the deceased enjoyed the sacrifice; taking the offerings and offering them all as if the deceased tasted them; offering the three-legged wine-cup without washing it; for the one who sacrifices to have a wine-bottle ready as if the deceased drank from his goblet; when the guests leave, for the host (who was the sacrificer) to bow them off, change to his mourning clothes, and sit down and weep, as if the spirit of the departed had left—this is sorrow, reverence, serving the dead as if serving the living, serving the departed as if serving those who are present; an appearance without the inner reality, imagery become a ritual." ¹

While we, with our different environment and training, unaccustomed to elaborate funeral rites, may find it difficult to appreciate all of this detailed rationalization of ceremonies; yet they strike a sympathetic chord in our breasts, and we feel that here was a man who knew the depths of the human heart, and with great originality was trying to preserve to his people those rites in which their hearts had found consolation and comfort even after the reality had left the beliefs which originated them.

That posterity approved of this rationalization of *Li* is ^{Later} shown by the fact that part of it was incorporated into the ^{Development.} *Book of Rites*, and became an integral part of the Five Classics, which, under the old system of education, every student memorized. In present practice *Li* is still funda-

¹ *W. E.*, xix, 23.

mental in the life and conduct of the people. To the student of the *Analects* and Mencius, the teaching that morality is inner was always there, and it did appear later in the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming; yet side by side there was the other conception of moral standards as imposed from without by the Sages and Confucius, to which the student must conform; and this aspect was more influential than the other. A much better conception of what China has been and still largely is, especially in those districts yet but slightly touched by modern culture, is gained by reading Hsüntze than by studying any other philosopher. In his emphasis upon *Li* and upon conduct as fitting an external standard, Hsüntze comes much closer to conduct as it is actually performed than does any other ancient Chinese philosopher. Because of the great values carried by the concept of *Li*, the people were glad to accept any rationalization of it, rather than let it go, and it always has, and probably always will take a very important, if not the chief place in the life of the people. As one reflective Chinese expressed it to me: "In the West, conduct is for the sake of getting things done; in China, conduct is for the sake of making people feel good." The formalities and multitudinous formal compliments that make up such a large part of Chinese social life and even of the epistolary literature, are the expression of this spirit of *Li*, the beautification of social life by formal actions, which may or may not mean anything to the person who performs them, but which serve mightily to make life pleasant and agreeable to everyone. In the West such practices are comparatively few and confined to the upper strata of social life, but in China they permeate every stratum of society,

receiving, of course, their greatest elaboration among the cultured and governing classes. In stressing *Li*, Hsüntze was truly expressing the peculiar genius of the Chinese people.

But for Hsüntze *Li* is more than a series of social and religious forms. It is an educational and social principle too. It provides a standard to which every individual should train himself, and a series of practices of high educational value, especially in the training of men's desires.¹ It is the basis of social organization. Society is necessarily based on the distinctions of superior and inferior, of older and younger, of poor and rich, of important and unimportant. Without these distinctions, society could not exist. It is *Li* which marks these distinctions, and which legislates the proper observances in dealing with different classes, and thus is able to unite the people by marking for each his place.² These two phases of *Li* can better be discussed in connexion with these other subjects, as they involve Hsüntze's doctrine of education, desire, inequality, and social organization.

Li is more than a purely moral principle. For the Confucians there is no ultimate distinction between moral and metaphysical principles.³ Just as for Lao-tze *Tao* is not only the cosmological principle by which the universe is ruled, but also the ethical principle by which men's lives should be governed, so in Confucianism even as late as in the Sung school the concepts of Nature, the Decree, etc., are both ethical and metaphysical concepts. Likewise in Hsüntze *Li* is a cosmological principle as well as an ethical principle. Hsüntze identifies it with *Tao*, and *Tao* is *Li*, as *Li* is *Tao*.

¹ Cf. Cha. XI and XII.

² Cf. Ch. XIV.

³ Cf. p. 52 f.

Li is an Educational and Social Principle.

Li is a Cosmological Principle.

"*Li* is that whereby Heaven and Earth unite; whereby the sun and moon are bright; whereby the four seasons are ordered; whereby the stars move in their courses; whereby rivers flow; whereby all things prosper; whereby love and hatred are tempered; whereby joy and anger keep their proper place. It causes the lower orders of men to obey, and the upper orders to be illustrious; through a myriad changes it prevents going astray. But if one departs from it, he will be destroyed. Is not *Li* the greatest of all principles?"¹

Thus *Li* for Hsüntze embraces the whole of virtue and of all metaphysical principles. Other ethical or metaphysical concepts are but expressions of one aspect of *Li*. Yet he does not usually use this word in this broad sense, but in a more restricted one, and puts another ethical concept with it to complete its meaning. We shall now turn to these other concepts.

¹ W.H., xix, 7.

CHAPTER IX

OTHER ETHICAL CONCEPTS

Of the other ethical concepts much less is to be said. There were no conflicts about them, and little or no development in their content. *Jen* and *Li* were the protagonists in the conflicts between the different Confucian schools, and the other virtues were accepted by everyone.

The only other virtue of which Hsüntze makes much is *Yi*.¹ This virtue is usually coupled with *Li*, though sometimes used alone. The character is composed of the words for "sheep" (which may be a contraction of the character for "good") and "I", i.e. "my sheep", the distinction of *meum* and *tuum*. Or by the other derivation it would mean, "I must be a good man." We can get at its meaning better, however, through its usage. It is usually translated by "justice" or "righteousness".

In the *Doctrine of the Mean* it is defined: "*Yi* is doing what is right and proper (or correctness); its greatest exhibition is in honouring the worthy."² Chu Hsi quotes this definition as his own. Perhaps the clearest indication of its meaning is given by Hsüntze:

"Men are able to form social organizations. . . . How is it that men are able to form social organizations? Because of their distinctions. How is it that distinctions can be

¹ 義; - 羊 + 我 or 義 + 我.

² *D.M.*, XX, 5.

carried out? Through *Yi*. For *Yi* are harmonized through social distinctions. When people are harmonious, they can unite . . . and have greater strength. . . . They gain this for no other reason than that they have social distinctions and *Yi*."¹

The meaning of *Yi* is clear from the above passage, it is "rights". In this passage Hsüntze states one of his distinctive doctrines, which was only implicit in Confucianism previous to him—that society is founded on social inequalities, of ruler and ruled, of aged and young, etc. This inequality is everywhere implied in Confucian writings, but did not come to clearness in previous writers. These inequalities must be harmonized; men must recognize their own inferiority and the superiority of others, and treat them accordingly—this giving of what is right and due to each man, this treating people as they ought to be treated according to their place in life is *Yi*.

This interpretation of *Yi* will be found to fit the word everywhere in ancient Confucian writings. For instance: "Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles, and be moving continually to what is right (*Yi*)—this is the way to exalt one's virtue."²

Yi is honouring age, while loving one's brother is *Jen*.³ *Yi* is the virtue that should be exhibited between a sovereign and his minister.⁴ *Yi* is the expression of the feeling of shame and dislike,⁵ and of the feeling of respect for age.⁶ It is the extension of the feeling of dislike aroused in a person

¹ *W.H.*, ix, 12.

² *Menc.*, VI, i, iv, 2, 4; v, 3.

³ *Menc.*, VI, i, vi, 7.

⁴ *An.*, XII, x, 1.

⁵ *Menc.*, VII, ii, xxiv, 2.

⁶ *Menc.*, VI, i, v, 2.

when he is not called by the proper honorific.¹ In other words, it is the recognition of class distinctions and class rights, and treating people according to the rights which are lawfully theirs. It is "rights-ness" rather than "righteousness".²

In modern ethics we have no virtue that expresses exactly this meaning. But *Yi* is almost exactly what the Greeks meant by *δικαιοσύνη*, which Aristotle defines as being the recognition of the rights of man neither too much nor too little. It comprehends all the virtues and is the foundation of the political life of society. Its fundamental principle is equality—proportional equality of merit or the absolute equality of legal rights.³ From this definition *Yi* differs in that it is not the comprehensive virtue, but the second of the virtues in the estimation of the Confucians, and that in ancient China there were no legal rights, and hence no absolute equality; the emphasis was upon differences rather than upon equality. Otherwise the correspondence is almost exact; for in Hsüntze, *Yi* is the foundation of society, and it is the recognition of the proportionate rights of different individuals in society. But in Hsüntze's teaching *Yi* is not definitely marked off from *Li*; *Li* also partook of the character of *Yi*, and so *Li* also came to have the meaning of the recognition of the proper rights of others, perhaps with an emphasis upon the observances due to people in the way of courtesy. In English "righteousness" has lost its original meaning of "acting in a right manner", or what is "rightful",

¹ Menc., VII, II, xxi, 1, 3.

² Cf. W.H., xvi, 11.

³ Windelband, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, p. 280.

and has come to mean upright or incorrupt; the nearest word we have to the meaning of *Yi* is "justice".

In one place Hsüntze catalogues the virtues: "He who is over men must be careful of *Li* (the rules of proper conduct) and *Yi* (justice), and also practise *Chung* (loyalty) and *Hsin* (faithfulness); and then only will he be fit for his position."¹

In addition there are *Ch'eng* (sincerity) and the two family virtues, *Hsiao* (filial piety) and *Ti* (reverence for the older brother or the elder). These ethical concepts deserve only a brief mention.

Chung.

*Chung*² is composed of "heart" and "middle", i.e. the heart in the middle. In popular Chinese ethics, the position of the heart indicates certain ethical characteristics. If the heart is to one side, the individual is prejudiced; a black heart indicates an utterly bad character, etc. Here the heart is in its proper place, and the meaning is that of sincerity, conscientiousness, loyalty.

Hsin.

*Hsin*³ is composed of "man" and "words", i.e. a man and his word; and the meaning is faithfulness, faith, veracity, credibility.

Ch'eng.

The *Doctrine of the Mean* exalts a different virtue, *Ch'eng*⁴ or sincerity. It is composed of "words" and a word pronounced *Ch'eng*. It means guileless, sincere, perfect in virtue. This word is only used twice in the *Analects*, and each time adverbially, without the substantive meaning of sincerity or perfection. However, in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, and to a lesser extent in the *Great Learning*, it is highly exalted, being made the whole of virtue.

¹ W.H., xvi, 11.

² 忠 = 人 + 言.

³ 忠 = 心 + 中.

⁴ 誠 = 言 + 成.

"Sincerity (or perfection of nature, *Ch'eng*) is the way (*Tao*) of Heaven. The attainment of sincerity (or perfection of nature, *Ch'eng*) is the way (*Tao*) of men. He who possesses sincerity (or that perfection, *Ch'eng*) is he who, without an effort, hits what is right, and apprehends, without the exercise of thought; he who follows his inclinations but hits the right (*Tao*)—he is the Sage."¹

Mencius quotes from this passage and approves it, but only mentions *Ch'eng* in one other place.² In Hsüntze's writings this virtue is not mentioned—sincerity or perfection of nature could not be expected of evil human nature. But he does give the concept a place—it is a quality of the Sage. Although he does not mention the word, he has the idea:

"The Sage gives rein to his desires and satisfies his passions, nevertheless he is controlled by principle. . . . The acting out of the right Way (*Tao*) by the benevolent (*Jen*) man is without effort;³ the performance of the Way (*Tao*) by the Sage is without forcing himself."⁴

By his conception of two orders of humanity, the ordinary man who needs to rely upon an external guide, and the Sage, inwardly guided because he has thoroughly trained himself, Hsüntze is able to incorporate all these differing ethical concepts in one unified whole.

*Hsiao*⁵ is composed of a "child" under "age", i.e. *Hsiao* and *Ti*. youth supporting age. It is the virtue which should subsist

¹ *D.M.*, XX, 18. Cf. also XXII ff. and *G.L.*, VI.

² *Menc.*, IV, 1, xü; cf. also VII, 1, lv.

³ Here Hsüntze also incorporates Lao-tse's principle of inaction or effortlessness.

⁴ *W.H.*, xxi, 18.

⁵ 孝: = 子 + 老.

between a son and his parents, filial piety. *Ti*¹ is also the word for "younger brother", i.e. it is the virtue which a younger brother should show to his older brother, or to elders in general. In this connexion we should recall that the Chinese have entirely different terms for the elder and younger of relationships, where in English we have only one term. The younger brother should show deference to his older brother and should serve him. In some Confucian circles, particularly that of Tsentze, filial piety and brotherly deference were exalted to the skies, and made the foundation of all virtues. That was making the family organization the basis of society, which was indeed the case. But Hsüntze saw that there were broader relationships too; and while he stressed *Hsiao* and *Ti*, yet it was only as constitutive elements of the more inclusive virtue of *Li*, the rules of all proper conduct.

¹ 弟, also written 悌.

CHAPTER X

MUSIC

In ancient Chinese philosophy, as in Greek thought, music ^{its} played an important part. The Odes were probably the ^{Importance.} first Chinese literary compositions, and they were written primarily to be sung. The Chinese language, with its monosyllabic character, lends itself naturally to poetry and rhythm ; indeed much of the ancient philosophy, including that of Hsüntze, was composed in the poetic form of the day. Music was highly esteemed. It was an integral part of all religious ceremonies, especially of the worship of ancestors, of court ceremonies, of the district gathering of notables, and the emperor even had it performed at meals.¹ Confucius was so impressed when he first heard the performance of the Shao, Shun's music, that for three months he did not know the taste of meat ;² it is recorded that he himself performed on the stone chimes,³ and liked to sing a good song.⁴

By music the ancient Chinese meant more than we do ^{its} by the term. What they called music was much nearer ^{Meaning.} the ancient Greek conception of the art than our present conception—it was a union of instrumental and vocal music and rhythm, with verse and dancing, so that the meaning of the music was brought out not only by the melody and

¹ *W.L.*, xviii, 9 f.

² *As.*, VII, xii.

³ *As.*, XIV, xli.

⁴ *As.*, VII, xxxi.

rhythm, but also by the words and the pantomime.¹ Of musical instruments the ancient Chinese had many; they are still to be seen in the music room of a Confucian temple. Hsüntze mentions drums, bells, stone chimes, reed organs of 36 and of 13 reeds, flageolets, flutes, lutes, various percussion instruments, singing, and dancing.² Of the singing it must be remembered that Chinese is extremely rich in homonyms, and that it would be almost impossible to understand a piece of poetry or of literary Chinese which was heard for the first time, unless at the same time one could see the characters in which it was written. So it would be even more difficult to understand Chinese vocal music than English singing. However, every educated man memorized the Odes, and did not need the assistance of seeing the words to comprehend what was sung. Probably ancient Chinese music was similar to some of that performed now, in that it consisted chiefly of rhythm, and the melody was less important than the rhythm. The dancing consisted of pantomiming by a group of performers who acted out the meaning of the music; for instance, in performing the Wu they marched north when describing the attack of King Wu upon Chou, and marched south again to show his victorious return; they moved their arms violently and stamped their feet to indicate the beginning of the battle, and knelt at the end to represent the peaceful government of the new dynasty. In pantomime they used pole-axes and shields in military dances, and feathers and yak-tails in dances of peace.

¹ A good description of the performance of an ancient piece of music (the Wu) by an ancient writer is to be found in the *Li-Ki*, XVII, 51, 16-18.

² *W.H.*, **xx**, 4.

This music was performed at the ancestral and other religious sacrifices and consequently became stereotyped in the ancient form of the time of the founders of the Chou dynasty. Confucius and the other Confucians took care to rectify any performance of this music so that it should conform exactly to the way in which it was anciently given. But there had been considerable cultural progress in the six hundred and more years since that music had been inaugurated, and people of the age found the old music rather monotonous and uninteresting. One duke complained to one of Confucius' disciples that when the ancient music was performed, he could hardly keep awake!¹ This duke was a zealous Confucian; how much more others who did not feel the Confucian influence so strongly! We are not surprised that other forms of music were introduced, more in harmony with the spirit of the times; the pantomime was enlivened by the introduction of male and female characters and even dwarfs, and pantomimes made up like monkeys.

The conservative Confucius and his disciples protested vehemently against this newer music, just as Plato protested against the new music of his day. Confucius went so far as to propose that this newer music be suppressed by law.² One of the reasons for the dislike of this newer music was that it tended to the licentious, and it must be said to the honour of Confucianism that in sex matters it has been as pure and purer than any other ancient philosophy, being even puritanical. But probably more fundamental was the feeling

¹ *Li-Ki*, XVII, iii, 4.

² *Ana.*, XV, x, 6.

that music had a profound influence upon the manners and customs of the people ; that it was a means of ethical culture ; and that this new music meant a relaxing of the moral tone of the community. Consequently we find the Confucians elaborating a theory of music that comes startlingly close to that of Plato and Aristotle.

Micius' Attack.

At the same time there was an attack upon music from another quarter. Micius was an enthusiastic social reformer ; his interest was in the improvement of the condition of the masses, in contrast to the Confucian interest in the educated and governing classes. In his zeal to eliminate everything which did not show its usefulness, he attacked music as well as funeral ceremonies. He stated that music was an economic waste ; it wasted money and wealth ; that it could not help the poverty and distress of the people ; that it could not protect the state ; and that it produced extravagant habits. Consequently it should not be merely reformed, as the Confucians held, but it should be eliminated altogether.

The "Book of Music" and Hsüntze.

The Confucian theory of music is to be found at present in the "Book of Music", which is part of the *Li-Ki*, and in Hsüntze's writings. Elsewhere there are only scattered hints. The origin of the present "Book of Music" is unknown. Possibly it was part of the ancient *Classic of Music*, one of the Five Classics. It was composed by someone in the Confucian school. From the similarity of Hsüntze's teaching to it, we know that he knew the book, and probably he quoted from it. Just whether he quoted from the "Book of Music" or the "Book of Music" quoted from him is uncertain. As a tentative hypothesis I have proposed the theory

indicated in the notes to my translation of Book XX of Hsüntze's *Works*, that the opening text of Hsüntze's book was taken from the "Book of Music", and that in the latter part of his book he quoted rather loosely from the "Book of Music" in confirmation of his teaching; but that the first three pages of Hsüntze's treatise are now incorporated into the "Book of Music". The basis of this theory is to be found in a detailed comparison of the text of the two writings, and of the variations of each from the other. These variations seem to show that one had tried to improve over the other when quoting. In addition there is the fact that the first three pages of Hsüntze's treatise (which are quoted by the "Book of Music") are a reply to Micias' attacks in consecutive order, while the "Book of Music" quotes all but the sentences referring to Micias, which are omitted. In their teaching the two writings are almost identical, except that Hsüntze's exposition appears to express a slightly maturer grasp of the problem, and a more comprehensive working out of the theory, and that it is slightly coloured by his teaching of authoritarianism, whereas the "Book of Music" in its earlier parts stands rather for self-expression than for conformity to a standard. We can therefore take Hsüntze's teaching on music as typical.

Music is the expression of human emotion, and absolutely essential to society. This is a reply to Micias' proposal to do away with music. Joyousness is an essential element of human nature. Now this joyful emotion must find expression. If it is expressed without conforming to principles, the result will be disorder and social anarchy. Hence the ancient Kings established music to be the

Hsüntze's
Theory of
Music.

expression of right emotion, to stir up goodness and to prevent evil.

Against Micus' attack that music has no good effects upon society, Hsüntze replies that music harmonizes those who hear it, because they therein possess a common experience; whether performed in the court where the ruler and ruled hear it together, or in the family circle, where the father and son, elder and younger brothers hear it together, or at the village or clan gathering, where the elders and the young hear it together; hence they cannot fail to be harmonious and reverent, affectionate and obedient. For music discriminates and unites, not only tones and melodies, but also people; it compares and distinguishes, and above all, it harmonizes, leading all in one direction. Thus it broadens people's purposes, dignifies their deportment, teaches them obedience, and above all unifies them: "It is the bond of inner harmony, the inevitable consequence of human emotion."¹

Against Micus' attack that music has no effect upon the state, Hsüntze declares that its influence upon people is profound. It harmonizes the people, hence the army is strong, cities are secure; and because the people are secure, they are contented with their prince, and he is secure on his throne. But the new music is only pretty and fascinating; it is dangerous, in that it causes the people to degenerate, be negligent, mean, low, lose their self-restraint, and so produces turmoil and strife. Then the people will be dissatisfied with their ruler, and he will be insecure.

Music is also a powerful educative force. It can turn

¹ W.-H., xx, 2.

people's hearts to goodness and change their customs. Without music to give expression to people's feelings¹ the people will only have the emotions of liking and hatred, but not the proper expression thereto, and hence society will be in disorder. Mourning clothes and the sound of weeping make people's hearts sad; wearing armour and singing in the ranks make them reckless; the pretty fascinating appearance of the dancers and the sound of the new music make people's hearts licentious; but the proper clothes, the posturing and singing of the orthodox music make people dignified and virtuous. When the evil and depraved sounds of the new music influence people, their rebellious temper responds, and disorder ensues; when correct music influences men, the obedient temper responds and tranquillity and good government results. When music is played, the people respond. Hence music is one of the greatest powers in the social organization and the state.

This teaching is very close to that of the Greeks on music. Comparison
with the
Greek
Theory. Virtue, says Aristotle, consists in loving and hating in the proper way, and implies, therefore, a delight in the proper emotion; but emotions of any kind are produced by melody and rhythm; therefore by music a man becomes accustomed to feeling the right emotions. Music has thus the power to form character. Pleasure is essential to music, but music should be judged by the character of its moral influence.² By music Hsüntze meant what Aristotle meant by good music; for in ancient China music was clearly distinguished

¹ Here Hsüntze again comes close to the Aristotelian doctrine of catharsis.

² G. L. Dickinson, *The Greek View of Life*, pp. 201, 202.

into orthodox and unorthodox ; and unorthodox music was not thought to deserve the name of music. In addition Hsüntze had the conception of an external standard of what is right, and so he could sum up his whole theory in one sentence, " Music is that whereby joy is conformed to principle (*Tao*) . . . and induces virtue." ¹

¹ W.H., 32, 3.

CHAPTER XI

DESIRE AND THE MIND; PSYCHOLOGY

We have already stated that to Hsüntze, desire was one of the fundamental elements of human nature.¹ By desire he meant both the purposive aspect of action, and also human seeking for satisfaction. It was in an analysis of desire that Hsüntze was led into a psychological analysis of the individual which was perhaps one of his most original pieces of work.

The problem of desire was a legacy left by Lantze to Chinese Lantze philosophy. For him desire was the source of evil: without desire there would be no theft or crime; hence the purpose of ethics was to reduce desire by returning to the primitive times when men's wants were few and consequently honesty and uprightness prevailed. This was a very un-Chinese procedure, for the Chinese are practical, and little given to asceticism; but when the problem was once raised, each great thinker had to deal with it.

Before the time of Hsüntze there had not been much discussion of the subject, and very little psychological analysis of human nature.

Confucius had said that desires should only be satisfied Confucian in the right way,² and that refraining from desire is not necessarily *Jen* (virtue).³ The problem of desire was raised to prominence by Sungtze, who was probably a leader in Sungtze.

¹ p. 51.

² *As.*, IV, v, 1.

³ *As.*, XIV, 11.

one of the minor schools into which Micianism split after the death of Micius,¹ and he broached a theory that the curbing of desires is not contrary to nature, but in accordance with nature, inasmuch as the desires themselves prefer the moderate, rather than the violent. His argument seems to have been that men do not like the extremes of bright colour, loudness, etc., hence their passions seek little and not much, simplicity not multiplicity.² Then the restraint of desire is what nature itself does. His teaching was thus based on a psychological analysis.

Mencius.

Mencius had divided the human spirit into two: the mind or will, consisting of the moral and intellectual powers, and the active powers (the emotions, desires, and appetites), or as Legge translates it, the "passion-nature".³ This mind or will should be supreme and should govern the other part of the soul, but it is also possible for the active powers to control the will. The ideal is to maintain a firm will and do no violence to the active powers or passion-nature. Yet the active powers should be vigorous and the mind clear and pure, and then we shall have the man whom nothing external can perturb.⁴

This division of human powers was accepted by Hsüntze, but the term which Mencius had used for the "active powers" was very ill chosen; it meant a comical active principle present in inanimate as well as living beings, and hence was ill-suited for use as a psychological term. Hsüntze did not use it in the sense that Mencius used it, but substituted the word "desire"⁵ or "emotion".⁶ For him the dichotomy of the

¹ *Hsü*, p. 340.

² *Menc.*, II, i, ii, 9.

³ *Cl. W.H.*, xviii, 17 f.

⁴ 欲.

⁵ 氣.

⁶ 情.

soul is into the "mind" or "will" and the "desires" or "emotions".

In regard to the treatment of the desires, Mencius had stated the common attitude of the day in saying, "For the culture of the mind, there is nothing better than making the desires few."¹

Hsüntze felt that it was his duty, as the acknowledged Hsüntze. leader of Confucianism in his day, to combat all unorthodox teachings. To combat Sungtze he was forced to go into a further psychological analysis of his own, and therein he came to face with the problem of desire for himself, and found his own solution thereto. He was thereby driven to protest against the common attitude as expressed by Mencius and others. Desire is a fundamental fact of human nature; desire is an innate quality of every human being, and cannot be removed. Human nature is the product of Nature; the emotional nature is the essence of human nature; desires are the reactions of the emotional nature. Hence it is not possible to eradicate desire, as it seems that some in China of that day had proposed just as Gautama and others in India. The numerousness or fewness of the desires depends on the innate strength of the emotions, not on self-control or disorderly conduct. Hence every attempt to lessen the desires themselves is bound to fail because of these facts of original human nature. "The emotional nature cannot escape from assuming that what a person desires may be had."² Desire is a fundamental unchangeable property of human nature.

¹ *Menc.*, VII, II, XXXV.

² *W.H.*, XXII, 12. Cf. *ibid.*, 11-16, for this discussion.

But the mind can control the desires without removing them or lessening them. Nature placed the heart (which is the term used for the mind in Chinese as well as in Hebrew) in the centre, to control the senses; it is the "natural ruler".¹

"The mind is the ruler of the body and the master of the spirit. It gives commands and all parts of the body obey. It itself makes prohibitions; it itself gives commands; it itself makes decisions; it itself makes choices; it itself causes action; it itself stops action."²

We see that this is a fact in the case of the economical man who wants good food, beautiful clothing, etc., but because he also desires wealth, he controls his desires and economizes, and thus stores up his wealth.³

Thus Hsüntze gives to the mind the power of ruling the whole personality. This term "mind" is an ancient one in Chinese literature, but the distinction of mind and emotions or active powers seems to date from Mencius. Confucius speaks of following "the desires of my mind",⁴ which clearly implies that this distinction had not been made. In the *Analects* this term seems to apply to the personality as a whole rather than to any particular part.⁵ It is not used at all in the *Doctrine of the Mean*. In the *Great Learning*, rectifying the mind is one of the essential steps in the process of knowledge,⁶ and the rectification of the mind seems to mean the elimination of anger, terror, liking, and sorrow.⁷ Only Mencius had made this division of the spirit into two

¹ W.H., xvi, 14.

² W.H., iv, 21.

³ Cf. An., VI, v; XVII, xxii; XX, i, iii; XIV, xlii.

⁴ Cf. p. 87.

⁵ W.H., xxi, 8.

⁶ An., II, iv, 6.

⁷ G.L., VII, i.

parts, which is somewhat similar to the division of the soul by Plato into three parts, the reasoning part and two passionate parts, the will and the appetites. Hsüntze keeps the reason and will together as the mind, and separates off only the appetites or emotions.

"The mind selects from among the emotions by which it is moved—this is called reflection."¹ It is through this Power of Choice. power of reflection and choice that the mind can control the desires. The development of character is through this sort of choice or reflection; through the continuation of this process, even perfection can be attained.

But we must remember that while Hsüntze gives to the mind all these powers, yet the mind cannot make choices according to its own view of what is best without running grave risk of going astray. Indeed, for the ordinary man, his mind is certain to go astray; it is only the superior man or Sage who can conform to the three conditions of emptiness, concentration, and unperturbedness, and can judge by an inner standard; others must follow the standard that the Sages worked out, namely the Confucian Way, in order to avoid prejudice and error.² The mind needs to be guided by principle. Thus Hsüntze keeps to his authoritarian standard of conduct.

Hence the mind is the controller of the desires. The mind can be controlled by principle, and then even if the desires are many, the mind can control them. But if the mind is not controlled by principle, though the desires be few, yet there would result disorderly conduct. So good or bad conduct depends on the mind, and not on the desires.

¹ W. H., xxii, 1.

² Cf. pp. 61-62.

Wisdom, then, consists in controlling the desires by principle, and in being temperate. For if a person is poor and in a low position, yet his desires cannot be removed; if he is rich and the emperor himself, he cannot satisfy all his desires, though he can come near to it. So self-control and temperance are the way to deal with desire in the case of the ordinary man.

For the Sage, the situation is different. He has completely disciplined himself to the right, and his desires do not depart from the right. Just as Confucius said that at 70 years of age he followed his heart's desires without transgressing the right,¹ so the Sage gives rein to his desires and satisfies his passions, nevertheless he is controlled by principle.²

On the other hand it is foolishness to try to remove all desires because they can never be completely fulfilled; that would be like a man who preferred the south and hated the north, but because he could not get all of the south, he turned around and went north! It would be taking what you hate because you cannot get all you want. Later Confucianism, in forgetting Hsüntze and turning to Mencius instead for guidance, committed this very error of trying to remove the desires instead of controlling them by the mind.

Other philosophies which do not follow the Confucian Way but give some inner principle will likewise fail. For judgments in the matter of desire are unusually difficult.

Men never get what they desire unadulterated; something else that they had not expected always comes with it; or if they try to remove something that they hate, it always takes something else away with it. Hence there should be a standard of judgment by which to decide such matters.

¹ *An.*, II, iv, 8.

² *W.H.*, xxi, 13.

If the standard is wrong, calamity will come mixed with what is desired, and people will think it is happiness; or happiness will come mixed with what is hated, and people will think it is calamity. So a standard, tried and tested by time, is necessary.

What is the standard? It is the Confucian Way, which to Hsüntze is *Lí*.

"Whence do the rules of proper conduct (*Lí*) arise? Man by birth has desire. When desire is not satisfied, then he cannot be without a seeking for satisfaction. When this seeking for satisfaction is without measure or limits, then there cannot but be contention. When there is contention, there will be disorder; when there is disorder, then there will be poverty. The former Kings hated this confusion, hence they established the rules of proper conduct (*Lí*) and justice (*Yí*) in order to set limits to this confusion, to educate and nourish men's desires, to give opportunity for this seeking for satisfaction, in order that desire should never be extinguished by things, nor should things be used up by desire: that these two should support each other and should continue to exist. This is whence the rules of proper conduct (*Lí*) arise."¹

If a person accepts this standard he is sure of gain; if he takes any other, especially an inner standard, he is sure of loss. No one can pick his own inner standards without grave danger, as when in a burst of anger a man barter the happiness of a hundred years for the dislike of a moment.

After all, the seeking for the satisfaction of desire does not of itself lead to satisfaction. Hsüntze too saw the "moral The Moral Paradox.

¹ *W.H.*, xix, 1.

paradox". As he says, anyone who has seen into the hidden parts of men's hearts knows that the man who has departed from principle is not happy, even though he should have gained wealth and position. Contentment does not consist in the possession of material things. Inwardly the evil man is anxious and fearful, and cannot enjoy them. When his mind is anxious and fearful, he cannot enjoy or recognize pleasant tastes or sounds or sights or feelings; though he be enjoying the goodness of all things, he only gets anxiety and injury. "For he desires to foster his desires, but indulges his emotions; he desires to foster his nature, but he endangers his body; he desires to foster his enjoyment, but he attacks his mind; he desires to foster his fame, but he disorders his actions. . . . He would be no whit different from . . . a robber . . . or a footless cripple." ¹

But the temperate Confucian gains contentment even in the lowest circumstances; if his heart is tranquil and contented, poor sights, mean sounds, poor food, cheap clothes, poor houses and furniture will yet content him, and he will enjoy life and increase his fame, so that even the greatness of being emperor would add little to his contentment and joy. Stoicism itself has hardly drawn a bolder picture of the self-poised, self-mastering personality, his mind the lord of his desires, and therefore of all that affects him, than this characteristic Confucian portrait.

Is not this psychological analysis startlingly modern? The mind, not suppressing, but controlling the desires; the mind reflecting and choosing from among the various emotions which affect it; the development of character

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 15 f.

through the continued choice of the good—is not this quite modern? Even the control by a standard—a principle voluntarily chosen is not so alien to Western thought. In Plato's Republic it is only a small minority, the guardians, who are guided by rational choice; the great majority of the people were left under the control of custom. Plato talks most about the minority who govern themselves and the state; Hsüntze talks most about the majority who had to follow authority; in spirit there is little difference. Even to-day our Christian ideal of the equality of all is still an ideal mostly unrealized. Hsüntze is a practical man legislating for his people; and the appropriateness to the situation of the Confucian principle of authority is shown in the continued persistence of the people governed by that principle. It is only in this new age of rapid progress that the demand for a progressive and consequently inner standard has arisen.

Hsüntze is the most psychological of all the ancient Psychology. Chinese philosophers, and the keenness of his insight is shown in the startling modernness of his analyses. In the problem of desire and in that of terms and definition,¹ he goes deep into psychology. Here we shall merely gather together a few more of his psychological insights. Others we shall leave until the discussion of that subject. Whenever Hsüntze gets into an ultimate problem, he is sure to get into psychology, and in that sense, his philosophy is founded on psychology. He is probably speaking of himself when he speaks of "the person who has tried to see into man's hidden parts, and put himself hard at work to investigate it."²

¹ Cf. Ch. XIII.

² W.H., xxii, 14.

Sensation.

Hsüntze attempts an analysis of the senses which comes close to our present analysis. There are five senses. Of visual sensations there is form and colour; form seems to include the beautiful and the ugly; of auditory sensations he mentions "'clear' and 'confused' sound, harmony, musical time, and other sounds"; of gustatory sensations he mentions "sweet and bitter, salty and fresh, peppery and sour, and other flavours"; of olfactory sensations he has "perfumes and smells, fragrant and putrid, the smell of fresh meat and fetid smells, the smell of the mole-cricket and the smell of decayed wood, and other smells"; "pain and itching, cold and heat, smooth and rough, light and heavy" are distinguished by the "bones, body, skin, and wrinkles".¹ These are all innate.² He notes the fact that these are not felt when the attention is elsewhere, as in fear and anxiety, "if white or black is in front of his face, his eyes will not see it; if somebody beats a drum thunderously beside him, his ear will not hear it."³

Illusion.

Hsüntze had also noted the facts of illusion.

"When a person walks in the dark, he sees a stone lying down and takes it to be a crouching tiger; he sees a clump of trees standing upright and takes them to be standing men. . . . The drunken man crosses a hundred-pace wide aqueduct and takes it to be a half-step wide ditch; he bends down his head when going out of a city gate, taking it to be a small private door. . . . When a person sticks his finger in his eye and looks, one thing appears as two; when he covers his ears and listens, a tiny sound is taken to be a big noise. . . . So in looking down from a mountain, a cow looks like a sheep.

¹ *W.H.*, xxv, 4 f.; iv, 13.

² *W.H.*, iv, 13.

³ *W.H.*, xxi, 1.

. . . In looking from the foot of a mountain, a ten-fathom tree looks like a chopstick. . . . When water moves, the shadows dance." ¹

The foregoing passage illustrates Hsüntze's extremely acute observation. He uses these facts convincingly in his attack upon spirits, for he shows that if anyone thinks he saw a spirit, it is because he made the judgment in such a situation as those above, when his mind was startled or confused !

He has also catalogued the emotions, of which there are *Emotions*. six : love, hate, joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure. These, with the desires, "doing things from a liking to do them, and forcing oneself to do things", ² compose the emotional or active nature. Yet the distinguishing of them is done by the mind. The necessity of expressing the emotions suitably, and that emotions are produced by such cognitive elements as memories and ideas, has already been noted. ³

The will is also mentioned, but it is not distinguished as *Will*. a separate faculty ; nor is there any psychologizing about it ; rather it is taken as equivalent to "mind" ; it is used as it was in Hsüntze's predecessors, chiefly in the phrase "a cultivated will" which is characteristic of the superior man ⁴ who can be prouder than the rich and honourable, ⁵ all of which conceptions were inherited by Hsüntze.

Most remarkable of all is that Hsüntze in one place mentions *Stimulus and the "stimulus and response relation",* ⁶ and "impulse", ⁷ *Response, Impulse.* and indeed implies this concept throughout his psychologizing. For him men are always doing something and being affected

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 13.

² *W.H.*, xxii, 5.

³ pp. 150, 160.

⁴ *W.H.*, xvii, 16.

⁵ *W.H.*, ii, 17.

⁶ *W.H.*, xxii, 1.

⁷ *W.H.*, xix, 21.

by something : pure thought does not exist for him. He does not separate the cognitive faculties from the others, as in the psychology of Plato and subsequent philosophers ; but cognition is for the sake of action. Knowing the right is for the sake of willing and doing the right.¹ The only separation of faculties that Hsüntze makes is the separation into the affective or emotional nature and the mind or the intellectual, moral, and conative powers. But the mind is above all a unity,² not an aggregation of faculties, and Hsüntze never makes the separation between the emotions and the mind absolute ; they reciprocally affect each other. Thus Hsüntze escapes many of the pitfalls into which Western psychology fell, and from which it is just emerging.

But Hsüntze did not psychologize for its own sake. He was primarily a practical man, and while he certainly had a remarkably keen insight, yet he had not the scientific spirit of seeking for knowledge for its own sake. That spirit he expressly depreciated.³ His psychological insights only came as by-products in the solution of some greater problem, such as that of the control of desire or of the nature of terms. In that he was a true Confucian, whose philosophy was first and foremost practical.

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 61.

² *W.H.*, xxi, 7.

³ *W.H.*, xxi, 141.

CHAPTER XII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

The Confucians were first of all moral reformers. While their main emphasis was upon the solution of their problems through a paternalistic government, yet they had also to provide for the development and regeneration of the individual. This process, which might almost be called their "means to salvation", was through education. Education, to them, was the way to a moral life, and hence was emphasized throughout.

We have already noted that even in ancient China there *Confucius*. was an emphasis upon education.¹ The attractive personality of Confucius gathered around him many disciples, grown men, who sought to learn under him the lesson of how to develop themselves so as to be able to fill their post as state officials, and how to govern a state.

Confucius did not himself develop any doctrine about education. He was not a professional philosopher, but a worthy state official who had been denied office because of his own unbending rectitude, and who in vain sought another prince to employ him. Sceptical of the influence of any superhuman powers, his teaching on moral reformation was simply self-reliance and wise choice of one's friends. "Let him have no friends unequal to himself; and when in the wrong, let him not hesitate to amend."²

¹ p. 11 f.

² *An.*, I, viii, 3, 4.

While Confucius did not express himself on any pedagogical theory, yet we know that in his intercourse with his disciples he stressed the importance of thinking, and of deducing from a principle its consequences.

"When I have demonstrated one angle and he cannot bring me back the other three, then I do not repeat my lesson."¹

He approved the statement about his favourite disciple, Yen Yuan, that he "hears one point and from it apprehends the whole ten".² But mere thinking of itself is useless. His most famous statement on the subject of study is:

"Learning without thought is useless. Thought without learning is dangerous."³

Thought should always be linked up with learning. Pure thought of itself cannot achieve anything.

"I have spent the whole day without food and the whole night without sleep in order to think. It was of no use. It is better to learn."⁴

Classicism.

Thus the thought of the individual must be subordinated to learning the wisdom of the past. This teaching is but another aspect of his general attitude of reverence for the past and dependence upon its authority. Consequently study was, to Confucius, the study of the Classics, of classical literature, of books, not nature. As the greatest conservator of the heritage of the past, Confucius naturally stressed the past and its authority. "I learn much and treasure it up."⁵ He characterized himself as "A believer in and lover of antiquity."⁶ His object was "to acquire knowledge

¹ *An.*, VII, viii.

² *An.*, V, viii.

³ *An.*, II, xv.

⁴ *An.*, XV, xxi.

⁵ *An.*, VII, xxvii.

⁶ *An.*, VII, v.

and constantly to exercise oneself therein." ¹ Confucius was a classicist in education.

That ideal set the standard for all subsequent Chinese education. It has been learning, memorizing of the Classics. It has been deductive, not inductive. It has been the study of books, not life.

Yet there was a protest against such a programme. We Mencius, have seen how Mencius, starting from Confucius' teaching of Nature, comes to teach that human nature is essentially good, and that virtue is the working out of these tendencies to good, even though he does not carry his teaching through to its logical conclusion and break with Confucianism. His philosophy of education is the outcome of his doctrine of human nature. Education is man's originally good nature expressing and developing itself.

"Let us not be like the man of Sung. There was a man of Sung, who was troubled that his grain was not growing, and so pulled it up. Quite exhausted, he returned home, and said to his people, 'To-day I am tired out. I have been helping the grain to grow.' His son ran off to look at it, and found the grain all withered. There are few in the world who do not help their grain to grow." ²

This attitude was quite the reverse of that of Confucius. But Mencius could not emancipate himself from the Confucian tradition, so he added another element, that this development must be according to a model.

"Yi, in teaching men to shoot, made it a rule to draw the bow to the full; his pupils also made it a rule to draw the bow to the full. A master workman, in teaching another,

¹ *An.*, I, 1.

² *Menc.*, II, 1, 8, 10.

makes it a rule to use the compass and square; his pupils also make it a rule to use the compass and square." ¹

This is the quickest and best way to learn things.

"When the Sages had exhausted the power of their eyes, they assisted them by the compass, the square, the level, and the plumb-line, to make things square, round, level, and straight—these instruments cannot be improved on. When they had exhausted the power of their ears, they assisted themselves by the six pitch-tubes, to rectify the five notes—these instruments cannot be improved upon." ²

The Sages and other wise men who had created the civilization of the day had established certain rules and models of conduct, and the quickest and best way of learning is to conform to these wisely established models. The concept of progress never dawned upon any Confucian. In this aspect of his teaching, Mencius was inferior to Confucius in the outcome of his teaching, though the principle with which he started showed a greater insight.

Hsüntze.

In this aspect of his philosophy, as in others, Hsüntze makes Confucius' teaching consistent and bases it upon a doctrine of human nature. We have seen that Hsüntze teaches that human nature left to itself tends to evil; hence education is absolutely necessary. On the other hand, this evil tendency does not prevent the development of goodness; every man has the capacity of rising to the height of the perfection of a Sage. Consequently we find Hsüntze stressing the power of the environment in moulding character, that power which Confucius stressed in advising the choice of good friends, and which the mother of Mencius illustrated

¹ *Menc.*, VI, 1, xx.

² *Menc.*, IV, 1, 3, 3.

in moving her house three times to bring her child into a good environment.

"The children of the states of Kan, Yueh, Yi, and Ho all make the same sounds when born, but when grown have different customs—teaching makes them thus."¹

"Raspberry vines growing among hemp are straight without being supported; white sand in black mud at the bottom of a pool is black too."²

Education is, then, the effect of the environment in moulding *Practice*, human nature, not the development of man's original nature. Were original nature to develop without guidance, only evil would result. Hence the necessity of being guided by the good. Man needs assistance in his development. But development is not supernatural; it is by the aid of the various agencies created by the Sages. Hsüntze paraphrases Confucius' words quoted above: "Confucius said: I have already meditated for a whole day. It is not as good as a moment's learning."³ The assistance that man needs is gained through study. By study is meant the practice of good rules and good practices; thereby a man's whole temperament may be changed so that he becomes a Sage.

"Original nature is that which I cannot produce, yet which can be developed. Self-cultivation is that which I do not originally have, but which can be produced. Acceptances and rejections and habitual practice are the means of developing original nature. To concentrate on one thing and not vary,⁴ is that whereby self-cultivation is perfected. Practice alters a person's inclinations; if kept up for a long time it alters

¹ *W.H.*, i, 2.

² *W.H.*, *ibid.*

³ *W.H.*, i, 2.

⁴ Study only orthodox teachings.

his inmost being. If a person concentrates on one thing and does not vary, he will become as wise as the gods and form a triad with Heaven and Earth. . . . If the man on the street cultivates goodness and wholly completes its cultivation, he will be called a Sage. First he must seek, and then only will he obtain; he must do it, and then only will he reach perfection; he must cultivate it and then only can he rise; he must complete its cultivation, and then only can he be a Sage. For the Sage is the man who has cultivated himself. A man who practises hoeing and plowing becomes a farmer; but if he practises chopping and shaving wood, he becomes an artisan; if he practises trafficking in goods, he becomes a merchant; if he practises the rules of proper conduct (*Li*) and justice (*Yi*), he becomes a Superior Man. The son of an artisan always follows his father's trade, and the people of a city or state are satisfied to repeat its peculiarities. He who lives in Ts'u becomes a man of Ts'u¹; he who lives in Yueh² becomes a man of Yueh; he who lives in central China³ becomes a man of central China. This is not from the original human nature received from Nature, but slowly by profuse cultivation it is attained."⁴

The word which I have translated "cultivate" or "practice" means literally "gather" or "collect". The Chinese language does not make the distinction that English does between things that can be counted, such as houses, and those that can only be measured, such as water. Conse-

¹ A semi-civilized state to the south of civilized China.

² A semi-barbarian state to the south-east of central China.

³ Lit. Hsia, the ancient part of China ruled over by the most ancient dynasty of Hsia, i.e. central and civilized China.

⁴ *W. H.*, viii, 20, 21.

quently Hsintze says literally, not "practising goodness" but "gathering goodness", as if goodness were something that could be added to, piece by piece, and so the illustrations that he uses are those of gathering. The nature of the language has affected his thought.

"By gathering earth and making a hill, the wind and rain originate; . . . by gathering goodness and making virtue, wisdom equal with that of the gods is obtained, and the heart of the Sage is perfected. For unless a person adds steps and half-steps to each other, he cannot go a thousand *li*; unless little streams are gathered, rivers and seas cannot be formed."¹

Concentration is essential. "The man who tries to travel along both paths of a forked road will never get there."² Concentration.

It is this concentration and continual persistence which gives the greatest promise of success. "A lame tortoise can go a thousand *li* by not resting half a step; . . . by alternately advancing and retreating, going to the left and the right; the six noble steeds could not arrive at the goal."³ Perseverance.
It is only by perseverance that the great goal of Sagehood can be reached.

But study is more than an intellectual process; it is a moral process as well; it is not only learning things, but carrying them out in practice as well.

"Not having learned it" is not as good as having learned it; having learned it is not as good as having seen it carried out; having seen it is not as good as understanding it; understanding it is not as good as doing it. The development of

¹ *W.H.*, i, 5.

² *W.H.*, i, 8.

³ *W.H.*, ii, 21.

⁴ *Tao*, the right way of life, knowledge.

scholarship is to the extreme of doing it, and that is its goal. He who carries it out knows it thoroughly. He who knows it thoroughly becomes a Sage. The Sage founds his conduct on *Jen* (benevolence) and *Yi* (justice); he decides right and wrong accurately; he makes his speech and action correspond to each other, not varying the least bit—there is no other reason for that than because he simply carries it out.”¹

The primary necessity of moral development had been also emphasized by Confucius, when he said that a youth should first train himself to be filial, respectful to others, circumspect and truthful, exhibit a comprehensive love for all, and ally himself with the good, and then “if he have energy to spare, let him employ it in polite studies”.² Probably this was an overstatement of Confucius’ real attitude, but it indicates that to the Confucians, study was by no means an intellectual process, but *primarily a moral process*, of carrying out the standards of conduct contained in the literature to be studied, and only secondarily an intellectual process. Chu Hsi defines the word “study” as “to copy an example”. Study is the study of morals, the acquisition of wisdom and its expression in conduct.³ Study thus becomes an integral part of the ethical development of the individual, and in this refusal to separate the ethical and intellectual aspects of study the typically Confucian attitude again shows itself.⁴

The Classics.

What should be the material of this study? The Classics.

“What should one study? How should one begin? The art begins by reciting the Classics, and ends in learning

¹ *W.H.*, viii, 19.

² Soothill, *Analyses*, p. 108.

³ *An.*, I, vi.

⁴ *Cl.* p. 53.

the Rites (*Li*). Its purpose begins with making the scholar, and ends in making the Sage." ¹

Hsüntze was probably the first Confucian to make a canon of classical literature. His canon has remained the official one with but one alteration. This fact is but another illustration of Hsüntze's deep influence upon Chinese thought.

Before Hsüntze, Confucius had quoted the *Book of Odes* ² and the *Book of History*, ³ and had expressed a high opinion of the *Odes* in particular. ⁴ Thrice he mentioned several of the books which are now the Classics together: once the *Odes*, *History*, and *Rites*, ⁵ once the *Odes*, *Rites*, and *Music*, ⁶ and once the *Odes* and *Rites*. ⁷ Once he mentioned the *Book of Changes*, ⁸ but this passage may be spurious. ⁹ From this list would come the names of four classics, the *Odes*, *Rites*, *History*, and *Music*. Mencius, as we might expect from his freer attitude toward external authorities, never attempted to give a statement of what authorities should be followed. While he quoted the *Odes* ¹⁰ and *History*, ¹¹ yet he took the remarkably free attitude of saying that it would be better to be without the *Book of History* than to give entire credence to it. ¹² He also praised the history of the state of Lu which Confucius had composed, the *Spring and Autumn*. ¹³ So we are

² The Canon of the Classics.

¹ W.H., I, 7.

² Cf. An., I, xv; II, II, etc.

³ Cf. An., II, xxi, etc.

⁴ An., XVII, ix.

⁵ An., VII, xvii.

⁶ An., VIII, viii.

⁷ An., XVI, xiii.

⁸ An., VII, xvi.

⁹ Cf. p. 69 f.

¹⁰ Menc., II, I, iv, 3; V, I, iv, 2; VI, I, vi, 9; VI, II, iii, 2.

¹¹ Menc., I, II, iii, 7; III, I, I, 5; III, II, v, 2; III, II, ix, 3, 6; V, I, iv, 4; VI, II, v, 5.

¹² Menc., VII, II, iii, 1.

¹³ Menc., III, II, iv, 8, 9; IV, II, xxi, 2.

not surprised that when Hsüntze tried to state a canon, he should sometimes mention four, the *History*, *Odes*, *Rites*, and *Music*, and sometimes five, the *Odes*, *History*, *Rites*, *Music*, and the *Spring and Autumn*, as being the Way in which to gain knowledge of the *Tao*, the right way of action.

"The Sage is the channel¹ of the Way (*Tao*). The Way (*Tao*) of the world pervades the Confucian doctrine; the Way (*Tao*) of all the Kings is united in it; hence the Way (*Tao*) of the *Odes*, *History*, *Rites*, and the *Music* follows it. The *Odes* teach this as their purpose; the *History* teaches this as its business; the *Rites* teach this in their performances; the *Music* teaches this in its harmony; the *Spring and Autumn* teaches this in its subtleties. . . . The Way (*Tao*) of the world culminates in it. He who follows it will be preserved; he who rebels at it will be ruined. From ancient to present times there has not been known anyone who followed it and was not preserved, or who rebelled against it and was not ruined."²

This is the canon of the Five Classics of later times, with one exception—the *Book of Music* was lost, and in its place was put the *Book of Changes*, which had been highly esteemed by Ts'ien Shih Hwangti and others. The canon of the Four Books was not established until centuries later; Mencius was not admitted into the catalogue of the classical writers in the Han or T'ang dynasties; not until the Sung dynasty was he ranked thus. The first person to rank Mencius with Confucius was Ch'en Chih-chai³ in the twelfth century, although Han Yu had eulogized him some centuries earlier.

¹ Lit. pipe.

² *W.H.*, viii, 13, 14.

³ 陳直齋.

It was characteristic of Hsüntze that he should esteem the *Book of Rites* (*Lî*) as the most important of all,¹ just as the rules of proper conduct (*Lî*) was the most important ethical principle.

More important than the formation of a canon was the fact that Hsüntze was the first to take the later attitude to the Classics, making them *the* material of instruction. They all teach one thing—the Confucian doctrine, the great Tao, the Way of the universe and of human life. Each classic expresses this teaching in its own way, and together they are the completion of creation. The Classics as the Authority.

“The *Rites* and *Music* give principles and no false teaching ; the *Odes* and *History* tell about the ancients and are not familiar. The teaching of the *Spring and Autumn* is suggestive rather than expressed.”²

This is the attitude that was taken by subsequent centuries, when scholarship was chiefly concerned in commentating upon those Classics, and study was gradually restricted to them. This exaltation of the Classics is one explanation of the fact that the best brains of the country in subsequent ages chiefly occupied themselves in elucidating these books. It is in this exaltation of the Classics and in his doctrine of authority that Hsüntze is truest to the fundamental attitude of Confucianism all through the ages.

The attitude of Hsüntze to the individual Classics is worthy of remark. While he emphasized the *Rites* above the rest, yet he never quotes it. We know that there was such a thing as a *Book of Rites*, though certainly not the present book, from the fact that Mencius quoted it. It was the *Odes* that Individual Classics.

¹ W.H., i, 9 f.

² W.H., i, 9.

Hsüntze quoted most of all. He used the *Odes* as a source of proof-texts which could be dragged from their context and used to prove his statements. In this respect the *Odes* had become for him almost a verbally inspired Bible; though of course no supernatural inspiration was implied. Confucius and Mencius had taken a similar attitude to the *Odes*, though not as pronounced as Hsüntze. So common were these quotations from the *Odes* that subsequent generations have supposed that Hsüntze was in the direct line of those who treasured the *Odes*, memorized them, preserved the tradition of their meaning, until in the Han dynasty, Mao published his edition of the *Odes* with a commentary.¹ The text of the *Odes* that Hsüntze quoted is much nearer to that of Mao than to the usual text. As the representative Confucian of the age, later generations have said the same thing of Hsüntze with respect to the other Classics too.

The *History* is quoted by Hsüntze much less than the *Odes*. In the portions which I have translated, the *Odes* are quoted 19 times, lost *Odes* 3 times, but the *Book of History* only 5 times. The same proportionate emphasis upon the *Odes* is shown in preceding Confucian writings. We may conjecture that the *Odes*, being older, were revered more highly through long usage; while the *History*, being a later composition than the *Odes*, was quoted less, although intrinsically it was more capable of quotation for moral purposes. The *Rites* and *Music*, while mentioned, are not quoted; while the *Spring and Autumn* is not always mentioned with the other four—it being the latest composition of all. Age seems to have been the chief element in the Confucian reverence

¹ Cf. Wang Hsien-ch'ien's "Introduction" 考證, 21 f.

for the Classics. This is what we should expect from their general reverence for antiquity.

But these Classics were capable of diverse interpretations. A Teacher. Micinus had already shown how the Sages could be used to prove a heterodox doctrine. Intrinsically these books were difficult to understand, almost impossible of comprehension without a teacher or commentary. Hence Hsüntze emphasized the need of a teacher in study.

"In studying there is nothing better than being intimate with a worthy teacher. Associate yourself closely with the teacher; familiarize yourself with his teaching; reverence it as universal and common to every age. . . According to the laws of learning there is nothing which gives quicker results than esteeming a worthy teacher."¹

But a teacher is more than a mere means of education; the teacher is an authority, a means of checking up one's learning, to indicate whether it agrees with the standard or not. Study is not only intellectual; it is doing as much and more than learning. In study, the second most important element next to a teacher, is the observance of the rules of proper conduct.² But how can a person know whether his observance of those rules is correct or not? Through his teacher.

"Without rules for proper conduct (*Li*) how could I correct myself? Without a teacher how can I know what particular action is according to the rules of proper conduct? If a person is to live according to the rules of proper conduct (*Li*), then his emotions must be naturally those that go with the rules of proper conduct (*Li*). . . Hence the student follows the rules of proper conduct (*Li*) and the ways of his teacher.

¹ *W.H.*, i, 9.

² *W.H.*, *ibid.*

But the teacher considers himself to be the correct measure of all things and honours that which Nature has implanted in him."¹

This is the second means of making definite and exact the standard of authority; the first is to follow the later Kings; the second is to follow one's teacher. Thus authority becomes concrete and exact. Hsüntze did not consider what should be done when teachers disagree; he merely said, Choose "a worthy teacher".

Thoroughness Study must be thorough; a student's learning must pervade his whole being. Hsüntze says sarcastically that the little-minded man's learning "goes into his ear and comes out of his mouth; between mouth and ear is only four inches; how can that be sufficient to make his seven feet of body beautiful?"² "Scholarship is to know things thoroughly and to unify them; to be unified in learning and unified in teaching. . . Scholarship must be complete and exhaustive."³ Thus study should continue all one's days and there should be continuous progress until the state of the Sage is reached.

Scholar,
Superior Man
and Sage.

In this connexion Hsüntze systematizes the use of the words, scholar, superior man, and Sage; they had been used by Confucius and others, but never put in logical relation to each other.

"He who loves to follow the Way and carries it out is a 'scholar'. He who has a firm purpose and treads the Way is a 'superior man'. He who is inexhaustively wise and illustrious in virtue is the 'Sage'."⁴

Thus these three terms become names of those who have

¹ W.H., ii, 22.

² W.H., i, 8.

³ W.H., i, 12.

⁴ W.H., ii, 21.

achieved different stages in the Confucian self-culture. The beginner is the 'scholar' ¹; the man who has gone a considerable distance is the 'superior man' ²; but the Sage ³ is the man who has reached perfection. Hsiüntze is the systematizer of Confucius' teaching.

But this completeness and comprehensiveness does not mean that the limits of what commonsense would dictate should be overpassed.

"If you wish to exhaust the inexhaustible, to pursue the illimitable; even if you went so far as to break your bones and utterly destroy your sinews, to the end of your days you would not be able to reach your goal. But if there were a limit, . . . whether slowly or quickly, whether first or last, how could you fail to arrive at your goal? . . . Hence there is no reason why the problems of 'hardness and whiteness', 'likeness and unlikeness', 'whether there is thickness or no thickness' ⁴ should not be investigated, but the superior man does not discuss them; he stops at the limit of profitable discussion." ⁵

Completeness and comprehensiveness are necessary, but that means completeness and comprehensiveness in virtue, in ethical development, which is the Confucian Way; merely intellectual discussions are not included in this ideal; unorthodox discussions can never reach the goal. Study from first to last is ethical in character, but it is conformity to a standard, not free self-development.

¹ 士.

² 君子.

³ 聖人.

⁴ Sophistical discussion somewhat like Zeno's puzzles. Cf. *W.H.*, II, 20, notes.

⁵ *W.H.*, II, 20.

This is the Confucian teaching on education ; except in minor details, it was never departed from. Hsüntze has perhaps been popularly known best for his philosophy of education. Confucianism was reverence for the past and for authority ; Hsüntze was its most logical exponent, and his doctrine of education was the logical and most vividly illustrated expression of that principle. In this respect he differed only slightly from the teaching of Plato. In Plato's Republic it was only the small class of philosophers who did the thinking for the state ; the rest of the citizens were to take their authority ; the slaves, at the bottom of the social scale, had no right to act except as they were told. Slavery has never become an important institution in China ; to the Chinese "all within the four seas are brothers". A practical democracy within limits has always prevailed, and the philosophers were state servants whose business was to care for the state and the people. When Plato philosophized, he talked most of the upper class of philosopher-guardians, and he legislated for them ; Hsüntze knew that the Sage can care for himself, and legislated for those beneath that status, the literati, who have always been the true rulers of China. Plato was making an ideal construction ; Hsüntze was facing a practical problem.

The most trenchant criticism of the whole Confucian philosophy of life is perhaps that while it has set up a very high ideal of life, yet it has never found the way to an adequate stimulus for self-development. It has preached self-development, and some individuals have reached extraordinary heights of ethical life ; yet it has never succeeded in developing a large number of its followers. Sagehood, even the status

of superior man, has remained the privilege of the exceptional few, not of the many. Perhaps this is an essential defect of any authoritarian system; the attempt to follow a model always results in an inferior imitation. It is only when the aim is creative self-development that true moral greatness can be reached.

CHAPTER XIII

LOGICAL THEORY

Terms.

In Chinese the term for logic is literally "the study of terms",¹ logical problems having first arisen as problems about terms rather than about judgments. In his logic, Hsüntze stands almost at the end of the stream of ancient Chinese philosophic thought, and he is influenced by all of the various schools of thought. Although he attacks heterodox philosophies most vigorously, yet, as is usually the case in such a situation, he is profoundly influenced by the men whom he criticized. Hence we must survey the course of the development of logical theory in ancient China in order to understand Hsüntze's teaching.

Confucius.

The two great sources of ancient Chinese philosophy were Lao-tze and Confucius. Confucius founded the Confucian or practical school, while most of the motifs found in the most theoretical heterodox schools find their source in Lao-tze. Just as Greek philosophy did not begin with Democritus and Socrates, so Chinese philosophy did not begin with Lao-tze and Confucius, but all earlier thinkers are unknown and their works are lost. Even the Classics, which date from an earlier time than Confucius, passed through his hands and were edited by him, so we cannot tell with any assurance what in them is from Confucius, and what is more ancient.

The fundamental concept in Confucius' logic is that of the "rectification of terms". Every action or thought begins with an idea. Ideas are represented by terms or names. It is these terms which give the direction to action and which are the focal points for the organization of life and of society. Hence the important thing to be done in the reform of society and of morals is the rectification of these terms.

The Rectification of Terms.

" 'The Prince of Wei,' said Tze Lu, 'is awaiting you, Sir, to take control of his administration,—what will you undertake first, Sir ?'

" 'The one thing needed,' replied the Master, 'is the rectification of terms.'

" 'Are you as wide of the mark as that, Sir !' said Tze Lu. 'Why this correcting ?'

" 'How uncultivated you are, Yu !' responded the Master. 'A wise man in regard to what he does not understand, maintains an attitude of reserve. If terms are not correct, then statements do not accord with facts ; when statements and facts do not accord, then business is not properly executed ; when business is not properly executed, proper conduct (*Li*) and music do not flourish ; when proper conduct (*Li*) and music do not flourish, then punishments become arbitrary ; when punishments do not fit the crime, then people do not know how to move hand or foot. Hence the superior man gives names to things which can be definitely stated, and what he so states he can always carry into practice ; for the superior man will on no account have anything incorrect in his statements.' "

¹ An., XIII, lii ; I have adapted Scothill's translation.

This statement is fundamental for the understanding of Confucius' philosophy. All reform, all guidance of the people in the right way, must be through the medium of correct terms.

The
Influence of
the Chinese
Language.

The Chinese language lends itself to the illusion that it is the term, rather than the judgment, which is fundamental in thought, much better than the English language. If Locke may be excused for founding his philosophy on the analysis of ideas, Confucius may be all the more excused for founding his programme of reform upon the rectification of terms. For the Chinese language is monosyllabic and uninflected; relations are expressed either by one of what are called in Chinese "empty characters",¹ each of which have a number of different meanings and uses, as prepositions, conjunctions, adverbs, or interjections and so are rather vague (the meaning in any particular sentence must be gathered chiefly from its position and the context); or relations are expressed simply through position. Hence the relational aspects of knowledge are obscured by the structure of the Chinese language, especially in the literary language, and it is not surprising that Confucius thought of the comparatively fixed nouns and verbs as the fundamental elements in knowledge, and hence in action. In addition, there is nothing in Chinese composition that corresponds to the sentence as the fundamental element in composition. Its place is taken by the clause or phrase, and phrase after phrase may be strung together for an indefinite extent without coming to a full stop. While there are such things as complete thoughts that would make a sentence in English, the Chinese language

does not force thought into the form of a complete and rounded sentence, but goes on, phrase after phrase, in a less organized manner. In this way, Chinese writing is really nearer to the actual course of thought than the artificial stopping of thought by the necessity of making a complete whole and putting down a period. The sentence is really a logical form into which the English language compels us to throw our thought; by long habit we have become accustomed to think that way. Not so the Chinese; his writing is much nearer his thinking; his thought does not need to be congealed in sentences; his clauses or sentences need not have subjects, nor is the presence of a predicate verb essential; what would be to us illogical constructions may be used with perfect propriety. This absence of the sentence as the prominent characteristic of speech and writing naturally hid the judgment as fundamental for logic from the view of Confucius much more completely than it did from that of Locke.

To see how important Confucius considered this rectification of terms to be, we need only consider how wide was the injury done by their confusion—government business cannot be properly done; proper conduct and music, the greatest influences in the establishment of correct conduct, do not flourish, punishments no longer fit the crime, and the people as a whole do not know how to act! What greater calamity could come to any state?

In illustration of "statements do not accord with facts" we should consider another of Confucius' sayings: "The Master said, 'A drinking horn that is not a horn! What a horn! What a horn!'"¹

¹ *An.*, VI, xxiii.

Importance
of Rectifica-
tion.

The word here translated "horn" originally meant a horned drinking vessel; but the vessel had changed shape while keeping its name; so that any vessel holding about three pints was called a "horn" whether it had the shape of a horn or not. Confucius wanted words to correspond to facts, and so objected to this term. Similarly:

"When Chi K'ang-tze asked Confucius for a definition of government, Confucius replied: 'To govern (*Cheng*) means to rectify (*Cheng*). If you, Sir, led the way in being correct (*Cheng*), who will dare to be incorrect (not *Cheng*)?'"¹

Not only are the words meaning "to govern" and "to rectify" or "to be correct" pronounced the same, but the Chinese character for "to govern"² includes the character "to rectify"³ as one component part. In those days when graft and corruption on the part of the rulers were prevalent, to say that "to rectify oneself" or "to be correct" is an essential part of "government" was setting up a high ideal. To govern without being correct could truly be said to be violating the meaning of the word. Confucius was trying to seek a standard interpretation of action, as embodied in the implications of terms, to which standard all conduct must conform. Without a standard it would be easy to find all terms, and therefore all action, relative. His ideal was that this standard of action would remove all doubt and uncertainty as to what to do.

"When right principles (*Tao*) prevail in the empire, there need be no discussions among the people."⁴

Confucius thought that all the troubles of the world came

Evil is Lack
of Rectifica-
tion.

¹ *An.*, XII, xvi.

² 正.

³ 政.

⁴ *An.*, XVI, II, 3.

because there was no objective standard of right and wrong, and the necessity of establishing a standard was one of the foremost objectives in his mind. Exactly as Hsüntze said :

"To-day the Sage-Kings are dead, the country is in disorder, wicked doctrines have arisen, the princes have no power to compel the people to do right, and no punishment to prevent them from following wrong. . . . That various forms, when absent, are understood by others, is because . . . the terms and the realities are bound together."¹

This seeking for an objective standard has been fundamental in all Confucian thinking.

Confucius was really attacking relativism in ethics. He Against
Relativism. felt that if there was no settled standard of right and wrong, then all other standards, as for example, the standard of what is proper conduct or *Li*, music, punishment for crimes, also could not be established. " . . . Then proper conduct (*Li*) and music do not flourish, . . . punishments do not fit the crime, . . . and the people do not know how to move hand or foot."² Exactly as Hsüntze said : "Now the Sage-Kings are dead, terms are carelessly preserved, strange nomenclatures arise, terms and realities are confused, and what is right and wrong is not clear, so that even an official who guards the laws or a scholar who chants the Classics is all confused. If a (good) King should arise, he would certainly follow the ancient terms and reform (rectify) the new terms."³

Then the object of "rectifying the terms" is to set up an An Objective
Standard. objective standard of right and wrong.

¹ *W.H.*, xxii, 8, 3.

² *As.*, XIII, 48; quoted on p. 199.

³ *W.H.*, xxii, 3.

"When Duke Ching of Ts'i inquired of Confucius the principles of government, Confucius answered, saying: 'Let the prince be prince, the minister minister, the father father, and the son son.'

"'Excellent!' said the Duke, 'Truly if the prince be not prince, the minister not minister, the father not father, and the son not son, however much grain I may have, shall I be allowed to eat it?' "¹

Error is the failure to act up to the standard implied in the name given to a person; it is a father failing to act as a father should, or a son failing to act as a son should. Thus the rectification of terms became one of the sources of the Confucian ethics and the criterion of right and wrong.

*The Spring
and Autumn.*

Now how did Confucius carry out this principle? "The world fell into decay and principles faded away. Perverse teachings and oppressive deeds waxed rife again. There were instances of ministers who murdered their sovereigns, and of sons who murdered their fathers. Confucius was afraid, and so wrote the *Spring and Autumn*. . . . Confucius said, 'It will be only by the *Spring and Autumn* that men will know me, and it will be only by the *Spring and Autumn* that men will condemn me.' . . . Confucius completed the *Spring and Autumn* and rebellious ministers and villainous sons were struck with terror." "²

The *Spring and Autumn* was the means that Confucius used to rectify terms. Some Western scholars have been at a loss to understand why the ancient Confucians should have praised so highly this brief, dry, and sometimes untrustworthy history. Confucius was not primarily writing history, but

¹ *An.*, XII, xi.

² *Menc.*, III, ii, ix, 7, 8, 11.

rather illustrating his theory of the rectification of terms. We cannot go into the details of how he did this, but can only mention the main points.¹

In the first place, Confucius endeavoured to settle the exact Words, meaning and relations of words. For example, he says in the *Spring and Autumn*: "There fell stones in Sung five in number."

The commentators explain this peculiar order of words by saying that he wished to make clear that the falling was the first thing, the realization that they were stones (probably meteorites) was next, and that the counting of them did not come until afterwards. The result was that the Kung Yang and Ku Liang commentaries investigated the use of words and grammar; they distinguish not only nouns and verbs, but also relational words. This was what was later called "distinguishing similarities and differences".

Secondly, Confucius distinguished and rectified the correct Rank, status and rank of the individuals he mentions. In his day the Chou emperor had already become unimportant and was disregarded, but Confucius in recording events year by year, in each year mentions the "first month of the Emperor's year", for the calendar had been established by the Chou dynasty; thereby calling people's attention to the existence and prerogatives of the imperial house, just as in the *Analects* we find him criticizing the Chi family and the three great houses of Lu for using imperial rites in their sacrifices.²

We have noted how the rulers of the feudal states gradually took higher and higher titles, until they usurped the imperial

¹ Cf. *Hu*, p. 98 ff.

² *An.*, III, i. ii.

title: in Confucius' day the rulers of Ts'u and Wu called themselves "Kings", the same title as the Chou emperor, but in the *Spring and Autumn*, Confucius only styled them "Viscounts", the title with which they were supposed to have been originally enfeoffed. Likewise the rulers of the powerful states of Ts'i and Tsin who styled themselves "Dukes", are only given their rightful title of "Marquis", and the rulers of the weak state of Sung are styled "Dukes", because these were the titles originally conferred by the Chou emperor.¹ Likewise when Duke Huan of Ts'i called the Chou emperor to a conference of the nobles, Confucius thought that a lowering of the Emperor's dignity, and wrote instead, "The Emperor when hunting came to Ho Yang." As Confucius said when one of his disciples proposed to do away with a ceremony which had become meaningless, "Ts'ze! You care for the sheep. I care for the ceremony."² Confucius felt that if the doors were once opened to radical changes in ancient customs, confusion and immorality would result.

Judgment of
Conduct.

In the third place, Confucius, in writing history, wrote his approval or condemnation of persons and actions into his history. In his time, freedom of speech was not yet possible. A private individual could not criticize his social superiors or the ancestors of his superiors too freely. But Confucius did what he could. The *Spring and Autumn* records the murder of a prince thirty-six times. In recording these murders, Confucius worded them differently to express his different attitudes to

¹ Cf. *W.H.*, ix, 10, and note, where Hsüntze makes this use of terms.

² *AN.*, III, xvi, 2.

the act. The differences of wording are minute, but the China of that day was a very cultured country, and by comparing the record in the *Spring and Autumn* with what actually happened, a cultured man could easily draw the moral. Confucius meant to imply that if a prince deserved death, killing him was no crime. On the other hand, if the prince was good, Confucius named as the murderer, not the actual doer of the deed, but the instigator of the murder. No wonder that "rebellious ministers and villainous sons were struck with terror".

But Confucius did not dare to be completely consistent in such a bold course, especially in the history of his own state, and so later ages did not always draw the true moral of Confucius' history, but instead taught some of the minor matters Confucius had inculcated, such as avoiding the personal name of the prince, father, or Worthy.

The results of Confucius' efforts to rectify terms were three-^{Effect upon}fold. (1) The dictionary and grammar were developed—^{Later} something which ancient China had been without. The Con-^{Development.}fucian writers made it a point to define the meaning of terms. We find this tendency quite prominent in Hsüntze. (2) It resulted in the development of logic. Hsüntze's logic is a direct outgrowth of Confucius' doctrine. Likewise we find Micius and Yangtze developing a logic. Confucius' doctrine of the rectification of terms became the source of Chinese logic just as Socrates' search for definitions became the source of Greek logic. (3) On Chinese history the *Spring and Autumn* has also exercised a profound influence; it became the model of historical form. But Confucius had to sacrifice strict historical accuracy to his aim of rectifying terms, and consequently the effect of the *Spring and Autumn* has been to

make Chinese history subjective and credulous rather than objective and critical.¹

Laotze.

The other great influence in the development of ancient Chinese logic was that of Laotze. Even though a person should go so far with Giles as to say that a great deal now found in the *Tao Teh Ching* is spurious, yet it is necessary that there should have been a philosophy essentially the same as that we now find there to account for the later philosophical development. Laotze was the first to deal with the great problem of Chinese logic—the relation of the name or term to the reality.

"The Indefinite! The Impalpable! (the universe). Within it are appearances. Impalpable! Indefinite! Within them are things. Profound! Obscure! Within them are essences. These essences are supremely real. Within them is reliability. From the ancient to present times, their name has not left them. Thereby we can talk of all things. How can we know the characteristics of all things? By this."²

The universe is indefinite and impalpable, but its "appearances" compose "things", these things have "essences" which represent the unchanging nature of things, such as the coldness and whiteness of snow, and which are included in the "name". It is these essences which are reliable, and through them the thing may be known. Snow may melt or a man may die, but the "name", the concept, persists, and the universe may be known through these "names". Here is a doctrine similar to that of Plato's ideas. Laotze has a standard of meanings, yet he does not wish to set it up as eternal.

¹ Cf. *Hu*, pp. 92-103.

² *Tao Teh Ching*, sect. 21.

Laotze is fundamentally a pessimist. The development of civilization has not been a benefit, rather the reverse ; it has brought an increase of evil. The ancient days, when life was simple, were much better than the present. Evil is the outcome of desire ; civilization and knowledge only increases desire, and hence evil ensues.

"When in the world beauty is recognized to be beauty, straightway there is ugliness. When goodness is recognized to be good, straightway there is evil. Thus existence and non-existence mutually originate each other ; difficulty and ease bring each other into existence ; long and short are compared by each other ; high and low depend on each other ; sound and echo re-echo each other ; before and after follow upon each other. Because of this, the Sage confines himself to inactive doing, and performs speechless teaching. . . . Not exalting worth keeps the people from striving. Not prizing things hard to procure keeps the people from theft. Not displaying things that can be desired keeps the people's hearts from being disordered. Therefore in the government of the Sage, he empties their mind but fills their belly ; he weakens their will but strengthens their bones (body) ; he continually causes the people to be without knowledge and without desire."¹

Laotze realizes that good and evil, beautiful and ugly, difficult and easy, long and short, high and low, are involved in each other ; that if we have one member of a pair, we must also have the other ; if we have good, we must have evil, etc. But his goal is to get rid of desire and evil, and he sees that the only way to do that is to get rid of *both* members of the pair of complementary terms, of good as well as evil,

¹ *Tao Teh Ching*, sect. 2, 3.

and to return to the primitive state in which neither good nor evil was known, to the simple chaotic time when there were no terms, when people had neither knowledge nor desire. Without knowledge there would be no desire. Hence Lao-tze emphasizes non-action, nothingness; he often speaks of the benefits of the simplicity which is without terms for things.¹

Herein is implied a different kind of logic from that of Confucius; terms are not existences, but expressions of the real essences of things. Terms and things are distinguished. What is more important, terms are relative to each other. Herein we find the germ of that relativism which was so characteristic of later unorthodox thinking.

Yangtze.

The Cyrenic individualist, Yangtze, took the other alternative involved in the distinction which Lao-tze had made between terms and realities. Lao-tze had held that while things change, yet the essences are real and reliable. Yangtze reacted against this realism, and went to the other extreme: terms are not realities; terms are artificialities. He did not recognize the existence of any universals; he recognized only particulars. "Realities have no names; names have no realities. Names are only artificialities." Names are only human creations, and have no real existence. "Realities are certainly not what are given by names." (Chinese has the same word for "names" as for "terms".) This is extreme nominalism. We find almost the same nominalism in ancient Greece, but from different premises and with different conclusions, in Democritus: "By convention sweet is sweet, by convention bitter is bitter, by convention hot is

¹ *Hu*, pp. 59-64.

hot, by convention colour is colour." From this premise Yangtze deduced two important consequences: (1) All terms, all rites and rules are only human creations, without any corresponding realities; and (2) only the individual is important, hence human relations are unimportant, and every individual can do as he likes. Yangtze carried this doctrine to its logical conclusion in extreme individualism and egoism.¹

Here we get the source of the nominalism which was henceforth to rule in Chinese logic, and which found expression in Hsin-tze as well as others. Laotze himself was a realist, but by making the distinction between reality and the term he opened the way to nominalism, which when once seen, did away with realism.

Micius seems originally to have been a disciple of Confucius, *Stoicism*, but he broke away from the Confucian conservatism, and wanted to break with the past and to reform on a new principle, that of utilitarianism. This attempt to base everything on a single principle shows his logical mind. To present his new doctrines convincingly, he then worked out a set of canons of proof.

"Discourse must establish its correctness. If a discourse has no correctness, it is like a man who is on top of a moving potter's wheel and talks of morning and night—he cannot distinguish what is right or wrong, beneficial or hurtful, nor can he clearly know them. Hence a discourse must undergo three criteria. What are these three criteria? . . . What is its foundation; what is its source; and what is its use?

"On what is it founded? On the one hand it is founded on the doings of the ancient Kings.

¹ *Ite*, pp. 177-9.

"How is it gained? On the other hand its source is the realities discovered by people's ears and eyes.

"What is its use? Express it in laws and government; see its benefit for the country and the people.

"This is what is meant by saying that a discourse has three criteria."¹

Here are three canons of proof: (1) By the ancient Kings; (2) by sense experience; and (3) by its practical effects. Of these three, Micius emphasized the third most of all, for it was his utilitarianism expressed in terms of logic. But unfortunately he interpreted it too narrowly, and used it, for example, to attack music as wasteful and useless. One of the chief reasons for the ultimate failure of this utilitarianism was that it was too narrow. The second canon seems quite promising, in that it emphasized sense experience as well as pure thought, and thus opened the way to the investigation of nature and to the inductive logic as well as pure reason. This conclusion, however, was not drawn by Micius himself. Sense experience is limited, and people's senses are easily confused, so we are not surprised that Micius should use this canon to establish the existence of spirits. In view of Micius' reaction against the Confucians, it is surprising that he should keep the first canon, but probably he found the argument from ancient history quite effective with the people of his time. In reality this canon is merely that we should take past experience and not repeat the experiments that have failed, and so is really a form of the third canon. In this way it is a form of the law of the continuity of experience, and so is one of the foundations of scientific procedure.²

¹ 墨子非命上.

² *Hu*, pp. 100-5.

Micius himself was very strongly religious, and his interest was more in establishing a Mician religion based on utilitarianism, with reverence for Heaven and the Confucian *Jen* universalized into love for all men for its principles, than in working out the implications of his philosophy. This was left for his successors to do.

After his death, his disciples seem to have split into two main divisions, the conservatives, who continued his religion, and the progressives, who were more philosophic and scientific. It was these Neo-Micians who worked out some of the most brilliant results of ancient Chinese philosophy. The Neo-Micians.

They made a psychological analysis of the process of knowledge. Starting with Micius' second canon, that knowledge has its source in sense experience, they analyzed what was involved in the process of knowledge, with a surprisingly modern touch, and distinguished three elements. The Process of Knowledge

Firstly, knowledge involves a power of knowledge.

"Knowledge is a power. Knowledge is that whereby we know, but do not necessarily know, as for example the power of sight."¹

Knowledge involves the power of the senses to be affected by stimuli, which power is there whether there are stimuli or not. Without this capacity for being affected by stimuli there would be no knowledge.

Secondly, knowledge is reception.

"Knowledge is a reception."² "Knowledge is that whereby we know a passing object and can get its form, as for example, a sight."³ In this definition, "knowledge"

‘黑子經說上。’ ‘黑子經上。’ ‘黑子經說上。’

is sensation. Sensation involves stimuli which are received by the sense organ. While this doctrine is not worked out further, we see that it involves an epistemological realism.

Thirdly, knowledge is meaning.

"Knowledge (or understanding) is intelligence."¹ "Understanding is that whereby we know how to consider a thing and to know it, as for example, wisdom."²

"Hearing is the power of the ear. To follow and examine what is heard and get its meaning is by the inquiry of the mind. Speech is the fluency of the mouth. To grasp what is said so that its meaning is seen, is by the dialectic of the mind."³

Thus the senses give sensations from outer stimuli, but the meaning is given to these sensations through the operation of the mind.

Time and
Space.

But how are these three factors synthesized? Through time and space. Here we come to the famous discussion of "hardness and whiteness".

"If a stone is not both hard and white, the reason is that it has not undergone the operation of time and space. If it is both hard and white, the reason is in that synthesis."⁴

"If the hardness does not also give the whiteness, then synthesis is necessary."⁵

"Hardness and whiteness are not external to each other."⁶

"If hardness and whiteness or different places are not synthesized, but are arranged apart from each other, then they are external to each other."⁷

¹ 墨子經上.

² 經說上.

³ 經上.

⁴ 經下.

⁵ 經說下.

⁶ 經上.

⁷ 經說上.

This teaching is very much more cryptic in the Chinese than in the translation, and it is not surprising that Hsüntze and others should have entirely missed its meaning. The eye perceives that a stone is white, the hand that it is hard. How does it come to be known as both hard and white? I know that the hard object I now feel is the same as the white object I now see because it is in the same time; I know that hardness and whiteness inhere in the same object because it occupies the same space. Hence it is through the synthesis of the mind in time and space that sensations from different senses are combined into one object. These Neo-Micians were not so very far from Kant's insight.

Time is also the important factor in memory.

"Knowledge which does not come through the five senses is explained by the operation of time."¹

Thus there is sense knowledge, which is synthesized through time and space, and there is memory, which is knowledge retained through the operation of time.

Terms or names are also an important factor in knowledge, *Terms.* because terms are a summary of the qualities of things, so that by hearing the term, the qualities of the thing are remembered and known.

"That fire is necessarily hot is explained through memory."²

"To see fire is to say that fire is hot, not because of the heat of the fire."³

Thus if we see fire from a distance, when we recognize that it is fire, we also know it is hot, because the term "fire" which we apply to the sight which we have, includes both

¹ 經下.

² 經下.

³ 經說下.

that of a certain visual configuration and of a temperature impression. Here we have Yangtze's nominalism modified in the direction of conceptualism.

Classes of
Terms.

Terms are also classified into three classes.

"Terms are general, class and particular."¹ "Terms. 'Things' is general. Whatever has substance must be given this artificial name. If it is called 'horse' that is a class name. If a thing is like this reality, then it must be given that name. If it is called Ts'ang (a personal name), that is a particular term. This name is confined to this particular reality."²

We shall meet this classification again in Hsüntze, though he does not seem to have thought that particular terms can be said to be terms, inasmuch as they refer only to one individual, and so he has only general and class terms. This classification he supplements by other classifications of terms.

Kinds of
Knowledge.

Following Micius' three canons of knowledge, the Neo-Micians developed a theory of three kinds of knowledge.

"Knowledge is hearsay, inference, or personal experience."³ "When knowledge is received from another person that is hearsay. When a partition does not intercept knowledge, that is inference. When a person himself perceives something, that is personal experience."⁴

In this classification, the scientific interest is predominant. There is no innate knowledge or any eternal truths, but all knowledge begins with experience, or with inference, such as inferring what is on the other side of a partition from what I see of this side, or with personal investigation. This emphasis

¹ 經上.

¹ 經說上.

² 經上.

⁴ 經說上.

upon scientific investigation was new in Chinese thought; before that, the ideal of philosophy had been that of the philosopher who sits in his study. The Neo-Micians emphasized the necessity of the investigation of natural phenomena, and we are not surprised that their teachings included not only theoretical, practical, and political philosophy but also arithmetic, geometry, optics, and dynamics. In ethics they held the modern doctrine that "action is the end of knowledge, but depends on desire".¹ The object of knowledge is to guide action, but the motive power of action is human desire. This psychological analysis led them to the theory that right is what is beneficial and brings pleasure, and to a typically hedonistic position.

Micius had counted upon the logic of his position to bring Dialectic assent, and likewise these Neo-Micians made much of dialectic or argumentation. For them dialectic was a means of distinguishing the right and wrong, the true and false.

"Dialectic is argumentation; when a dialectic is victorious it is correct."² "Dialectic is saying it is a cow, or that it is not a cow—this is argumentation. These cannot both be correct. If both cannot be correct, then one must be incorrect. Being incorrect is, for example, saying that it is a dog."³

"Dialectic is saying it is right or saying it is wrong. The one which is correct will win."⁴

In other words, dialectic (by which is meant Socratic dialectic or debate) is the means of ascertaining the truth, just as to-day a judge uses the debate between the lawyers

¹ 經上.

² 經說上.

³ 經上.

⁴ 經說下.

on the two sides of a case to ascertain what is the truth. This teaching implies (1) that there is such a thing as truth, which is absolute in some sense, (2) that this truth can be known, and (3) that the truth will necessarily win in debate. It was this doctrine of dialectic that was both the greatest strength and the greatest weakness of these Neo-Micians.

Dialectic is to
Discover
Truth.

The Neo-Micians found that argument was the best way to win assent, and so they developed the doctrine of dialectic to great lengths, into the details of which we cannot go. The purpose of dialectic is (1) to make plain what is right and wrong, (2) to indicate what is good and what is bad government, (3) to decide what is like and what different, (4) to investigate terms and realities, (5) to settle what is beneficial and what injurious, and (6) to fix upon what should be disliked.¹ Thus the function of dialectic was to discover and fix all truth, both metaphysical and ethical. In this process of discovering and establishing truth, the Neo-Micians worked out seven moods of logical inference, including a statement of the inductive method, which implied the uniformity of nature, so that a person could infer from the cases that he has examined to cases that he has not examined, and gain a correct induction without making a complete enumeration of all cases. What the Neo-Micians taught covered Mill's first three canons of induction. Such a teaching as this in ancient times was really extraordinary.

The contributions of the Neo-Micians to ancient Chinese philosophy may be summed up as (1) a conceptualism between the realism of Confucius and the nominalism of Yangtze,

¹ 小取篇.

which made "reality" only a subject and "terms" only a predicate, and so avoided ontology, (2) their scientific method, (3) the emphasis upon investigation and inference, thus opening the way to scientific contributions, and (4) they prepared the way for a conception of law, which, however, did not develop until the end of this period. But the very intricacy of their philosophy helped to bring about their downfall. Hsüntze followed their analysis until they began to talk of time and space, and then, like a practical man, he went no farther. The Chinese are pre-eminently practical, and if the Confucians were criticized by the contemporaries of Hsüntze as impractical,¹ how much more the Neo-Micians!

But they aggravated the difficulty of being understood by adopting cryptic methods of teaching. Their liking for dialectic led them to propound a series of logical puzzles, similar to Zeno's paradoxes, based on their philosophy; so that they mystified the layman by stating and proving such statements as the following:

"An egg has feathers,"² "a chicken has three feet,"³ "Ying (a small city) is the country,"⁴ "a dog can become a goat,"⁵ "a horse has an egg,"⁶ "a frog has a tail,"⁷

¹ Cf. *W.H.*, vii, 2.

² The feathers of the chicken must be in some sense present in the egg.

³ The feet cannot be moved without the mind, and so the mind must be considered as a third foot, since it has motive power.

⁴ Compared with illimitable space, Ying and China are equally small.

⁵ There is no absolute standard of terms, hence a dog might just as well be called a goat.

⁶ In the process of evolution, there was a time when the ancestor of the horse was a creature which developed from an egg.

⁷ Because it had a tail as a tadpole.

"fire is not hot,"¹ "a wheel does not rest upon the earth,"² "the eye does not see,"³ "pointing does not get there, getting there never ends,"⁴ "a tortoise is longer than a snake,"⁵ "the square is not square, and the compass cannot be round,"⁶ "the shadow of a flying bird never moves,"⁷ "there are times when the point of a flying arrow does not move and when it does not stop,"⁸ "a puppy is not a dog,"⁹ "a yellow cow and a black horse make three,"¹⁰ "a white dog is black,"¹¹ "an orphan colt never had a dam,"¹² "if daily I halved a foot long stick, in ten thousand ages I could never get to its end."¹³

These paradoxes were both a strength and a weakness;

¹ Without the mind to synthesize, fire as seen would not be known as hot.

² A wheel in turning can only rest upon particular places, not upon the earth in general.

³ Without the activity of the mind, the mere activity of the eye cannot produce sight.

⁴ What we can point out never attains to full knowledge of a thing; there is always more to be learned.

⁵ Some big tortoises are longer than some small snakes.

⁶ The actual squares and circles made by the use of the square and compass are never perfectly square or round.

⁷ The shadow can only fall upon particular spots; it is a different shadow upon each spot, and hence the shadow cannot move.

⁸ In appearance it does not stop; but it must be at each of an infinite number of points along its path, and hence must stop at each of them.

⁹ Because all individuals are different; though this puppy grow into a dog, yet the puppy would not be the same as the dog.

¹⁰ Without the synthesizing activity of the mind there are only the sensations of yellow and black, and the figure of an animal; yellow and black and animal make three.

¹¹ Terms are not absolute, but only given by men; and hence a white dog may just as truly be called black.

¹² Because when its dam was alive it was not an orphan.

¹³ Based on the infinite divisibility of a finite distance. Cf. *Hs.*, pp. 191-250, for these Neo-Mileans.

they drew popular attention to their teachings and put opponents on the defensive, so that clever students were saying to the Confucian teachers, "Can you solve this paradox?" At the same time these paradoxes helped to get the Neo-Micians into disrepute, because most people were not equal to such dialectical agility, and so despised the authors of such "senseless trash". Just as there was a reaction against Hume's dialectic against causality towards a common-sense position, so this dialectic of the Neo-Micians helped to strengthen the opposition.

This opposition came not only from the common-sense *Chuangtze*. Confucians, but also from the brilliant follower of Lao-tze, *Chuangtze*. He was the Heraclitus of ancient China. To him change was fundamental and everything was relative. His philosophy was essentially pessimistic; though he lived in the world, yet he did not concern himself with this impermanent changing world. All things are one, "Heaven and Earth are born with me and the universe is one with me." He developed a doctrine of biological evolution and of adaptation to the environment that in many respects anticipates modern biological theory.

Chuangtze observed the strife between the Micians and the *Dialectic*. Confucians, and came to the conclusion not that either one was right, but that both were wrong, and that there was no objective standard of right and wrong. Everything is relative. He turned his keen criticism against the Neo-Mician confidence in the power of dialectic, and showed that "the dialectician cannot see everything".¹ Because a man is debating for his belief, he is prejudiced; because of

¹ 莊子齊物論。

his prejudice there is contention. The greater the contention the more prejudiced he becomes. Is the winner in a battle of wits necessarily right? Analyzed in this way, it was easy to see that the Neo-Mician confidence in dialectic was misplaced.

Complete
Relativism.

But Chuangtze went still further and doubted that there is a right and wrong. Right and wrong imply each other; truth and falsehood are impossible without one another; if there is good, there is also necessarily evil. Of the three implications of the Neo-Mician confidence in dialectic, Chuangtze denied all three. Truth is relative; our intellect cannot know it; and truth does not win in debate. With brilliant imagery, Chuangtze enforced his teaching of the complete relativity of all truth, so that even though he was declared unorthodox and was forgotten, yet his striking illustrations were not forgotten.

Quietism.

All change is by natural law, so why seek to reform anything? Such considerations led Chuangtze to a quietism and a pessimism that caused him to retire from the world and seek only to be content with his lot and undisturbed at life or death.¹

Such teaching as this was destructive of all philosophy, as well as of all initiative for reform. Is it any wonder that the conservative reform party, the Confucians, felt that they must do battle with all such philosophies as those of the destructive Chuangtze and the sophistic Neo-Micians, and that they felt that the most important thing was to establish a standard of truth and falsehood which could not be impugned?

¹ *Hu*, pp. 266-72.

Mencius had answered some of the criticisms against the Confucians, but most of his effort was directed against Kaotze, whose distinctive doctrine was that human nature was neither good nor evil but indifferent—a rather unimportant matter. Against the major attacks of these other philosophies he had done little, merely making a few animadversions against Micius. There had been no logical answer to their criticisms. It was Hsüntze who came to the rescue of Hsüntze. Confucianism, and partly by his attacks on the other philosophies, and partly by his systematic statement of the Confucian teaching, he won the day for Confucianism.

Hsüntze's polemic against the unorthodox schools was Polemic. continued and severe. Not only did he write a book "Against the Ten Philosophers", who were all unorthodox teachers, and criticize them by name, but his positive teaching is continually directed against them. Thus, in a description of burial rites appropriate to different ranks of people, he ends with a lengthy description of the burial of a criminal, and leaves it for the enlightened reader to see that this description of a criminal's burial is that advocated by Micius for everyone! In his book "On Music", he answers in order Micius' attacks against music; he conducts lengthy debates with Sungtze's pupils on the subject of desire; and illustrates his classification of fallacies from these philosophers' teachings. He argues that the Neo-Mician sophisms are trying to "exhaust the inexhaustible or pursue the illimitable."¹ It is interesting, as showing the relative importance of the different schools in that day, that Hsüntze's attacks were directed chiefly against Micius and the Neo-Micians. Indeed at one

¹ W.H., II, 20.

time it seemed as if the Mician teaching was to supersede the Confucian. Chuangtze was only mentioned once; his doctrines had not had any length of time to spread through the educated world. The attacks of Hsüntze and his pupils against the opposing philosophies were of one the fundamental factors in the eventual supremacy of Confucianism.

Rectification
of Terms.

As a true disciple of Confucius, Hsüntze took as his fundamental logical principle the rectification of terms. But as we have seen in his ethical theory, the Sage is to gain his ethical standards for himself, whereas the ordinary man is to take them from authority; consequently in Hsüntze's logic he also has two stages: that of the King who is wise and righteous, who is to rectify terms, and that of the ordinary man, who must bow to authority. We shall take up the King's problem first.

As with Confucius, so Hsüntze believes that all evil and difficulty in private and public life come from terms not being correct, and hence there is no true standard of right and wrong.

"Now the Sage-Kings are dead, terms are carelessly preserved, strange nomenclature arises, terms and realities are confused, and what is right and wrong is not clear, so that even an official who guards the laws or a scholar who chants the Classics is all confused."¹

When there were no such "strange terms" to be "a pretext for confusing the correct nomenclature, the people were guileless."² Virtue among the people, together with subservience to the will of the wise ruler, can only be secured by setting up a correct standard of action by means of correct

¹ *W.H.*, xii, 3.

² *W.H.*, xii, 2.

terms. So we see that for Hsüntze, even his logic is a means of serving his practical, ethical purpose.

Then "if a King should arise, he would certainly follow the ancient terms and reform the new terms".¹ A new Sage-King would not need to begin anew; for he had some things already fixed.

"When the later kings formed the terminology, in the names of punishments they followed the Shang dynasty, in the titles of nobility they followed the Chou dynasty, and in ceremonial terms they followed the *Ritual*."²

Hsüntze does not contemplate making a new beginning; he implicitly believes that truth is in some sense objective; what the Sages discover is necessarily congruent; hence a new Sage will agree with and take over the discoveries made by previous Sages, and build on the foundations which they had laid. Hsüntze does not always say "Sage-King", by which he meant a King who was wise enough to be a Sage; instead he often uses the equivalent term "King". The Chou dynasty kings of Hsüntze's days were effete, and are never mentioned; "King" to Hsüntze means "the ideal King."

As we now see, Hsüntze had not analyzed the situation *Criticism*, correctly. It was not a case of a static world, wherein the only problem was to get back to a fixed standard; but the Chinese world, just as every other part of the world, was progressing, and new situations were coming up, which needed new terms and new definitions to meet them. Changes of fundamental importance were occurring, which could not be fixed in the old moulds. Not many years after the death

¹ W.H., xxv, 3.

² W.H., xxi, 1.

of Hsüntze, the new Emperor, Ts'in Shih Hwangti, completely did away with the hoary feudal system, which had been established by those Confucian heroes, King Wu and Duke Chou, and established an absolute monarchy. But no Confucian foresaw such a change; they were all, like Hsüntze, looking backwards to the glorious past for their models. Confucianism has never succeeded in adapting itself to a changing world, and never can do so without radically altering its fundamental principles. The problem is to get a fixed unchanging authority in new situations. The only answer that Confucius or Hsüntze could make was to say: Fix the situation by fixing the terms. Hsüntze wanted to fix the situation by law, to fix the terms by the imperial absolute authority so that no new distinctions could be made.

Logical
Theory.

But the development of logic and dialectic in China had shown that it was not an easy thing to fix terms. The problems of "terms and realities", of "likenesses and differences" were involved. In order to present a consistent and persuasive method of rectifying terms, Hsüntze had to work his way through all the problems raised by previous logical theories. It is through Hsüntze that the discoveries made by the Neo-Micians and others found their way into the Confucian teaching.

"If a new King should arise, he would certainly . . . reform the new terms. Then he could not but investigate (1) the reason for having terms, together with (2) the means through which similarities and differences are found, and (3) the fundamental principles in applying terms to things."¹

¹ W.H., xlii, 3.

Around these three points Hsüntze groups his logical theory. Let us see how he develops it.

First, "the reason for having terms." The purpose of terms is to further mutual comprehension. "Because of them, when people of different districts, with different customs, meet, they can communicate."¹

"The use of a term is to know the reality when one hears the term."² "Terms . . . and speech are the messengers of . . . meaning."³ Terms are social entities, their purpose is to serve the individual's purpose, and to enable social intercourse to exist. It is in his emphasis upon the social character of terms that Hsüntze made his greatest contribution to Chinese logical theory.

"That various forms, when absent, are understood by others, is because in the case of different things, terms and realities are mutually bound together."⁴

Here is one of the central points in Hsüntze's doctrine of terms. Terms and realities are not unrelated; yet there is not a one to one correspondence between appearances and realities, as the naive realism of Confucius implies; but there is a connexion, at least enough of a connexion, that given a word, the corresponding appearance or reality is indicated. Here there is a realism implied which is clearly not a naive realism; but just what particular attitude Hsüntze took towards the epistemological problem, we cannot tell. Hsüntze was not interested in the epistemological problem for itself, as were the Neo-Micians, and he did not pursue the problem further. When his theory implies

¹ *W.H.*, xxii, 1.

² *Ibid.*, 10.

³ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

that the same term has the same meaning to different minds, that is enough for him.

Value
Judgments.

But Hsüntze, as a true Confucian, goes farther than merely indicating different realities by different terms. That is very important, but Confucius had used terms not merely to distinguish similarities and differences, but also to pass value judgments. The popular way of passing judgments upon a person's character is to call him a name. It is exactly this "calling names", but taken in a eulogistic sense, that Hsüntze means when he says, "He regulates nomenclature . . . to make plain the noble and base."¹ Here we have the ethical emphasis of the Confucians emerging. For instance Hsüntze in dealing with Sungtze's saying, "To receive insult is no disgrace," not only distinguishes between glory and shame, but also between just or righteous glory and the glory of circumstances, and similarly between just or true shame and the shame produced by circumstances.² Hsüntze not only distinguishes between things that are different, but also makes a value judgment in distinguishing similar things. Thus not only judgments of likeness or difference, but also value judgments are incorporated in terms. Calling a man a homicide is not the same as calling him a murderer, but should the meanings of "homicide" and "murderer" become mixed, when a judge says, "You are guilty of homicide," no one would be sure how to deal with that person. What Hsüntze wants is a definite, fixed set of categories, so that all that is necessary is to apply the right category to each situation, and then everyone will know how to deal with it. In this way public

¹ *W.H.*, xxii, 4.

² *Ibid.*, xviii, 15 f.

business will not suffer from the calamity of being hindered and set aside by the necessity of creating or rectifying categories. The rectification of terms should be the provision of a set of correct categories or types for action.

The second subject for investigation by a new King is Senses the Medium.
 "What are the means through which similarities and differences are found." This medium is the senses. Hsüntze adopts most of the Neo-Mician analysis of the process of knowledge. The senses distinguish each their own kind of sensation, and the mind distinguishes the six emotions: joy, anger, sorrow, pleasure, love, hatred, together with desire and the two conative qualities of action, doing things from a liking to do them, and forcing oneself to do them. In making action depend not only on immediate desire or liking, but also on remote desires, which is achieved by reflection and by conflict with immediate desires, Hsüntze greatly improves on the Neo-Mician analysis of conduct as depending on knowledge and desire. However, Hsüntze does not pursue this analysis further; indeed the words in which he expressed this distinction are open to other interpretations.

But knowledge does not come only through the senses. The Mind Gives Meaning
 Hsüntze follows the Neo-Micians in holding that the mind gives meaning to impressions. .

The mind "gives meaning to impressions, and only then, by means of the ear, sound can be known; by means of the eye, forms can be known. But the giving of meaning to impressions must depend on the senses given by Nature each noting its particular kind of sensations and then only knowledge can be had." ¹

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 3.

The figure implied in the text is that of a storekeeper, who, in Chinese stores, sits at the back of the store and records each transaction as it occurs in an account book. The senses each make their record upon the account book; but that record does not itself constitute knowledge; knowledge only arises when the mind comes to that record and interprets it. Thus there are in knowledge two chief factors—the senses and the mind.

The important thing in rectifying terms, then, is to recognize that similarities and differences come from the distinctions made by the senses, and so, in settling the meaning of terms, to go to the sense-impression which is responsible for the term, and see whether the term fits the reality or not.

Terms are by
Social
Agreement.

But Hsüntze recognized that not all terms come from sense-impressions, and so he added a third subject for investigation, "the fundamental principles in applying terms to things." The fundamental principles are the classes of terms and the "agreements about terms". Hsüntze recognized that terms are not absolute, but relative, yet he wanted to get a definite standard of meaning for terms. So he inquired how it was that terms came to be established in the first place. It was by his fundamental emphasis upon man as a social animal that he gained his solution of this problem. "In the case of miscellaneous names given to things, they followed the established customary designations of the Chinese people."¹

If terms are thus given to things, then they are not absolute. "There are no terms assuredly appropriate of themselves.

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 1.

There was an agreement and things were named. When the agreement has been made and has become customary—that is called an appropriate designation. That which is different from what is agreed upon is called an inappropriate designation. Terms have no corresponding realities appropriate of themselves. There was an agreement and things were named; when the agreement had been made and had become customary—these were called terms appropriate to the realities. But terms are really felicitous; when a term goes to the point, is easily understood, and is not contrary to the reality—this is called a felicitous term.”¹

Hsüntze fully recognizes the social character of terms. Herein he takes an important step in advance of previous philosophers. With Chuangtze he recognizes that terms are relative; but that does not mean that terms have no fixed meaning; on the contrary terms do have a fixed and definite meaning, but not in the nature of things, only by convention. In investigating the meaning of terms for the purpose of rectifying them, it is these social conventions which should be investigated, and then terms can be rectified.

“Investigate the agreements about terms; use what these agreements acquiesce in; set yourself against what they refuse to countenance, and then you will be able to stop this confusion.”²

But conventions cannot give an absolute fixed standard, such as Hsüntze wanted, because individuals may decide not to agree with the conventions. Consequently Hsüntze wanted these terms given an absolute character by the power of the State. Hsüntze's reaction to Chuangtze's

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 6 f.

² *Ibid.*, 8.

relativism was to call in the authority of an absolute ruler to give absolute character to moral and intellectual standards. His world had gone to pieces so much that he could see no other way of unifying it than through absolute rule. In so far Hsüntze himself was a relativist. His exaltation of absolute power was put into practice in a startling fashion by one of his disciples.

**Classes of
Terms.**

By means of this analysis it is possible to classify terms, not only by a single element, but by several, for the fundamental thing is that terms should convey the correct meaning to others. Hence Hsüntze classifies terms in different ways. In the first place, terms are the same or different. "When things are alike, they are named alike; when different, different names."¹

Likewise they are classified into simple and compound. In a monosyllabic language like the Chinese, where each syllable is a word, the classification according to the number of words or syllables in a term would be quite prominent. "When a simple term would be sufficient to convey the meaning, a simple term is used; when a simple term is insufficient, then a compound term is used."² If "horse" will convey the meaning, well and good; if not, then "black horse" should be used—the criterion is whether the terms convey the correct meaning to the other person, not what they mean in themselves. Here he has come a long way from the realism of Laotze and Confucius.

In place of the tripartite classification of terms into particular, class, and general terms used by the Neo-Micians, Hsüntze has only the latter two classes. Possibly he does

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 0.

² *Ibid.*

not think individual names worthy of being classed as names ; possibly he realizes that all terms are general, though he does not say so explicitly. " When simple and compound concepts do not conflict, then the general term may be used ; although it is a general term, there is no harm in using it. . . . Although all things are manifold, there are times when we wish to speak of them all, so we call them ' things '. ' Things ' is the most general term. We press on and generalize ; we generalize and generalize still more, until there is nothing more general ; then only we stop. There are times when we wish to speak of one aspect, so we say ' birds and beasts '. ' Birds and beasts ' is the greatest classifying term. We press on and classify ; we classify and classify still more, until there is no more classification to be made, and then we stop." ¹

The problem of the relation of the universal and the particular considered as real entities had not arisen in China ; nominalism had been so prevalent that the problem had not arisen, and Hsüntze came to a conceptualistic position without feeling that there was any problem in the nature of the relation between the universal and the particular. The only thing he emphasized was the necessity of not making contradictions in making generalizations.

The important rule to be followed in the use of terms is that of consistency. " He who refers to different realities should never use other than different terms ; thus there could not be any confusion. Likewise he who refers to the same reality should never use other than the same term." ²

¹ *W.H.*, xiii, 6.

² *Ibid.*

The Same and
Different
Realities.

Then how deal with the extreme doctrine of change, which holds that things are never twice the same? Use your common sense and see. "There are things which have the same form but two localities: or they may have different forms but the same locality. When things can be separated, when their forms are alike, but their locality different, although they may be undistinguishable—they are called two realities. When the form changes, but the reality cannot be separated, though it looks different, we call it transformation. When there is transformation but no separation—these are called one reality."¹

Two horses are in different places, and so are judged to be two; a grub and a moth continue to fill the same or consecutive places, and so are judged to be the same thing. Although Hsüntze rejected the Neo-Mician speculations as to space and time, yet he used space as the criterion of whether there was one or two objects involved. "By this method realities are investigated and their number is determined—this is the fundamental principle in regulating terms."²

These are the three things to be investigated in the rectification of terms—the meaning of the terms used, not only distinctions made by terms as to different or similar realities, but also the value judgments implied by terms; the manner of perception, the sense impressions which together with the meaning given them by the mind gives the distinctions of similarities and differences in the realities denoted by terms; and the tacit social agreements involved in terms,

¹ *IF.M.*, xxi 7.

² *Ibid.*

so as to use the same terms for the same realities and different terms for different realities.

In conformity with these three criteria, Hsüntze establishes *Fallacies*, three classes of fallacies in the use of terms.

The first class is where terms are used to confuse other terms. Here he quotes three sayings: " 'To receive an insult is no disgrace,'¹ 'the Sage does not love himself,'² 'to kill robbers is not to kill men,'³ these are fallacies in the use of terms with the result of confusing the terms."⁴

1. Terms Confused by Terms.

These fallacies can all be resolved by using the first criterion of investigation. "Investigate the reason for having terms, observe of what sort the terms are, and then you will be able to stop this confusion."⁴

Insult belongs to the class of things which are disliked, so does disgrace; it is useless to make men think it is otherwise. "Oneself" is a particular under the universal "man", "robbers is also a class term under the universal "men", and the fallacy of arguing that because the Sage loves men he does not love himself or that robbers are not men is apparent by considering of what sorts the terms are.

¹ Sungtze's teaching. Cf. *W.H.*, xviii, 14 f.

² Probably the argument is that the Sage loves men (in Chinese the word for "men" also means "others"), hence not himself. In the Neo-Mician *大取篇* we find written: "The love of all men does not abstract from oneself; oneself is included in the number of those who are loved; if oneself is among those who are loved, then one will love himself; and the natural order will be to love oneself and love men (others)." But this argument is not the same as the one quoted here; it seems rather to be a rebuttal. The aphorism quoted in the text would seem to come more naturally from Yangtze.

³ A Neo-Mician paradox. Cf. note to *W.H.*, xii, 7. ⁴ *W.H.*, xii, 7.

2. Terms confused by Realities.

The second class of fallacies is where terms are confused by realities. Here Hsüntze also quotes three examples:

" 'Mountains and abysses are equal,'¹ 'the desires seek to be few,'² 'the flesh of domestic animals is not included in what is considered good tasting; the great bell is not included in music,'³—these are fallacies in the use of realities with the result of confusing the terms."⁴ Here the second criterion applies. "Investigate the means through which similarities and differences are found, and see what fits the reality, and then you will be able to stop this confusion."⁵

By our senses we can perceive that mountains are higher than abysses and that men's desires do seek much and do not extinguish themselves, that meat is good tasting, and that the great bell is included in music, and hence we can perceive the fallacy in these arguments.

3. Realities confused by Terms.

The third class of fallacies is that where realities are used to confuse terms. Here Hsüntze gives two examples:

" 'Even if you do not go and see, the centre pillar exists,'⁶ 'an ox-horse is not a horse'⁷—these are fallacies in the use of terms with the result of confusing the realities."⁸ Hsüntze applies the third criterion here—there is no such thing in common conventions as an "ox-horse", and by

¹ The earth is round, hence there is no absolute up or down—a teaching of Hsüntze, the Neo-Mician.

² Sungtze's teaching. Cf. *W.H.*, xviii, 17 f.

³ Cf. note to *W.H.*, xxii, 7.

⁴ *W.H.*, xxii, 7.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Cf. notes to *ibid.*, 8.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

investigating these conventions we can see the fallacy of this sort of reasoning.

Possessing this classification of fallacies, the wise Confucian need not fear to deal with paradoxes or teachings of any sort.

"In dealing with strange things and bizarre changes, which have not been previously heard of nor have been previously seen, he suddenly takes up one corner and then is able to state to what class they belong and answer them without any doubt or disconcertion; he explains them and sees through them, and they correspond to his explanation as the two halves of a tally—such is the great Confucian."¹

While Hsüntze is showing a new King how to rectify terms, he is really setting up a standard of judgment whereby a Confucian can judge any new or strange teachings and see through them. That any teachings which differed from the Confucian teaching might be right never entered Hsüntze's head.

What he really wanted, was for a King to lay down a standard of right and wrong, whereby everything might be tested. Since it could not be absolute as inhering in the nature of things, as Confucius held, it was to be absolute as supported by the greatest authority and power in the country, and so could be universally established. While the King was to work out and establish a new standard, the ordinary man was to use what standard he had now.

"All discussions must establish a point of reference,² and then only can they be worth anything. Without a point

¹ *W.H.*, viii, 18.

² Lit. "a high correctness."

of reference, right and wrong cannot be discriminated, and the argument cannot be settled." ¹

Without an authoritative standard whereby right and wrong can be judged, there is no use in discussing at all. Such is the reaction of the Confucian against the paradoxes of the Neo-Micians and the sceptical relativism of Chuangtze. What is this standard?

"What we have heard called, 'The greatest point of reference in the world,' whence the boundaries of right and wrong, rank and title, terms and resemblances arise, is the government of the Kings. All talking and discussions about realities and terms have the Sage-Kings for a model." ²

This is a typically Confucian reliance upon authority, not revelation; for Hsüntze did not believe in a God who could give revelations, but on the authority of the wisest and best men he knew, the Sage-Kings. The people are to rely upon authority. "Since their people did not dare to make strange terms a pretext for confusing the correct nomenclature, they were united in virtue and law-abidingness, and respectful in following orders. . . . This was the extreme of good government." ³ So the rectification of terms and the fixing of a standard by authority are to have important results upon the political condition of the state.

Dialectic.

The dialectic that was so highly prized by the Neo-Micians is rejected by Hsüntze and yet allowed. If the prince is wise and can guide his people by his proclamations and laws, what need is there for dialectic? They will know how to act and be undisturbed by strange doctrines. But "now the Sage-Kings are dead, the country is in disorder;

¹ *W.H.*, xviii, 15.

² *Ibid.*, 16 f.

³ *Ibid.*, xxii, 3.

wicked doctrines have arisen, the princes have no power to compel the people to do right, and no punishment to prevent them from following wrong, and so there is dialectic." ¹

Dialectic or argumentation is then only a second best procedure, inferior to the use of the prince's power, allowed because there is no sage prince to compel the people to follow the Confucian Way. Neither does Hsüntze give dialectic any large place in his teaching; in reality it is nothing more than an explanation of the Confucian teaching "in order to make known the law (*Tao*) of what one should do or should not do." ² "Dialectic and explanation is that whereby the mind delineates the Way (*Tao*)." ³ Dialectic exists only because of the lack of a given authoritative standard; because of that lack, names are given and dialectic is used—dialectic is merely a means of making explicit what is involved in rectifying terms.

Hsüntze's aim, then, was to set up a "canon" such as that whereby the wise princes were able to classify fallacious teachings, and so did not need to "dispute about them. So the people were easily unified in the right way of life, although the prince could not make them understand all the reasons for things. Hence the wise princes dealt with the people by authority and guided them to the right Way, explained things in their proclamations, gave statutes in wise maxims, and restrained them by punishments. Hence their people were transformed into the right way of life as by magic." ⁴

This ideal of Hsüntze had an important effect upon history. Li Sze. When the next emperor did arise, only a very few years after Hsüntze's death, one of Hsüntze's disciples, Li Sze,

¹ *W.H.*, xxii, 2.

² *Ibid.*, 9.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

was this "First Emperor's" prime minister. Ts'in Shih Hwangti himself seems to have despised literature and philosophy, but he was a man of energy and of discrimination in the choice of men, and Li Sze probably deserved his post. How deeply Li Sze had absorbed the teachings of Hsuntze we do not know; probably his philosophical insight was only slight. But he was a man of intelligence and of considerable culture, for he invented a new style of writing, the Lesser Seal, which has held its own to the present as one of the recognized styles of writing. Ts'in Shih Hwangti had conquered all the feudal states, and did not propose to be bothered with the revolts of any feudatories; so with one stroke he did away with the whole feudal system altogether, and made himself absolute autocrat of the empire. At once there was a chorus of objections from the Confucian literati, for the feudal system was implied in the Classics, and was eulogized by the Sages and by Confucius himself. In their zeal they quoted the Classics in substantiation of their contentions, and probably wrote treatises against the change. Ts'in Shih Hwangti had unified China under one government for the first time in history, and the Confucians, in defending the feudal system, were proposing a retrograde step. In this crisis Li Sze brought forward Hsuntze's doctrine of authority, that the country should be unified in opinion by the power of the King. He saw that such a unification could not be made as long as the Classics held their authority, and so he proposed his famous plan, to make a new start in history, to confiscate the Classics and kill any Confucian literati who should oppose the authority of the Emperor, and thus by force achieve an intellectual as well as political unification.

of the empire. Half of this plan was Hsüntze's doctrine that authority in intellectual matters should be imposed by force ; but the other half, the proposal to do away with the Classics and begin anew, would have been abhorred by Hsüntze, for the Classics, to him as to all Confucians, were the foundation of the correct teaching. Li Sze's scheme cannot be imputed to Hsüntze ; but this event shows how dangerous the doctrine of authority can become in the hands of an unscrupulous man. The result was that many scholars were immolated for their principles, in this case rather for political than philosophical principles, and that later generations had to search in old houses and in the memories of old men for the lost literary treasures of the race. The true carrying out of Hsüntze's teaching came rather in the Han dynasty and later, when the Confucian philosophy overcame all the other philosophies, and was established by imperial edict as the orthodox philosophy. The ban on other philosophies was so strict that except for a few persons, these teachings were entirely forgotten by the intellectual world of China until, in the last generation, there has been a revival of interest in these ancient philosophers. In the establishment of Confucianism as supreme in China, Hsüntze's teaching received its greatest approval.

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CHAPTER XIV

INEQUALITY

Politics the
Goal of Con-
fucianism.

In turning to Hsüntze's political philosophy, we have first to note that all ancient Confucian philosophy had for its purpose the furthering of the art of government. Just as Aristotle entitled the whole of his practical philosophy "Politics", so the Confucians would have labelled almost the whole of their philosophy "Politics". The Confucians were even more deeply interested in politics than was Aristotle; he lived in an age when the individual could no longer play an important part in the political life of his state. The Confucians were, on the other hand, all government officials, either actually or potentially. Some were prime ministers of the petty states into which China was divided; a few were rulers; all the rest were officials of higher or lower grade. Just as in republican Rome the only career open to a young man of noble family was that of public office, so in China the only legitimate occupation for a man of letters was the service of the state. Naturally there were some who became disgusted with the political condition of the times, and left political life; that meant retirement from the world—such were the recluses with whom Confucius sometimes met. But most of the educated class were like Confucius and Mencius, content to wait all their days for a ruler who would know their merit and employ them. Even in his old age Confucius would not give up his

chariot, for that would be needed if he were to take office again. Let us hear Hsüntze or one of his disciples discourse on the functions of a literary man.

"King Chao of Ts'in¹ questioned the Master, Hsün Ch'ing, saying, 'Are literary men of no use to a state?' The Function of a Literary Man.

"The Master, Hsün Ch'ing replied, 'Literary men imitate the ancient Kings, magnify the rules of proper conduct (*Li*) and justice (*Yi*). They are diligent ministers or sons, and honour their superiors very highly. If a ruler would employ them, their place at your court would be most appropriate. When they are not employed, they retire, order the people, and are guileless—they are thoroughly obedient subjects. Although they be poor, harassed, freezing, or starving, they certainly would not follow evil methods (*Tao*) into avarice. Though they be without even a place to put down an awl,² yet they are clear as to the great principles of ruling a district. They mourn and no one responds to them; yet they are familiar with the principles of ruling all things and of fostering the people. If their position is that of ruler, then they are material for a king or duke. If it is subordinate, then they are servants of society and the treasures of the prince. Although such a one should be retired in a poor rustic mean place, no one would fail to esteem him, because he sincerely holds to an honourable path (*Tao*). When Confucius was about to be Minister of Crime, Mr. Shen-yu did not dare to come to court to drink his mutton-broth; Mr. Kung-shen divorced his wife; Mr. Shen-huei crossed the border and fled. The traders of cattle and horses in Lu did not have false prices, but set them right and waited

¹ a.d. 306-251.

² Leadless or without rule.

for a buyer. When he lived in a city or community, the boys of the city or community shared the produce of their nets, and those who had parents took more than the others: the virtues of filial piety and reverence to elders so influenced them. When Confucian literati are at your court, they adorn your rule; when they are in inferior position, they beautify the customs. When a Confucian is in an inferior position, he is like what I have said.'

"The King said, 'Yes. Then how is he when he is a ruler?'

"Hsün Ch'ing replied, 'When he is a ruler, he is great. His purpose is fixed within him; proper conduct (*Li*) is cultivated at his court; the laws and correct measurements are rectified among the officials; loyalty, faithfulness, love, and serviceableness are exhibited to the people. He would not do one unrighteous (not *Yi*) act or kill one innocent man to get the empire. Such rightness (*Yi*) is trusted by men. When it is known throughout the continent, then the whole empire will respond to it like an echo. Why is this? Because then his name will be honoured and glorious, and the country will be willing to obey. Hence those who are near will sing and rejoice at him; those who are distant will fall over themselves to hasten to him. All within the four seas will be as if one family; none of the educated will fail to follow and obey him. Then he may be called a leader of men. The Ode says,

"From the west, from the east,
From the south, from the north,
None thought but of obedience,"¹—

¹ Odes, III, I, x, 6.

this expresses my meaning. Then if, when the Confucian is in an inferior position he is what I have said, and when he is a ruler he is what I have now indicated, how could he be said to be of no benefit to a state ?'

"King Chao said, 'Good'." ¹

In this long disquisition on the function of an educated man in society, Hsüntze mentions only his service as a government official. Nor is that the case because he is talking to the ruler of the most important of the feudal states. It was the constant condition of the times. The criticism made by King Chao is most interesting. Ts'in was located in the more mountainous region to the west of central China, and had absorbed a barbarian population. It was less touched by the culture of China than any other state, and was criticized by Hsüntze as not having any literary class.² Doubtless the practical king's reply after listening to such a list of virtues which he had not seen exhibited in the lives of most Confucians was as much sarcasm as a polite way of getting rid of such an idealist.

It was natural that ancient Chinese philosophy should reflect the social condition of the philosophers. It is said that philosophy is the reflection of the scientific method of the time—rather it is the reflection of and upon that which educated people are doing. In China that was politics; hence politics is the heart and centre of Chinese philosophy. Even the mystic quietist Laotze had his political philosophy in which he urged the ruler to "govern a great state as you would fry

¹ *W.H.*, viii, 3-6.

² *Hsüntze*, Book XVI, f. 10.

a small fish",¹ to keep the people in ignorance and simplicity so as to prevent the vices of civilization. Lao-tze was historiographer at the imperial court. Philosophy was created by government officials for government officials, and so political theory was of paramount importance.

Inequality.

The fundamental element in the Confucian political theory was that of human inequality. Here Mencius took direct issue with the Confucians, for he held that the principle of making distinctions between man and man is wrong, and that the principle of universal love is right. All the Confucians held to this doctrine of inequality, but Hsüntze was the first to give it a thorough theoretical grounding.

Confucius.

"The Master said:—'The people may be made to follow a course, but not to understand the reason why.'"² This saying may be said to represent the essential position of the Confucians. To Confucius, as to the other educated men of office, there were two classes, the rulers and the ruled, and it is the business of the educated to rule the country. As Mencius stated succinctly: "People labour either with their minds or with their hands. Those who labour with their minds rule others; those who labour with their hands are ruled by others."³

Mencius.

To banish inequality would be returning to a state of barbarism.⁴ In advising the ruler of the state of T'eng in putting in a new system of land tax, Mencius stated clearly that there must be men of a superior grade as well as farmers; the one class is needed to govern, and the other to support the rulers.⁵

¹ *Tao Te Ching*, sect. 60—neither gut nor scale it; leave nature alone.

² *An*, VIII, ix.

³ *Menc.*, III, i, iv, 6.

⁴ *Menc.*, VI, ii, x, 5, 6.

⁵ *Menc.*, III, i, iii, 14.

But the time was not one in which a mere *ipse dixit* could close the matter. Mencius was arguing against the Confucian position, and putting his arguments in logical form with utilitarianism as his basis. To meet such an argued attack, the Confucians needed to do more than give the statements of even a Mencius as an authority. They had to reason better than their opposers. It was this task which Hsüntze took up.

We have already noted the importance which Hsüntze gives to sociality as the pre-eminent human characteristic.¹ This sociality means for him the division of classes, just as it means the division of labour.

"Man by birth has desires. When desire is not satisfied, then he cannot be without a seeking for satisfaction. When this seeking for satisfaction is without measure or limits, then there cannot but be contention. Then . . . there will be disorder . . . and poverty."²

Desire is a fundamental characteristic of human nature. But everyone's desires cannot be satisfied, for everyone desires "to be as honourable as the emperor and so wealthy as to own the country."³ Everyone's desires are to gain the utmost degree of satisfaction. But only one man can be emperor; even his desires cannot be completely satisfied.⁴ Desire is inextinguishable and insatiable; through it men inevitably come into conflict. The great social problem is how to deal with men's desires so as to avoid this evil. In a previous chapter⁵ we have discussed Hsüntze's answer to the individual's aspect of this problem. But there still

Class divisions are the Remedy for Insatiable Desire.

¹ pp. 48-50.

² *W.H.*, xxi, 14.

³ *W.H.*, xix, 1.

⁴ *Ch.* XI.

⁵ *W.H.*, iv, 23.

remains the social problem, for there are always some men who are not guided by the ideal method of following the Way, and who instead follow their instinctive desires. So there must be devised a method of social control for these people. Such social control is achieved by dividing the people into classes of the inferior and the superior, so that each class will only expect the conditions of life and the particular satisfactions that naturally come to it, and so their expectations will be narrowed and desire will be controlled. Hence inequality is for the sake of peace in society.

"Wherein is it that man is truly man? Because he makes distinctions. When he is hungry he desires to eat; when he is cold he desires to be warm; when he is tired he desires to rest; he likes what is helpful and dislikes what is injurious. . . . Hence the path of human life cannot be without its distinctions; no distinction is greater than social divisions; no social division is greater than the rules for proper conduct (*Li*)."¹ But according to the rules of proper conduct a filial son will wait for his father to eat before he eats; he will warm his father before he warms himself; he will work for his parents even though he be tired; thus through the rules of proper conduct (which for Hsüntze include the whole of ethics) desire is subordinated to the distinctions of superior and inferior made by men. As he states it more philosophically:

"All things are present together in the world but have different forms. Of themselves they are not appropriate²; but they are used by men—this is art. Different grades of men live together with similar likings but different moral standards

¹ *W.H.*, v, 52.

² No natural teleology.

(*Tao*), with similar desires but different amounts of knowledge—this is nature. Their original capabilities are alike in wisdom and stupidity. But their developed abilities are different and they are distinguished by their wisdom and stupidity. If their ability could be alike yet their wisdom be different; if they could act selfishly without incurring trouble; if they could give rein to their desires and not be limited; then the people's hearts would be aroused to strife and there could be no satisfaction. If this were the situation (because of the disorder) a wise man could not get to rule; if a wise man did not get to rule, he could not gain merit or fame. If he could not gain merit or fame, the multitude would not be separated into their proper classes. If the multitude were not separated into their proper ranks, the positions of prince and subject would not be established. If there were no prince to rule the subjects, if there were no superior to rule the inferiors, the country would be injured and people would give rein to their desires.

"People desire and hate the same things. Their desires are many but things are few. Since they are few, there will inevitably be strife. For what a hundred workmen accomplish goes for the nourishment of one individual; yet an able person cannot be skilled in more than one line; one man cannot govern two departments at the same time. If people leave their positions, there will be poverty; if the masses are without social divisions, there will be strife. He who is impoverished is in trouble; he who strives will suffer calamity. For the purpose of rescuing people from trouble and eliminating calamity there is no method as good as that of making social distinctions plain and forming a social organiza-

tion. If the strong coerce the weak, and the wise terrorize the stupid, and the people who should be subjects rebel against their rulers, and the young insult the aged, and the government is not guided by virtue: if these are the circumstances, then the aged and the weak will suffer the trouble of losing their support and the strong will suffer the calamity of division and strife.

"Work is what people dislike; gain and profit is what they like. If there is no distinction of occupation, then people will have difficulty in getting work done and the calamity of striving in order to attain any desired result. If the union of male and female, the separation from other males and females inherent in the relation of husband and wife, the making of engagements by the relatives of the groom and bride to be, the sending of betrothal presents and the going to get the bride, are not according to the rules of proper conduct (*Li*): if this is the case, then men will have the trouble of losing their mates and the calamity of having to struggle to gain any sex relations. Hence for this reason wise men have introduced social distinctions."¹

Thus social organization through making social distinctions is the necessary method of gaining peace and tranquillity among men whose fundamental quality is desire. Inequality is a necessary means of securing advantageous social relations under the conditions imposed by innate human nature.

But inequality is not innate. One of the fundamental teachings of Confucianism was that men's capabilities are equal, in that all can reach the utmost development. Later Confucians differed; Han Yü postulated different grades

Original
Nature Equal

¹ *W.H.*, I, 1-2.

of human nature; but not so ancient Confucianism. As Hsüntze states in the quotation above, men's "original capacities are alike in wisdom and stupidity. But their developed abilities are different and they are distinguished by their wisdom and stupidity". The difference is due to varying degrees of development of their original capacities. Hence we have a democratic aristocracy; it is a moral, and not an aristocratic, hereditary inequality; it is equality of nature, but inequality of development. In many respects Confucius was really democratic. He refused to condemn Chung Kung because his father was low and bad, holding that not ancestry but a man's present condition is the criterion¹; and he taught that "in teaching there should be no class distinctions".² But his democracy was confined to his own class; those who could not rise to possess the qualifications necessary to be a member of the learned and governing class could only work to support their superiors. So Hsüntze is expressing here the true spirit of Confucius. It is an indication of his genius that he should have been able to synthesize a democratic with an aristocratic tendency and to present so convincing an argument for an aristocratic society.

In one place Hsüntze considers the various grades of society, and states the qualifications "whereby they take different stations in life". This statement is interesting as showing that his ideal was an aristocracy of merit and of service; the qualifications are moral and intellectual. The emperor's virtue and character are great, his wisdom and power of thought are very illustrious. The feudal nobles call their subjects

¹ *As.*, VI, iv.

² *As.*, XV, xxxviii.

up for military or public service only at the right seasons of the year ; they are just ; they are obedient to the emperor and they protect their subjects. The next grade of officers are cultivated and courtly ; they are obedient to superiors and they fulfil their responsibilities to their inferiors. The lower officials carefully keep the laws and records. The ordinary people show filial piety and reverence to elders ; they work hard and are careful in business and so gain food, clothing, long life, and escape from punishment. Evil-doers gain uneasiness, shame, punishment, or death because of their wickedness or immorality.¹ Here we have what is a high social ideal for the day. It is that of a paternalistic government which feels its responsibilities, and of a hard-working and obedient people, who are satisfied with their lot and content in their condition of life.

Typical of
Chinese
Society.

Hsüntze was but expressing the ideal spirit of Chinese society, then as now, through his philosophy. Until the present period, when everything ancient in China seems to be breaking up under the impact of a new civilization, Chinese society was organized loosely into classes, and the people were satisfied, most of them, to stay in their own class. An exceptional child was given an education, the rest of the family sacrificing so that he could have leisure to study ; he was advanced to the learned class, and if he had sufficient ability, to the governing class. Chinese society has been the most remarkable example of a stable social system that the world has ever known ; and it is this social system which has enabled the Chinese to continue their long existence

¹ *W.H.*, iv, 15 f.

as a nation in spite of repeated conquests. But this social system contained no provision for other than a very slow advance, and it is the problem of stability plus advance which China is facing now, for it is the sudden advance in culture and civilization which is breaking up China's ancient social system.

But under the conditions of a relatively non-progressive society, is not Hsüntze's solution of the social problem irrefutable? Granting that human nature does include the elements of desire and a tendency to evil, is not confusion inevitable unless social divisions are established, "so that everyone should be under someone's control?"¹

The method by which Hsüntze secured the subservience *Li* of the individual to the common good is by the principle of *Li*, the rules of proper conduct, a system of authoritarian ethics promulgated from above, which people were to accept because it offered the only way out of the otherwise inevitable turmoil. This concept of *Li* as distinguishing rank he found in the *Doctrine of the Mean* and the oldest part of the *Book of Rites*. Here Hsüntze closely linked his political philosophy with his ethics, and made his ethics the means to the realization of the end his political philosophy set up.

Contrast with this justification for inequality the one put forward by Aristotle. Aristotle was face to face with a quite different situation — a society of leisure founded on the labour of a vast number of slaves. Leisure he felt was essential; without leisure there could be no philosophy; but he could conceive of no leisure without slavery. Hence he justified slavery by postulating original differences in human

¹ *W.H.*, ix, 3.

nature, so that one man was naturally a slave and another was naturally a citizen or a ruler. Of course his theory did not fit the facts of slavery. Epictetus was not an emperor nor was Epaphroditus a slave. But in China slavery has never played any large part in social life. It was not until centuries after the social system had been fixed that the Chinese were conquered by another people, and then these other peoples were so inferior in civilization and culture that they became Chinese in conquering. There has always been a certain idealism in Chinese thought, of which the widely quoted saying, "All within the four seas are brothers" is an expression. Hsüntze was not facing slavery nor a caste system, but the social relation of the ruler and the ruled, and he found the necessary basis for this relation of ruler and ruled in human nature; not in human nature as it should be ideally, when all should be equal in capacity, and each develop only to that stage to which he raises himself by his own efforts, but in human nature as it is, with its existing inequalities. Hsüntze has a certain democratic possibility in his theory that Aristotle, ruled by the conception of fixed differences between individuals, could not have; and at the same time Hsüntze's theory fits the facts of society much better, and must be an ingredient in any theory of political organization. Human differences are necessary in any society which is based on the division of labour. The difficulty with his as with all Confucian theories is that they make no provision for social advance. The concept of progress may be said to be the oldest and yet the most active element in our Western political and moral philosophy, and one which we have not yet fully assimilated.

CHAPTER XV

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Although Hsüntze wrote more upon political philosophy than upon all other phases of philosophy combined, yet it is perhaps less interesting to us than any other part of his work. His emphasis upon politics was due to the general tendency of the Confucian philosophy to make that the goal and practical justification of philosophic thought, rather than to his own theoretical interests. While we find him making important and original contributions in other departments of philosophy, in this department we find much less that is original, and nothing, outside of his defence for inequality and attack upon war, that will repay careful study. Hsüntze's own contributions are theoretical rather than practical.

Political philosophy is more conditioned by the social and political state of the time than any other part of philosophy, as it is more closely connected with the social and political movements of the age. In the matter of insights into the real situation of the day, the Confucian thinkers were inferior to the practical men of the time. The Confucians were always harking back to the good old times of the Sage-Kings, and hoping for a revival of their government. They wanted to revive the feudal system in its ancient state, at a time when the feudal system was showing its weakness by promoting internal warfare, disunion, intrigue, and political weakness. Only the

Confucian
Conservatism

fact that there were no powerful enemies which could attack China prevented the country from falling a prey to a foreign invader. Yet nowhere among Confucians was there any realization of the real remedy; the only cry was "Back to the Ancients!" Such lack of forward vision is the inevitable result of authoritarianism. It remained for the practical political genius, Ts'ing Shih Hwangti, to see that what China needed was not a step backwards, but one forwards, and so in spite of the opposition of the Confucians, he abolished the feudal system entirely, unified China for the first time, under an absolute monarchical government, and created for himself a new title, that of Emperor,¹ in place of the old "Son of Heaven" or "King", a title which has continued to be the imperial title of China. He was in fact as well as in name, the "First Emperor".

Follow the
Three
Dynasties
and the Later
Kings.

In political theory as in ethics the Confucians held to authoritarianism. Their teaching in general was that a ruler's methods should follow those of the Three Dynasties, the Hsia, the Shang, and the Chou (in other words the ancient Kings); in detail they should follow those of the later Kings who observed best and illustrated most clearly the ancient ideals.² Hence there was no chance for progress, except in a limited sense as the founder of a new dynasty reinterpreted the old standards. But an absolute break with tradition was unthinkable. Consequently the Confucians were acting in accordance with their beliefs when they attacked the progressive "First Emperor" who, as a practical man, refused to follow the old models, and set up a new government, adapted to the new situation.

¹ 皇帝 in place of 天子 or 王 or the "sacred" title 帝.

² Cf. *Ann.*, XV, x; *W. II.*, ix, 8.

But in spite of this authoritarianism, the Confucians did an inestimable service to China in emphasizing the theory that government is for the benefit of the governed, and that the laws of morality apply to the governors even more than to the people. The literati of China were the intermediaries between the people and the rulers; the rulers were a small class of hereditary families, who called to their aid the men of ability in their states. These literary men of ability were closely related to the common people; some among the members of their own family, certainly some of the members of their clan, were sure to belong to the farmer class, and as the literati participated in the clan gatherings, the views of the common people were sure to be forced upon their attention. Their sympathies were naturally with their own clan, and so through these literati, the views of the people would be carried to the ruling aristocracy. There seems to be considerable probability in the view that the *Book of History* was composed by these literati. In it the government officials were made important, and the prince was shown as continually relying upon the judgment of his ministers, with the conscious or unconscious purpose of increasing the importance of the literati in the government. How far this attitude is that of the original writers and how far it is from the editing hand of Confucius we do not know.

Mencius is especially urgent in advocating the principle that government is for the sake of the people. In one place he states explicitly that the sovereign is inferior to the people and to the spirits,¹ and he reiterates the statement that benevolence and sympathetic feeling for the people is the foundation of

¹ *Menc.*, VII, II, xiv, 1.

successful rule, and that the people will invariably turn to and support such a ruler.¹ The Confucian ideals of government are very high.

Hsüntze.

Hsüntze expresses the same teaching, that the success of a government depends on the morality of the ruler. In a comparison of different types of rule, it is the moral ruler who is successful, even though outward events harass him.

"If a man's deportment is respectful, his heart loyal and faithful, his methods according to the rules of proper conduct and justice, and his ruling passions love and benevolence, were he to rule over the empire, although he were harassed by the four barbarian tribes, the people would not fail to honour him."²

Note that it is the people who are to decide whether the ruler is to be honourable and not his mere rank. The same motif comes out in a famous simile, invented or quoted by Hsüntze: "The prince is the boat; the common people are the water. The water can support the boat, or the water can capsize the boat."³ The fundamental thing in government is the care of the people. Anything like the megalomania of Louis XIV, saying, "I am the State," was impossible in Confucian China.

Right of
Revolt.

The natural consequence of this sort of feeling is that the emperor is not felt to be fixed upon his throne, but can be dethroned if he is too bad. This remarkable doctrine of the right of a vassal to revolt against and dethrone an evil monarch has been by some wrongly ascribed to Mencius. It is, however, much older than he, as it is written into the

¹ *Menc.*, I, 1, 7, 3; IV, 1, iii, 1; IV, 1, ix, 2.

² *W.H.*, ii, 18.

³ *W.H.*, ix, 4.

Book of History, where its enunciation is first ascribed to Chung-Huai, one of the principal ministers of T'ang.¹ In this *Book* the doctrine is connected with the conception of Heaven as a personal God, who gives his Decree to a dynasty, until the dynasty becomes evil, whereupon the Decree is withdrawn, and conferred instead upon a righteous vassal noble, who overthrows the evil dynasty and sets up a new dynasty. But Heaven sees as the people see,² and so this doctrine is really that the people, led by the nobles, may revolt against wrong. It is stated at various places in the *Book*,³ but most dramatically in a conversation between Tsu Yi, a courtier, and Chou-sin, the last of the Shang monarchs.⁴ Tsu Yi warns his emperor of the increasing power of the Chou family, and when Chou-sin replies that his life is secured by the Decree of Heaven, he is answered by the statement that his crimes are too many, and that the dynasty will very shortly perish! In view of Mencius' scepticism regarding the *Book of History* we cannot be too credulous of it, especially of the earlier parts; this doctrine which legitimized a successful revolt was probably invented at the time of the Chou conquest to legitimize their position, just as Chou-sin was villified to gain sympathy for them.

But whatever the origin of such a teaching, it had tremendous moral possibilities, and it was its moral quality which caused such enthusiastic acceptance by the Confucians.

¹ *Hist.*, IV, 11, 11.

² *Hist.*, II, 11, 4; V, 1, 11, 7.

³ *Hist.*, IV, 1, 11, 4; V, 1, 1, 11; V, 11, 10, 17; V, 11, 5-15; V, 11, 1-17; V, 11, 4-10.

⁴ *Hist.*, IV, 1, 5.

In *Book of History*.

In Confucius and Mencius.

Confucius, who edited the Classics, approved of it, as the *Spring and Autumn* shows. Mencius went so far as to state that it is the duty of a ruler's clan to dethrone an unrighteous ruler, and substitute another; and he made this statement highly dramatic by making it to the ruler of one of the feudal states! ¹

In Hsüntze.

Hsüntze accepts and defends this doctrine. But as Heaven is for him impersonal Law, or Nature, Heaven cannot be concerned in this matter. The Decree he likewise defines as "what one meets at the moment".² So the supernatural sanction is entirely gone; but the moral sanction is thereby strengthened. An evil ruler is not a true ruler at all. "When the country has no real prince, if there is a feudal noble who has ability, and if his virtue is illustrious and his majesty is great . . . then if he should seek out and kill this isolated and wasteful tyrant, he would injure no one, he would be a blameless subject."³

The Chinese have been long suffering, and this doctrine has not led to frequent overthrowals of dynasties; but it has been a powerful check upon the rapacity of emperors, and it has furnished the foundation of a moral philosophy of history such as no other country has had. It is one of the true greatnesses of Confucianism.

Reward and
Punishment;
Law.

As to the best method of government, the Confucian answer was simple: Promote the worthy and dismiss the incompetent.⁴ Law had not yet developed in China. Hsüntze himself never came to the idea of law as fundamental

¹ *Memo.*, V, ix, ix, 1.

² *W.H.*, xxii, 2.

³ *W.H.*, xviii, 3.

⁴ *Ann.*, II, xix; XIII, ii; *W.H.*, ix, 3 f.; xviii, 8.

in justice. In fact he criticized Shentze for the latter's stress upon law.¹ Although law was gradually coming into importance, and although Hsüntze in his teaching helped to prepare the way for the concept of law, yet he himself held to the old notion of the official exercising a paternal attitude towards the people. In the simple days of ancient China it was comparatively easy for an honest official to hold court and combine the functions of accuser, judge, and to a certain extent, that of law-maker too, and yet by following custom, to give a good and just government. But as life became more complex, that became more and more difficult, and so the Confucian emphasis upon the rectification of terms arose, which, on its governmental side, was a call for law. But a law based on principles that would cover all cases had not yet arisen, and so Hsüntze still valued law much less than he did a righteous and just official.

"He who, when there is a law, acts according to the law, but when there is no law, decides according to the analogies of the case, is doing the utmost possible in holding court. . . . There has been bad government under good laws; but from ancient times to the present there has never been known to be a bad government under a superior man."²

As to the conduct of the literary man in government, The Literary Man. the Confucians held that when he was given office he should do his best, and when he is dismissed, he should retire to his home in quiet dignity.³ Quite noble is the description of the courage of a literary man—not the courage of the baresark, but moral courage: "He who dares to stand erect for the best Way there is in the world, who dares to act out

¹ Cf. note to *W.H.*, xvi, 20.

² *W.H.*, ix, 2.

³ Cf. *A.*, VIII, x.

the meaning of the Way of the former Kings, who on the one hand will not follow a prince who governs wrongly, and on the other hand will not follow a people who would govern wrongly; who, when there is benevolence (in the character of the ruler) will not consider poor emolument a bar, nor when there is no benevolence will consider riches an attraction (to taking office); who, when the country recognizes his talents, desires only that the country shall rejoice with him, and who, when the country does not recognize him, will stand alone (for his principle) between Heaven and Earth and not fear—this is a man of superior courage.”¹

Taxation.

On particular matters of government the Confucians also had specific teachings—generally leaning in the direction of a liberal and beneficent rule. On the important matter of taxation the Confucians generally stood for a tax on land and no more—which was the original tax in ancient times—one-tenth of the produce. Some rulers had levied two-tenths, and we find one of Confucius’ immediate disciples, Yutze, urging upon such a ruler, his master, to lighten the taxation and suffer privation with the people.² Mencius had a pet system of taxation which he urged upon the rulers with whom he came into contact, that of dividing a square plot of ground into nine equal squares,³ one of the outside

¹ *W.H.*, xxi, 10.

² *A.*, XII, ix.



squares to each of eight families, and they to cultivate together the inner square, whose produce went to the government. Such a scheme would hardly work except on a newly cleared plain; but there is evidence that even in Hsüntze's time there was still virgin ground to be cultivated.¹ Such a plan was too utopian to be carried into effect. In general he advocated a tithe upon land—to a minister who only wanted to take one-twentieth, he replied that this amount would be insufficient for the needs of government, and would result in a return to barbarism, just as levying one-fifth was oppression.

Hsüntze likewise advocates a tithe upon the land, no more and no less,² and attacks those who levy oppressive taxes severely. The ruler who merely levies taxes to enrich himself is only preparing the way for his own destruction and the enrichment of his enemies. The man who grinds down and impoverishes the people loses their allegiance, so that his army is weak, and can neither attack others nor defend himself—such a ruler can only wait for disaster to overtake him and for the enemy to plunder his treasures.³ In Hsüntze's time of continual fighting and sudden changes in the political situation, there probably were cases which bore out Hsüntze's optimistic theory; but the sublime faith in which he put forward this theory as the law of history is affecting.

The Confucians were also free traders. In a country Free Trade, divided up into petty states such as ancient China, there were many opportunities for the establishment of customs barriers. But as the larger states swallowed up the smaller

¹ *W.H.*, ix, 6.

² *Ibid.*, 9.

³ *Ibid.*, 5.

ones, they did not remove the existing barriers, so that in Hsüntze's day there were many customs barriers within each great state. To-day these numerous barriers on every road and river are the greatest hindrance to Chinese commerce. When commerce was small and limited, such barriers occasioned no great inconvenience; but as commerce grew, thoughtful men saw the foolishness and injury wrought by these customs barriers. So we find Mencius advocated only the inspection of travellers to catch criminals at the frontiers, but no taxes to be levied there; he even went so far as to say that this was the ancient government of King Wen, to give authority to his suggestion.¹ Likewise we find that Hsüntze advocated the same thing. He enumerated the articles that came from each of the four quarters: feathers, ivory, rhinoceros hides, copper, cinnabar, cornelian, purple, linen, fish, salt, felt, rugs, furs, yak tails, horses and dogs, and then showed that through free trade the products of the then known world could all be utilized by China.² From the number of things he mentioned, the trade of China with its neighbours must already have been extensive.

Conservation. Likewise the Confucians advocated the conservation of the natural resources of the country—a thing to which China has not yet attained, and which is still sadly needed. Mencius advocated closed seasons against fishing and cutting down trees.³ Hsüntze did the same; young timber must not be cut down, and then mountains and forests will not be bare, and the people will have a surplus of timber. Marshes and pools must not be fished at the spawning season, and

¹ *Menc.*, I, II, v, 3; III, II, viii, 1; II, I, v, 8.

² *W.H.*, ix, 10.

³ *Menc.*, I, I, iii, 3.

then the people will have enough fish to use and a surplus for barter. Likewise the people should not be taken away from the fields for military or public service at the planting or harvest seasons, and then food will be plentiful. All these things should be regulated by a paternalistic government.¹ China to-day should heed the voice of her ancient teachers.

As rulers of the people, the Confucians also turned their *Penal Theory*. attention to penal theory, mainly in the direction of upholding the traditional standards, while still expressing a certain sympathy with the evil-doer. The remarkable thing about Chinese penal theory is that we do not find any mention of the theory that punishment is to exact revenge for injury or of the *lex talionis*. The *Book of History* states that the end of punishment is to make an end of punishing, and to promote virtue. In one place directions are given for the commutation of punishment by fines, but the language is archaic and not that of the time of Confucius.² Confucius stated that government by laws and penalties is not as good as government by the ruler's good example.³ Mencius declared to the king that it was the lack of a certain livelihood which led the people into crime, and that the business of a ruler was to see that his people's economic condition was stable. Punishing the people without first securing their economic status was simply entrapping them.⁴ How ultra-modern this teaching seems! Hsüntze stated that the reason for "all punishment is the restraint of violence, the hatred of evil, and the warning against its future occurrence."⁵

¹ *W.H.*, ix, 9 f.; 12 f.

² *Hist.*, V, xxi, 9; V, xxvii, 14-22.

³ *An.*, II, iii.

⁴ *Menc.*, I, i, vii, 20-2; III, i, iii, 3.

⁵ *W.H.*, xviii, 6.

He added that it is to give an appropriate recompense.¹ Here he has stated what is the basis of modern penal theory—the control of evil, the expression of the moral judgment of society in a punishment appropriate to the crime, and deterrence from future crime. The idea of taking vengeance is absent—showing that the Chinese civilization of that time was far removed from the primitive blood feud; but the idea of the reform of the criminal was also absent. Confucianism lacked any method of reforming the evil-doer, other than through his own exertions. Some sophists had advocated the abolition of corporal punishment, advocating in its place punishment by altering the clothing of the criminal; but Hsüntze opposed that as having no deterrent effect,² and being misgovernment.

Against War. The common people always suffer most from warfare, and so these Confucians attacked warfare as unrighteous and unadvantageous. One of the fundamental principles of Confucius was that a good example was the most effective way of government—whence the conclusion is easily deducible that force and war is wrong. When one ruler invited him to teach military tactics, he declined and quickly left that state.³ An unsubmitive people should be attracted by a display of virtue, not coerced by warfare.⁴ Mencius declared that there are no righteous wars in the *Spring and Autumn*,⁵ and he himself denounced war in unmeasured terms. War is leading on the land to devour human flesh. Generals and all those concerned in making or planning war should suffer the severest punishment. Death is not enough for

¹ *W.H.*, xviii, 6.

² *Ibid.*, 5 f.

³ *An.*, XV, i.

⁴ *An.*, XVI, i.

⁵ *Menc.*, VII, II, 4, 1.

such a crime.¹ To employ an uninstructed people in war may be said to be destroying the people.² Those "good ministers" who plan alliances and aggression are "robbers of the people", and their sovereigns are tyrants like Ch'ie; even should such an one obtain the empire he could not hold it even one day.³ The only right way to gain territory is by gaining the goodwill of the people, so that they willingly come under such a beneficent rule. In such a situation the people of even neighbouring states will look upon such a benevolent ruler as a parent, and so they will be quite unwilling to attack him.⁴ In defence, the accord of the people arising from the righteous government of a benevolent prince is a much stronger defence than either the advantage of opportunity or season, or the natural strength of position, or walls and moats.⁵ The only time when war is justified is when such a benevolent ruler is attacked by evil opponents, and then the benevolent ruler will necessarily conquer.⁶

This attack upon war was one thing that the Confucians had in common with their greatest opponents. Laotze's quietism led him to pacifism; Micius adopted Confucius' dislike of war and made pacifism one of the cardinal tenets in his creed. China presents the unique picture of a country in which practically all important philosophical opinion was against war, and in which continual warfare has been common.

This is a truly idealistic doctrine. Hsüntze accepts and elaborates it, especially the latter part of what has been stated.

Hsüntze—
Virtue
Strengthens
the Peaceful.

¹ *Menc.*, IV, I, xiv, 2, 3.

² *Menc.*, VI, II, viii, 2; a restatement of a saying of Confucius in *An.*, XIII, xxx.

³ *Menc.*, VI, II, ix, 2, 3.

⁴ *Menc.*, II, I, v, 6.

⁵ *Menc.*, II, II, I.

⁶ *Menc.*, II, II, I, 5.

Our present text of Hsüntze's writings¹ represents him as discussing military affairs with a certain general before the king of the state of Chao. The general begins with a statement that the important thing in warfare is strategy, which had recently been instrumental in winning some famous battles. Hsüntze replies that strategy is unimportant; the important thing is uniting the people. Strategy is deceit; the armies of a benevolent and righteous King cannot use that. He will unify his people through their love for him. Then he will not need to use strategy, for the people of all states will so love him that they will inform him of the plans of his enemies, and his own soldiers will be so animated by loyalty to him that their discipline and ardour will be irresistible. On the other hand, the soldiers of the enemy will know of his virtue, and as a result will hate their superiors and love this benevolent King, so that an enemy will not have any army to send against him! In this way he will be irresistible through his benevolence. Morality, *Li* and *Yi*, is the source even of military strength. Thus this ideal King will conquer without fighting!

Hsüntze carried this argument into ancient history, stating that the ancient righteous Kings "had executions, but no battles. . . . If the ruler and ruled were satisfied with each other, then they congratulated them. . . . Hence the people of countries which were ill-ruled rejoiced at the government of these Kings, and were not satisfied with their own rulers, but wished these Kings to come"² and take over the territory!

¹ *W.H.*, xv.

² *Ibid.*, 10 f.

On the other hand, war results in the destruction of the warlike. The warlike prince inevitably injures the people whom he conquers, and hence he will be hated by them, and they will be eager to fight against him as soon as there is an opportunity. On the other hand in his conquest he also inevitably injures his own people, and so lessens their regard for him. Thus by his very conquest, he strengthens the opposition and weakens his own power, so that as soon as he gets into difficulties his enemies will combine and overthrow him¹—a theoretical argument which has shown its validity in the case of every purely military conquest, such as those of the Assyrians or Napoleon. It was characteristic of Hsüntze that he employed a logical, theoretical argument against war, whereas Mencius resorted to denunciation rather than to logic. Such were the temperaments of the two men.

War
Destroys the
Warrior.

The righteous ruler of a state which is oppressed should not be discouraged, but should conserve his strength, improve the economic condition of his people, curb his troops, cultivate his morality, and give the people a just and beneficent government. Then his fame will fill the country, his army will be powerful, and all the states will submit to him of their own accord, so that without a fight he will become emperor, equal with Yao and Shun.² Such is the method of warfare advocated by Hsüntze. Righteousness conquers because of its influence upon the hearts of the people. A beautiful and idealistic theory!

Righteous-
ness Conquers

But Hsüntze does not go to the extreme of pacifism. Like Mencius, he sees that there is a place for fighting, and in his discussion with the disciples of Sungtze, who had

No Pacifism.

¹ *Ibid.*, 5 f.

² *Ibid.*, 15 ff.

proposed the theory that everyone should consider that insult is no disgrace, and hence not fight, he avers that fighting is the natural human reaction to injury.¹ When a disciple states that armies are utterly bad; they are good for nothing but "to contend and take things from others", Hsüntze replies that warfare may be benevolent, in that it is for the purpose of "stopping tyranny and getting rid of injury". Even the ancient emperors and kings found it necessary to punish their enemies by force.² War is justified in this limited sense.

Micius.

In their opposition to war, the Confucians found a point in common with their great opponent, Micius. Just as for him universal love was the greatest virtue, so war was the greatest evil. He attacked war as being injurious to Heaven, to the spirits, and to men. In this respect Hsüntze agreed with him. Mencius, meeting Sungtze as the latter was on his way to urge two states not to fight, told him that he approved of his aim, but disapproved of his means. Sungtze was going to show these two kings that war had no 'utility', which was Micius' criterion of good; Mencius urged him to argue instead that war was not virtuous.³ It was this difference of emphasis, the Micicians arguing that war was injurious and the Confucians that it was wrong, which distinguished the two schools, and well illustrates the difference in spirit between them.

Chinese
Militarism.

But both Confucian and Mician arguments against war were too idealistic for the contemporary rulers. While the Chinese have never been a typically warlike people, and while

¹ *W.H.*, xviii, 14 f.

² *Ibid.*, xv, 11.

³ *Menc.*, VI, II, iv.

the common people have always been peaceful, yet the ambitions of their leaders led them to fight. In this period of the "Contending States" battles were fought in which a quarter of a million men were killed. Sze-ma Ch'ien, the historian, states that in the battles leading up to the final victory of Ts'in a million corpses bit the dust.

There has always been this militaristic tradition in China. While Confucianism with its pacifistic teaching has been the official philosophy and religion of China's rulers, yet they have always secured their place and maintained their rule by military power. China presents the spectacle of a country with a military tradition among the ruling class, at war with a peaceful tradition among the scholarly class, and yet the ruling class has constantly been recruited from the scholarly class. Chinese ethics has thus been constantly at war with itself, with a theoretical pacifism but a practical militarism. This attack upon war has never been refuted; it has merely been disregarded. While it seemed inconclusive to many, yet it was incorporated in the sacred books which were upheld by the authority of the state and of Confucius, and hence could not be false. Yet the martial ideal has continued to be popular in China, chiefly through the medium of the novel and the drama. The strategist Tsao Tsao is still one of the most popular figures in Chinese history and novels. The result of this unreconciled conflict between theoretical idealism and practical militarism must have been fatal for morals in many respects. Yet the continued existence of the ideal has been of great promise to those who, like Han Yü, gave themselves up devotedly to the classical ideals. The continued existence of this antinomy

shows that Confucianism has not been all-powerful in China when popular sentiment opposed it; rather that it has been modified by the demands of practical life to fit the situation.

The Confucians were Reformers who sought to reform from above.

The great Confucians were primarily reformers. With them reform began not at the bottom, but at the top of society. It was quite natural that in their character as government officials they should wish to reform first those whom they served. They held that the people do as the ruler does, or, as it is expressed in the *Book of History*, "You are the wind; the common people are the grass".¹ If the prince is upright, the people will follow him. As Confucius said: "If a ruler is himself upright, his people will do their duty without orders; but if he himself be not upright, although he may order, they will not obey."² Consequently Confucius spent his days seeking a prince who would follow his teaching; just as Plato hastened to Syracuse to put his theories into practice, so Confucius travelled from court to court seeking a virtuous prince. He said: "Were there any prince to employ me, in a twelvemonth something could have been done, but in three years the work could be completed".³ Even more striking is the statement in the *Great Learning* that under Yao and Shun the people followed them and were virtuous, whereas under Ch'ie and Chou the people likewise followed them into evil.⁴ This doctrine is echoed by Mencius, "Once rectify the prince, and the state will be firmly settled" in virtue.⁵ It is likewise the pre-supposition of Hsüntze, "While T'ang and Wu lived, the country obeyed, was well governed and prosperous; while

¹ *Hist.*, V, xxi, 4; III, I, ii, 4; also *An.*, XII, xix.

² *An.*, XIII, vi. ³ *An.*, XIII, x. ⁴ *Q.L.*, IX, 4. ⁵ *Menc.*, IV, i, xx.

Ch'ie and Chou lived, the country obeyed, was ill-governed and suffered calamity."¹ But Hsüntze recognizes that there is a difficulty in this statement: that people have a character; his age is not that of T'ang and Wu; people are naturally evil. Hsüntze prefers to stay by the theory; since rulers and people are both evil, and there is no good ruler, there is no chance for an empirical testing of the first part of this theory.

So all these great Confucians went from one prince to Legitimism, another. But their emphasis upon reform beginning from above led them to become in a sense legitimists in politics—they stood for the *status quo*. Confucius held that the Chou king should be revered even though he were effete and powerless. The feudal system, as established by the ancient kings, became itself a thing to be revered and supported. Anything that savoured of negligence of the emperor was condemned by the Confucians, as involving disrespect of that anciently established institution. Confucius criticized those families who used imperial rites.² This attitude prevented the Confucians from recognizing true greatness in others than those who held the imperial throne. Mencius refused to speak of the great leaders of the feudal princes, Duke Huan and Duke Wen, who were entitled lords protector³; Hsüntze defended the Confucians from criticism because they refused to recognize the lords protector as great men, and said it was because they were not really great!⁴ The only good thing, according to him, that Duke Huan did, was to employ a worthy, Kuan Chung, as his prime minister,

¹ *W.H.*, iv, 21.

² *Menc.*, I, 1, vii, 2.

³ *An.*, III, i, ii.

⁴ *W.H.*, vii, 23 ff.

and that he followed Kuan Chung's advice. But it is worth noting that Hsüntze did not criticize these lords protector as severely as did his predecessors; he was willing to see some good in them, and even to say that "their course of action was approximately correct".¹ The reason is probably to be found in the fact that by his time political conditions had become so much worse than before, that even the lords protector stood out as comparatively virtuous in their apparent respect for the emperor, in comparison with the kings of Hsüntze's day who disregarded and even despoiled and deposed the emperor.

But men must live, and Hsüntze's pupils could only go into the service of these kings who had illegitimately usurped power; so Hsüntze taught them how to seek preferment. Hsüntze was a practical man as well as an idealistic theorist. But he taught them to seek favour by righteousness, not artfulness, and therein showed the sterling quality of the Confucian ethic.

Politics
Ethics.

was In this discussion of the Confucian political philosophy we have seen that it was really nothing more than putting the Confucian ethics into practice. Their ethics was at the same time a theory of society. While the primary interest of the ancient Confucians was in politics, yet the means were never indifferent—the means had always to correspond to their ethical ideals. Hence we can truly call the Confucian philosophy an ethical idealism.²

¹ *W.H.*, vii, 24.

² Using the word idealism not in the epistemological sense, but in the meaning of sincere endeavour in following high ideals.

CHAPTER XVI

IDEALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

We are sometimes inclined to think of the Confucians Idealism, as a group of practical men whose interests were confined to practical affairs to the exclusion of ideal interests. But we must not forget that through all their teaching there ran a strain of high idealism that even carried them to conclusions which seemed to contradict the ordinary experience of men.

As we have seen, there was little belief in any supernatural Agnosticism, powers to furnish a basis for this Confucians idealism.¹ The Confucians tended to agnosticism regarding supernatural beings, and their philosophy as a whole did not represent a strong religious tendency. Among the philosophies of the time, it was that of Micius which was typically religious; to him Heaven and the spirits were very real beings, upon whom men could depend, and who continually assisted men, rewarded the good with happiness, and punished the evil with misfortune. Even though Confucius and Mencius believed in a Higher Power, Heaven, yet Heaven had only a small place in their thinking; for moral development they depended entirely upon man's own efforts, and Hsüntze's denial of Heaven as a personal Power, making Heaven into Natural Law which was moral as well as physical, was the logical outcome of the Confucian emphases. But Religious Spirit, we must not think that the Confucians were not religious. They had a faith in the power of ideals to realize themselves

¹ Cf. p. 62.

that transcended anything which ordinary human life offers, a belief in the power of goodness that their own experience did not substantiate. This moral idealism was a powerful force in their lives and teachings, and has continued to be the greatest treasure of the great souls of China through all the ages.

Philosophy of
History.

This idealism showed itself most clearly in their philosophy of history. Here their fundamental thesis was that virtue is necessarily rewarded, and vice is necessarily punished. We have seen that they gave to the people only a very small place in government: they were only the grass which bends to the wind. Such was the opinion of all ancient philosophers, in the West as well as in the East. "The government depends entirely on the ruler, not on others".¹ So there arose the idea of the superior man, the ideal King, which became the idealistic element in Confucian thought.

The Power of
Righteous-
ness.

Confucius himself held that a truly virtuous ruler, by the sole power of his own goodness, would reform his whole country. "He who governs by his moral excellence may be compared to the Pole-star, which abides in its place, while all the stars bow towards it."² With a righteous ruler, the people will not be disrespectful, unsubmitive, or insincere; they will come from all parts of the country carrying their children, to learn of him.³ Indeed "if good men ruled the country for a hundred years, they could even tame the brutal and abolish capital punishment!"⁴ It was an ideal such as this, of the power of the ruler's moral character, which Confucius held before the rulers with whom he came in

¹ *W.H.*, ix, 10.

² *Ans.*, XIII, iv.

³ *Ans.*, II, i.

⁴ *Ans.*, XIII, xi.

contact, to urge them to adopt the standard of perfection in their own lives.

But in the *Book of History* there is as implicit an interpretation of history that led to the universalizing of Confucius' theory. We have already noted¹ that in that book there is expressed the theory that each new dynasty came into power because of its virtue, and because of the degeneracy of the preceding dynasty. Ch'ia and Chou became the equivalent of what we mean by a "Nero", and T'ang, Wen, and Wu became synonyms for the highest moral excellence. We have already seen that the negative aspect of this theory became generalized into the assertion of the right of revolt against an evil ruler.² But there was also a positive aspect—virtue of itself leads to the highest position.

Such a conclusion was easily drawn by reflective thinkers, especially when, in the times succeeding those of Confucius, the political situation became more and more unsettled, the weakness and lack of virtue of the Chou kings became apparent, and it was seen how easily an individual could climb from obscurity into the most influential positions, as in the case of such men as Su Ts'in and Chang Yi. This conclusion is drawn in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, where it is said: "He who is greatly virtuous will be sure to receive the appointment of Heaven".³

Mencius went about openly proclaiming that the ruler who would adopt the Confucian principle of action would become emperor. For this purpose he sought out the ruler of one of

¹ p. 54 f.

² p. 253 f.

³ D.M., XVII, 5. "The appointment of Heaven" means "the emperorship".

the largest and most civilized states, Ts'i, and told him plainly that he could attain to the imperial dignity by following Mencius' teaching. Indeed "to raise Ts'i to the imperial dignity would be as easy as it is to turn round the hand".¹ But the way to the imperial dignity was not that which the king was following at the time. What he was doing was like climbing a tree to seek for fish! Not by warfare was this goal to be achieved, but by gaining the love and loyalty of the people. The king should improve their economic condition, establish schools, give them a just and beneficent government, and cultivate his own moral excellence as the foundation of it all; then he would certainly become emperor, just as did those emperors of old.

Hsüntze takes up this idealistic theory, and further elucidates it. We find in him both Confucius' optimistic theory of the influence of a virtuous ruler on his own people, and also the theory that perfect virtue leads necessarily to the imperial throne. The ruler's example spreads, because of the pre-eminence that his position gives to him.² But Hsüntze is even more idealistic than Mencius. Mencius seems to hold that to become emperor, a ruler must first be ruler of a large state, a "state of ten thousand chariots", and hence Mencius sought out Ts'i and not a smaller state. Hsüntze holds that even the ruler of a small state which has been subdued by a larger aggressive state, by cultivating benevolence and justice, can rise out of his subject position to that of emperor. Hsüntze also elaborates the successive steps by which this result would be attained. Through the virtue

¹ *Menc.*, II, 1, 6. Cf. also that whole chapter and I, 1, vi, vii.

² *H.N.*, xxi, 3.

of the ruler, those officers who seek immoral ends, mere power and subversion of others, will retire, and at the same time worthy and good men will hear of the fame of this virtuous ruler and will come forward to offer their services. Then he will be able to establish a just government, good customs, a loyal army, and a good economic system. Because the people are satisfied with their ruler and are united, his army will be powerful; through wise economic policies the people and state will be enriched. Then the fame of this righteous ruler will spread through the whole country; the hearts of the people of other states will be drawn to him; they will love him as the fragrance of an epidendrum, while they regard their own unrighteous ruler as a branding iron or a tattooing needle: consequently armies sent against such a righteous ruler would be unable to fight, and his own army would be irresistible. It has been through the influence of this theory, that in the hierarchy of virtues fixed loyalty to one's superior has assumed such a subordinate place in comparison to what is best for the whole. We do read of such cases as that of the Viscount of Chi, who had been imprisoned and threatened with death by Chou-sin, but who, upon the conquest of the country by the Chou dynasty, swore that he would never serve another dynasty and fled to Corea, and was only slowly won over to the new rule to give a plan of government embodied in "The Great Plan,"¹ or as that of Su Wu,² who maintained his loyalty to the Chinese emperor though in captivity by the Huns for nineteen years and against every conceivable bribe and torture. Yet we often find cases of generals or ministers who have turned over from one master to another—to such we must not apply our Western

¹ Hist., V, iv.² Lived second century A.D.

standard of absolute loyalty to one's superior, inherited from our militaristic ancestry, but we must remember that with the Chinese it is the higher loyalty to what is best for the country and the people, which rules over all particular loyalties, and which may justify what in our eyes looks like treachery.

The people of neighbouring states will hear of the fame and accomplishments of such a righteous ruler, and of their own motion they will depose their evil rulers and seek to come under the rule of this Sage-King, and so such a virtuous ruler will find the whole country turning towards him without needing to strive or to do any fighting except possibly to punish a few recalcitrant and incorrigible opponents.¹ This is the only way to the emperorship. Indeed Hsüntze is so certain of this theory that he expressly declares that the man who cannot mount to the emperor's throne from the rule of a small place is not a great Confucian.²

A Deduction
from History.

We should hardly expect such an idealistic theory as this from practical government officials such as the Confucians, but we must remember that for them it was in the main a legitimate deduction from history. We have noted that it was one of the foundation principles of Hsüntze's teaching. That such an ideal theory was held at all, showed the invincible optimism of the Confucian mind. It was the great Confucian ideal—the voluntary submission of the world to virtue in the person of a King who based his authority on righteousness, whose army was irresistible because it loved its ruler, and whose fame was great because it was founded on the great virtue of the King—it was a wholly ethical ideal, founded on reflection upon human nature and its potentialities.

The Problem
of Evil.

But such an ideal as this is open to all the difficulties

¹ *W.H.*, ix, 16 ff.

² *Ibid.*, viii, 10.

that are presented by the fact of evil, and we are not surprised that many attacks were made upon it, and that the Confucians themselves had to recede from some of the details of a theory which asserts in such unbounded measure that virtue necessarily prevails and vice necessarily fails. Such a procedure is especially evident in Hsüntze, who does not evade such attacks, or counter them with abuse and ridicule, as does Mencius, but comes to the point and wins out by sheer logical force of argument.

There were many problems raised by this idealistic theory. From within the Confucian circle there was the problem as to why Confucius himself did not become emperor. Everyone admitted that he was a Sage equal with Yao and Shun, then why did he not achieve the position to which his virtue entitled him? Mencius answered this problem by saying that not only is it necessary for a private individual to have virtue equal to that of Yao and Shun, but he must also have been presented to Heaven by the preceding emperor, and it was on this account that Confucius did not obtain the emperorship.¹ Such a statement is giving up the purely ethical criterion for greatness. More plausible is the explanation given by Hsüntze: "Ts'ao-fu was the best charioteer in the world, but without a chariot and horses his ability could not have been apparent; Yi was the best archer in the world, but without a bow or arrows his genius would not have been apparent; the great Confucian is the best unifier in the world, but without a place of one hundred li² his power of achievement cannot be seen."³

Why did not
the Great
Confucian
become
Emperor?

¹ *Moan*, V, i, vi, 3.

² Thirty-three miles in size; a small place in which to show his ability.

³ *W.R.*, viii, 10.

A man who is capable of sagehood must have the unrestricted government of at least a small place in order to show his ability and begin his career. Such an explanation fitted the cases of Confucius and Mencius, for Confucius was dismissed from office after a few months, and because of his unbending attitude never received office again; Mencius never even received more than an honorary position. But Hsüntze himself held the magistracy of the town and district of Lan-ling for a long period, and his disciples felt that he was a Sage, equal with Yao and Shun. Why then did not Hsüntze become emperor? In the interesting "Gloss"¹ two explanations are given: first, that the times were so evil that Hsüntze had to hide the fact that he cherished the heart of a Sage, as did another Worthy in danger, by feigning to be mad, and so his ability was not known to the country. A second explanation is that the times had changed; the world was evil and admired Ch'ie and Chou; those who did evil became prosperous, the good suffered from calamity. Here we see one Confucian retaining his idealism only by placing it in the dim past; in the present world evil reigns, virtue is persecuted and must hide her head.

Were the
Sage-Kings
really good?

A further attack upon this idealism was upon the historical foundations of the theory. We must remember that the *Book of History* was not the only historical record accessible at that date. Sze-ma Ch'ien gave a version of the events leading to the overthrow of Chou-sin² somewhat different from the idealistic one given by the *History* and the Confucians. There had been the influence of Yangtze, who was completely sceptical as to the possibility of gaining any

¹ W.S., "Gloss".

² Cf. W.H., "A Sketch of Chinese History".

absolute ethical standard whatsoever, and in the writings now assigned to him and to the relativist Chuengtze we find attacks upon the character of the Sages themselves. Mencius himself made things worse by attacking the trustworthiness of the *Book of History* itself. Were these Sages and Kings really as good as the Confucians made them out to be?

Hsüntze devoted almost a whole book to meeting these objections.¹ In the first place it was objected that Ch'ie and Chou were the legal rulers of the empire, and that T'ang and Wu were their feudatories, rebelling against their liege lords. Hsüntze replied that Ch'ie and Chou were only legal rulers in form; but their commands were disobeyed and they had no real power, so in reality they did not possess the empire. On the other hand T'ang and Wu were loved by the people as their parents, and hence were the rightful emperors. Secondly, it was objected that T'ang and Wu were not great, because they could not make the country obey them. In support of this contention there was instanced the fact that the states of Ts'u and Yueh had never admitted the government of T'ang or Wu. (The fact probably was, that the China of the days of T'ang and Wu was only a small district around the Yellow River, and that Ts'u and Yueh, being in the Yangtze valley, did not come under their influence.) Hsüntze replied that under the government of these emperors, states at different distances served their feudal lord in different manners; those nearest made the largest and most frequent offerings; Ts'u and Yueh, being distant, belonged to the class of feudatories which only sent tribute once a year or once a generation. Thirdly, it was objected that Yao and Shun

¹ *W.H.*, xlviii, q.v.

showed weakness in that they abdicated. The *Book of History* represented both of them as yielding the throne to their successors, alleging old age and the weight of the cares of state. This word "abdicate" implied three sorts of weakness. In the first place it implied that they abdicated because they had to yield to force as did some contemporary rulers. This criticism Hsüntze had no difficulty in meeting. Secondly, it implied that they yielded to another dynasty. Hsüntze said that this implied no weakness, because they selected a successor who was their equal in virtue, and hence a Yao succeeded Yao, and there was no change. But when these two objections were answered, the critics replied, saying that they abdicated because of old age and mental decay. This charge Hsüntze also indignantly repudiated. He showed that the health and body of the emperor was most delicately cared for by every conceivable luxury—how could there be any decay? No, the tradition of their abdication is the invention of shallow and low minds. Probably the reason that Hsüntze showed so much animus against the tradition that these Sages abdicated, a thing plainly stated in the *Book of History*, was to be found in the meaning that this word had taken from contemporary history, when the statement that such and such a prince had abdicated was equivalent to saying that he had failed. In the fourth place it was objected that Yao and Shun did not show the reforming power which the Confucians had declared to be so powerful in men of perfect virtue, in that Chu, the son of Yao, and Hsiang, the younger brother of Shun, seemed most conspicuous in lacking virtue. According to the Confucian theory, filial piety and reverence for one's older brother are two of the

greatest virtues, and conversely a man is held responsible especially for the conduct of his son and his younger brother—Chu and Hsiang ought to have been especially influenced by Yao and Shun! Hsüntze could only answer that these were paltry insignificant fellows such as have existed in every age, and that the instructing and transforming influence of Yao and Shun cannot be judged by these two insignificant fellows alone, just as a good archer cannot shoot straight with a bent bow and a crooked arrow; but Yao and Shun must be judged by their effect upon the whole empire, which was wonderful. And he ended up by declaring that both those who originate such theories as these and those who study them can only suffer calamity—thereby showing how sorely these objections touched him!

People not only objected to this Confucian idealism because the great Confucians had not been advanced to high office, and because the ancient Sages were not as good as they were made out to be, but they also objected that contemporary history and life did not bear out such idealism. Here was an objection which the Confucians found indeed hard to meet. For five centuries and a half the Chou rulers had steadily deteriorated, and the political condition of the country had been going from bad to worse. The latter part of this period is called by historians the period of the "Contending States", because that period was one of incessant bloody warfare, murder, and treachery. The feudal nobles were killing each other off, and the period can best be compared to England during the Wars of the Roses, only that in China the thing went on a much larger scale, and that it ended, not by the creation of another nobility, but in the creation of an absolute

Contemporary History
Disproves
Idealism.

monarchy, with its absolute authority, and the destruction of the feudal system. Kingdoms were lost and won by every conceivable crime and stratagem, and the only reason that the Chou emperor was not displaced was that he was a nonentity, and that the tigers had not yet finished eating each other up. Finally, even this inoffensive Chou ruler, the last representative of the virtuous days of the past, was dispossessed, his sacred tripods were taken by the rapacious ruler of Ts'in, and a relative was put over half of the minute remainder of the Chou territory, with only the title of Prince. In such days as this, the holding of any except a sceptical, cynical theory of morals implied extreme idealism.

In particular, the theory that virtue is rewarded by rule seemed untenable. The state of Ts'in was gradually advancing its power by sheer force and craft. Li Sze, a disciple of Hsüntze, who was later to become the prime minister of Ts'in Shih Hwangti, is represented as asking Hsüntze about the armies of Ts'in, which for four generations had been victorious and which had overawed the country by sheer immoral opportunism. To this objection Hsüntze could only reply by reiterating his theory of history, and stating that the advantage that Ts'in had taken of the other states was an unadvantageous advantage, and that all the while Ts'in had been fearful that the other states would unite and crush it.¹

The truth was that the appearances were quite against the Confucians. Kingdom after kingdom had been gained by crime; there was no real emperor. Rule seemed to be the reward of evil. In these circumstances Mencius and Hsüntze

¹ *W.H.*, xv, 11 f.

retreated to the last defence—they had to admit that a state could be gained without virtue, but surely the empire could not be gained except by virtue. Ts'in Shih Hwangti had not yet appeared, and so this defence was still left to them. Mencius could still say: "There are immoral princes who have gained a state; but no immoral prince has obtained the whole empire."¹ Hsüntze could argue to the same effect: "The empire is the weightiest thing there is. Unless the Emperor is extremely strong, he will not be able to bear its weight. It is the largest of all. Unless he is most discriminating, he will not be able to divide it properly. It is the greatest of all. Unless he is most wise, he will not be able to harmonize it. Unless he is a Sage, he will not be able to fulfil these three extreme requirements A state can be captured by force, but the empire cannot be captured by force. . . . Why is this? . . . A state is a small thing. A small-minded man can possess it. Small methods can gain it. Small power can control it. The empire is a large thing. . . . Unless a man is a Sage, he cannot possess it."² Alas for logical human reason! Only a few years after the death of Hsüntze, Ts'in's victorious advance culminated in the conquest of the whole empire *by force*, and the setting up of a dynasty owing its authority solely to force. And the prime minister who brought about this consummation was Li Sze, a disciple of Hsüntze, a Confucian, but lacking the Confucian idealism. Then cynicism triumphed. But the empire of Ts'in Shih Hwangti, as every other empire which has been founded solely on force, fell after his death, and the next dynasty was careful to found its authority on real

¹ *Menc.*, VII, II, xii.

² *W.H.*, xviii, 4 f.

or assumed virtue. So to Confucian idealism there was left a remnant of its former theory—immorality may gain the empire, but it cannot keep it.

Problem of
Evil in Indi-
vidual Lives.

Because of their idealism, the Confucians had not only to meet the problem of evil in its political application, but also in the lives of individuals. For they asserted that virtue is rewarded and evil is punished in the case of individuals as well as of states. Their problem was the more difficult in that they could not appeal to a future existence to even up matters, for in ancient China there was no belief in a future life except that of the continued existence of ghosts who could be recalled and worshipped. This ghostly existence held no moral judgment in store for the dead; instead they were dependant for food and all other things upon the offerings of the living, and hence the wicked father of a wealthy son had a much better ghostly life than the virtuous father of a poor son. Happiness and misfortune were proportioned according to the circumstances of their descendants. Hence if ethical idealism was to seek for any reward for virtue, it must be in this life.

Confucian
Stoicism.

In dealing with the problem, Confucianism pursued the same path as that followed by Western thought. Confucianism incorporated a strong Stoic element. "You may rob an army of its commander-in-chief, but you cannot rob even a common man of his will."¹ "With coarse food to eat, water to drink, and a bent arm for a pillow—even in such a state I could be happy, for wealth and honour obtained unworthily are to me as a fleeting cloud."² This noble sentiment of Confucius was echoed by Mencius and Hsüntze.

¹ *As.*, IX, xxv.

² *As.*, VII, xv.

"If his heart is tranquil and contented, though " the things he sees, hears, eats, wears, and lives in are mean, yet they can foster him. " For he may be without the goodness of all things, yet he can enjoy life ; he may be without a position of high rank, but he can increase his virtue. If such a man were given the empire, the greatness of being emperor would decrease his private enjoyment." ¹ This is the enjoyment of the virtuous soul which is contented in virtue without the aid of advantageous circumstances—a truly noble ideal. Virtue is its own reward.

Confucius had emphasized the superior man—the man who incorporates in himself the ideal life. The superior man is he who strives to embody the moral ideal. The Sage did not play any large part in the teaching of Confucius or Mencius. Sages were few and distant ; they were the great ideals. But when Confucius himself came to be regarded as a Sage, his followers began to wonder if there were other Sages, and Mencius only with difficulty kept from admitting that he was a Sage ! In Hsüntze's philosophy the Sage filled an important place, and the distinction came to be between the Sage who lives on one plane of life, and the ordinary man who is imperfect and limited. But Sages for him too were rare, and the problem came to be whether the superior man's virtue had any compensation.

One thing could be pointed out—that difficulty has a disciplinary value. Mencius pointed out several worthies who rose through hardships, and stated : " Thus, when Heaven is about to confer a great office on any man, it first exercises his mind with suffering, it hardens his sinews with toil, it exposes

Evil is
disciplinary.

¹ W.H., xxv, 15.

his body to hunger, it subjects him to extreme poverty, and confounds his undertakings. Thus it stimulates his mind, steels his nature, and supplies his incompetencies."¹

Wicked
Inwardly
Unhappy.

Another thing that could be shown is that the wicked, though apparently happy, yet inwardly are troubled and unquiet. "The person who has tried to see into man's hidden parts . . . knows that there is no one who in their purposes despises moral principles, who is not inwardly anxious, . . . and inwardly fearful. When the mind is anxious and fearful, though the mouth be holding meat, it will not recognize the flavour thereof; though the ears hear bells and drums, they will not recognize the sound thereof; . . . for he may enjoy the goodness of all things, yet he cannot be contented. If he gains a respite and contentment, his anxiety and fear nevertheless do not leave him. He . . . makes himself the servant of material things."²

So it was possible for the Confucians to keep their idealism. In his more optimistic moments Hsüntze could say: "In the end the superior man will certainly get what he wants, and will certainly not meet what he hates."³ Or "The young serve the old; the inferior serve the noble; the degenerate serve the worthy—this is the pervading law of the universe."⁴ In individual cases the law may not hold, but in general, in the end, usually, righteousness will bring its reward. The Confucians concentrated their attention on this fact, and thereby achieved a moral idealism that has been the greatest treasure that China has had. True, it was based on faith; the ancient Confucians thought that they found it in history,

¹ *Menc.*, VI, 11, xv, 2.

² *W.H.*, iv, 17.

³ *W.H.*, xxii, 14 f.

⁴ *W.H.*, vii, 28.

but they first read it into history and then read it out again. True faith will always find reasons for its convictions, and it is to faith, not reason, that human progress has been due. In their moral idealism the Confucians achieved a conviction that became for them a true religion, which blossomed into beautiful fruit in many noble lives.

In this survey of the development given to Confucianism by Hsüntze we have seen that he was a true Confucianist. In all the essentials he agreed with Confucius and Mencius. His was the genius that brought out the implications of Confucius' teaching, and that furnished a theoretical foundation for his philosophy. The fact that in one particular he found it advantageous to depart from Confucius' teaching in order to give a more stable foundation for Confucius' own main emphasis does not detract from the fact that he was a true follower of Confucius, in some respects truer even than Mencius. From the *Analects*, the *Doctrine of the Mean* and the *Great Learning*, Mencius, to Hsüntze, there was a true progression. Each commented upon and amplified his predecessor. While Hsüntze praised unqualifiedly only Confucius and Tze-kung of all the Confucians,¹ and criticized some of the others, that was because his gaze was fixed upon the Sage rather than upon the superior man, and his ideal was very high. In everything except his theory of ethics and doctrine of human nature, Hsüntze was a disciple of Mencius as well as of Confucius. But none of his predecessors gave a continuous

Hsüntze a
True Con-
fucian.

¹ W.H., viii, 17. Tze-kung is probably Chung-kung. Cf. An., V, iv; VI, i, iv; XI, ii; XII, ii.

and rounded view of the Confucian teaching—it was an apothegm here and a saying there, brilliant sparks, but no luminous picture.

Hsüntze gives
the best
Picture of
Confucianism

Whether because of the invention of easier means of writing¹ or solely because of the systematic character of his mind, Hsüntze was the first of the ancient Confucians to give us a rounded picture of Confucian thought, and the only one to do so in the age in which Confucianism first came to self-expression. Hence the study of Hsüntze reveals, better than any other writer, the true genius of Confucianism, and his writings give us a fuller view of ancient thought than we get anywhere else. So we see that he is of fundamental importance in the study of Confucianism.

His
Originality.

Hsüntze was not a pioneer, striking out new paths for the thought of humanity; he linked himself up to the best that he knew, and devoted his life to the development and defence of Confucianism. His originality lay rather in following out the old paths—giving a new setting to old solutions, bringing out their implications, and furnishing them with a firm theoretical foundation. Thus he did make important contributions to Confucian thought, and during the Han dynasty these contributions became interwoven with the great stream of Confucian thought, so that even though Hsüntze himself was condemned, the essentials of his teaching have never been lost. Everything that he touched became marked with his own personality, whether it was the theory of music or the rules of proper conduct.

Hsüntze weaves the Confucian teachings into a remarkably consistent and rounded philosophy, which is yet singularly

¹ The hair pencil was invented about 220 B.C.

able to harmonize discordant elements. Its parts fit each into each so that no particular topic can be discussed thoroughly without the discussion leading into all the other parts. This is a characteristic not to be found in any other ancient Chinese philosopher—indeed it is very rare in any philosophy. Yet his teaching is by no means shallow or superficial; he penetrates so deeply into the heart of things and into a knowledge of human nature, that his philosophy is truly universal and yet truly Confucian. His can truly be said to be a very unusual mind, and he is one of the great thinkers of the world.

His Great-
ness.



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THE CLASSICS.

Abbreviation.

Edouard Biot, *Le Tchou-Li*, 2 vols. and Table Analytique.

Paris, 1861.

James Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, 7 vols. Hongkong and London, 1861-72. Contains—

<i>The Analects</i>	<i>An.</i>
<i>The Doctrine of the Mean</i>	<i>D.M.</i>
<i>The Great Learning</i>	<i>G.L.</i>
<i>Mencius</i>	<i>Menc.</i>
<i>The Book of Odes</i>	<i>Odes.</i>
<i>The Book of History</i>	<i>Hist.</i>
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
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GENERAL INDEX

- Abbreviations, 295
 Abdication, 284
 Ability, 249
 Aboriginal tribes, 41
 Absolute, 231 f., 237, 240, 286
 Advancement of officials, 260 f.
 Agnosticism, 65, 275
 Agriculture, 1
 Ancestor worship, *see also* Spirits;
 2 f., 59, 70, 72, 114, 120 f., 142, 151
 Ancestry of Hsüntze, 117
 Antism, 59, 64, 72
 Appetites, the, 170
 Aristocracy, 7, 14, 84, 251
 Aristotle, 15, 18, 38, 50, 84, 150,
 157, 164, 167, 242, 252 f.
 Antisemitism, 16
 Atonement, 98
 Assyria, 55, 269
 Attacks upon Confucianism, 86,
 122 ff.
 Authority, *see also* Standard; 4 ff.
 7, 56, 81, 89 f., 100 f., 102 ff., 107,
 109 f., 128, 132, 136, 173, 193,
 196 f., 226, 237 ff., 240 f., 256 f.,
 286 f.
 Bacon, 93
 Bamboo Annals, 13
 Benevolence, *see* Jen
 Birth of Hsüntze, 22, 35 f.
 Blood feud, 266
 Boat and winter, the, 258
 Book of Changes, the, 30, 59, 69 f.,
 189 f.
 Book of History, the, 6, 13, 16, 189,
 192, 257, 259, 266, 277, 282, 284
 Book of Music, the, 70, 194 f., 169
 Book of Odes, the, 6, 16, 30, 189,
 191 f.
 Book of Rites, the, 30, 70, 189, 191,
 253
 Books of Chronicles, the, 56
 Buddha, *see* Gautama
 Burial rites, 2, 122, 137-42, 223
 Burning of the Books, 44
 Calvin, 77
 Canon of the Classics, 189 ff.
 Catholic theology, 104, 107, 109
 Ceremony, *see* Li; Festive, 119;
 Military, 118; Social, 116
 Chang Yi, 20 f., 32, 277
 Changu, 234
 Changes, the Book of, *see* Book of
 Changes, the
 Chao, state of, 19, 21 ff., 23, 26,
 30 f., 33, 36
 Character development, 60
 Characters, Chinese, 9
 Character of Hsüntze, 24 f.
 Ch'ang, 130, 168 f.
 Chi, Viscount of, 55 n., 279
 Ch'ia, the emperor, 55, 67, 71,
 83 f., 108, 207, 272 f., 277,
 282 f.
 Ch'ing, appellation of Hsüntze,
 26 ff., 33
 Chiu Pao-ai, 47
 Chioa, 173
 Chou, Duke of, 55 n., 85, 106, 146,
 220
 Chou dynasty, 1, 13, 17, 20, 55, 121,
 205, 225
 Chou-sin, the emperor, 54 n., 55,
 67, 71, 108, 102, 259, 272 f., 277,
 279, 282 f.
 Chronology of the life of Hsüntze,
 35 ff.
 Chu, son of Yao, 294 f.

- Chu Hsi, 53, 64, 75, 82, 93 n., 95, 102, 103 n., 136, 166, 188
- Chuangtzo: 27, 22; attacks Confucius, 21, 86; attacks *Li*, 123; attacks Sage, 283; criticized by Hsüntze, 100; on expensive burials, 130; evolution, biological, 13, 75; on history, 54 f.; Hsüntze on C., 224; logic, 221; on the natural, 77; his philosophy, 18; problem of appearance and reality, 68; refused official position, 15; relativism, 238; on spirits, 143; on terms, 231
- Ch'ui-an-shen, Prince, 23 ff., 27, 30 f., 35 ff.
- Chung, 111 n., 158
- Chung-kung, 202 n.
- City-state, 6 f.
- Class divisions, 11, 246 ff.
- Classes of terms, 232 f.
- Classicism, 182
- Classics, the, 6, 54, 59 f., 168, 240 f.
- Cognition, 180
- Cumerson, 264
- Commentaries on Hsüntze, 44, 46
- Conceptualism, 210, 218, 233
- Confucius, 6; agnosticism, 65, 69, 73, 143; agreed with by Hsüntze, 291; ancestry, 117; on authority, 101, 105, 237, 271; the beginning of Chinese philosophy, 16; on the *Book of Changes*, 69; on the *Book of Odes*, 102; on Classics, 189; democracy, 87, 251; on desire, 169; on destiny, 71; discipline, 39; on divination, 68; edited the *Book of History*, 267; on education, 161 ff., 188; example of the ruler, 84; on expensive burials, 139 f.; on feudal system, 240; government office held by, 12, 242; followed by Hsüntze as authority, 106; gave ruin to his desires, 174; on God, 72; on Heaven, 60, 275; on heresy, 107; Hsüntze's opinion of, 86; on inequality, 246; on internal and external morality, 124 ff.; influence of the ruler, 270; legitimism, 273; on *Li*, 119 f., 145; on *Li* and *Jen*, 124 ff.; literary character of, 30; logic, 190 ff.; as Minister of Crime, 243; on mourning, 148; on music, 161; on the natural, 77; no distinction of mind and emotion, 172; opinion of Hsüntze on, 109; orthodoxy, 79; on parents, 119; on penal theory, 265; personal appearance, 67; philosophy, 17; praised by Hsüntze, 109, 291; on the problem of knowledge, 87; realism, 227, 232; rectified music, 163; right of revolt, 260; on the ruler, 272; Sage not emphasized by, 289; sought a prince to reform, 272; sought government office, 14, 22; a source for Chinese philosophy, 108; on spirits, 64, 69; Stoicism, 168; as transmitter of the *Tao*, 85; travels of, 14, 23 f.; use of terms, scholar, superior man, 104; on war, 266; why did he not become emperor, 281 f.
- Concentration, 93 ff., 99, 173, 185, 187; see also Unity
- Conquest, 267, 269
- Conservation of natural resources, 264 f.
- Conservatism, 5, 13, 256
- Consistency, 233, 292
- Contending States, 271, 285; see also Warring States
- Convention, 230 f., 236
- Correct form, 120
- Courage of the literati, 261 f.
- Courtesy, 80, 118; see also *Li*
- Culture, ancient, of China, 2
- Custom, 5, 112, 116, 119, 136, 227; see also *Li*
- Customs barriers, 264
- Danqing, 162

- Death of Hsüntze, 38
 Decree of Heaven, 71, 259; defined, 260
 Deductive reasoning, 183
 Definition, 207
 Democracy, 7, 11, 84, 117, 126, 106, 251, 264
 Democritus, 198, 210
 Dreife, Ch. XI, 51, 77, 98, 108, 153, 223, 229, 247 ff., 253
 Destiny, 71, 133, 250
 Dialectic, 221 f., 226, 238 f.
Discordancy, 157
 Disciples of Hsüntze, 39
 Disciplinary value of suffering, 280 f.
 Discussion of Military art, 268
 Disgrace, 270
 Distinctions, 63
 Divination, 60, 68
 Doctrine of the Mean, on authority, 105; on Ch'eng, 158 f.; on divination, 68; on Heaven, 61; on human nature, 70; on Li 146; on Li and Jen, 130; on the mind, 172; on mourning, 148; quotes Confucius, 106; on rank, 263; on spirits, 65, 143; on unity, 93; on unperturbedness, 96; virtue rewarded by the throne, 277; on Yi, 155
 Earth, 60, 114, 144, 164, 186, 221, 262
 Eclipses, 3
 Economics, 265, 269, 279
 Education: see also Study; Chap. XII; 12, 14, 103 f., 153, 166
 Egyptian religion, 68
 Emotion, 97, 145 f., 165, 167, 170 f., 176, 179, 229
 Emperor, 6, 20; why did not Hsüntze become a, 282
 Empire, not gained without virtue, 287; not kept without virtue, 288
 Emptiness, 92 f., 99, 103 n., 173
 Environment, 184 f.
 Epaphroditus, 164
 Epictetus, 254
 Epistemology, 51, 227
 Error, 107, 204
 Ethics: Ch. VII, VIII, IX; 11, 15, 51 f., 274
 Evil, problem of, Ch. XVI
 Evolution, biological, 13, 75
 Examinations, civil, 95
 Faith, 200 f.
 Faithfulness, see Hsin
 Fallacies, 235 f.
 Family, 2 ff., 6, 7, 112, 196, 267
 Fate, 71
 Festive ceremonies, 118
 Feudal nobles, 251, 273
 Feudal system, 226, 240, 265, 286
 Filial piety; see Heiao; 4, 121, 284 f.
 Follow the later Kings, 104 ff.
 Force, 287
 Fortune telling, 15, 66 f.
 Four Nobles, 27 n.
 Free trade, 263 f.
 Freud, 150
 Friends, 181, 184
 Funeral ceremonies, 145 ff.
 Funerals, 142
 Future life, 288
 Gentiana, 77, 171
 Generalization, 233
 Gentleness of Hsüntze's writings, 43
 Geography of China, 2, 6
 God, 3, 60, 90, 63 f., 72, 238, 250
 Government: Ch. XV *passim*; 12 f., 202, 238, 242, 262
 Grammar, 206, 207
 Great Learning, on the influence of rulers, 272; on Li and Jen, 130; on the mind, 172; on the problem of knowledge, 67; on science, 73 f.; on unperturbedness, 95 f.
 Greece, 6, 10, 86, 113, 142, 210
 Greek philosophy, 198

- Greeks, the, 13, 53, 76 f., 161, 207
- Hades, 71
- Hair pencil, 202 n.
- Han dynasty period, the, 13, 32, 43 f., 241, 292
- Han Fei-tze, 25, 31
- Han Yü, 45, 83, 55, 190, 250, 271
- Heart, the, 172
- Heaven, 2 f., 17, 57, 59 ff., 62 ff., 71, 114, 118 f., 143 f., 164, 180, 213, 221, 250, 262, 275, 281, 289
- Heracitus, 221
- Historical criticism, 55
- Historical Record*, the, 25, 29 n., 33 f., 76 f., 144
- History, 12 ff., 54, 56, 64, 71, 73, 113, 207
- Hobbes, 80, 104, 113 n.
- Homonyms, 9
- Hsiang, brother of Shun, 284 f.
- Hsiao, 112 n., 150 f., 252
- Hsin, 111 n., 158
- Hsun, used as surname of Hsüntze, 28 and note
- Huan, Duke of Ts'i, 14, 71, 206, 273 f.
- Hueltze, the Neo-Mician, 17; criticized by Hsüntze, 100; see Neo-Micians
- Human nature: Ch. VI, 32, 48, 51 ff., 83, 103 f., 144, 147, 165, 169, 171, 183 ff., 250 f., 263 f., 293
- Hume, David, 221
- I*, see *Yi*
- Ideal King, 12
- Idealism: Ch. XVI; 56, 245, 254, 274
- Illusions, 65, 178
- Immolation, 139
- Immortality, 70
- Improbability of human nature, 83
- Impulse, 179
- India, 50
- Individualism, 211
- Individual's problem of evil, the, 298 ff.
- Inequality, Ch. XIV; 7, 83, 155
- Influence, 216; of Hsüntze, 44
- Inner standard, 111-28, 173, 175
- Insult, 228, 235, 270
- Interests of Hsüntze, 41
- Interpolations, 43
- Iron age, 17
- Japanese editions of Hsüntze's works, 47
- Jen: Ch. VIII; 23, 88, 111 n., 126 ff., 150, 159, 169, 188, 213, 258, 262
- Justice, see *Yi*
- Kantze, 53, 223
- King, 13, 20, 34, 225
- Knowledge, 230
- Kuan Chung of Ts'i, 14, 273 f.
- K'uang, the personal name of Hsüntze, 20
- Kuei-jen-tze, 21
- Kung Shen-lung, 17, 33; see also Neo-Micians.
- Lan-ling, 24 f., 27, 30 ff., 37
- Land tax, 246
- Language, Chinese, 7 ff., 200; difficulty, 10 f.
- Lantze, attacks upon Confucianism, 122 f.; on emptiness, 92; on Heaven, 61; on inaction, 158 n.; influence on Chu Hsi, 64; influence on Hsüntze, 61, 98 n.; interview with Confucius, 124; left problem of desire, 169; Li not mentioned, 122; logic, 208; on the natural, 77; pacifism, 207; philosophy, 17; politics, 145 f.; realism, 232; reward earned with kindness, 126; a source of Chinese philosophy, 198; on spirits, 65, 142; style, 42; on Tao, 62, 153; on unperturbedness, 96
- Law, 260 f.
- Legitimism, 273 f.
- Lex talionis*, 265

Li: Ch. VIII; 2, 4 f., 32, 52, 80 f., 88 f., 106, 111 n., 144-52, 157, 160, 175, 186, 189, 191, 193, 199, 201, 203, 225, 243 f., 249, 250, 253, 259, 268

Li Sze, 25, 27, 28 n., 31, 240 f., 286 f.

Liberty, 128

Life of Hsüntze, Ch. II

Likin, 264

Literary character of Hsüntze, 40

Literary criticism, 48

Literati, 10, 12, 243 f., 257, 261, 271

Literature, Chinese, 12

Little-minded man, the, 194; *see also* Small-minded man, the

Liu Hsiang, 25, 28 f., 33 f., 36 f., 43

Locke, 200 f.

Logic: Ch. XIII; formal, 15; theory, 58, 75

Lords Protector, 34, 273

Loyalty, *see* Chung; 279 f.

Lu, state of, 10, 24, 31, 37

Magistrate, Hsüntze as, 24

Manifold, 94, 233

Mao's edition of the *Odes*, 192

Masaca, the, 249

Materialism, 50, 64

Mathematics, 15

Mean, the golden, 147

Meaning, 229, 232, 234

Meh Ti, *see* Micus

Memory, 214

Mencius: 21 f., 32; accepted government office, 14; abused opponents, 281; admitted he was a Sage, 289; ancestry, 117; on authority, 89, 102; as an authority, 247; on the *Book of Changes*, 89; on the *Book of History*, 259, 283; on Ch'eng, 159; on the Classics, 189; confused with Confucius, 129; on the conservation of natural resources, 264 f.; dates of his life, 38; denounced opponents, 269; on destiny, 71; disciples, 39; disciplinary value of suffer-

ing, 289 f.; division of the mind, 170; distinction of mind and emotions, 172; divorced his wife, 98; on education, 183; the empire is not gained without virtue, 287; on ethics, 89; on the example of the ruler, 84; on expensive burials, 140; government is for the sake of the people, 257 f.; on government office, 242; government service the legitimate business of a gentleman, 12; on Heaven, 275; on history, 54; Hsüntze a disciple of, 291; Hsüntze's reply to, on human nature, 80 f.; Hsüntze's criticism of, 80; on human nature, 53, 79, 82 f., 103, 183; influence of the ruler, 272; inner morality, 152; as interpreter of Chinese thought, 136; judgment of character, 68; on Li, 120, 136; on Li and Jen, 131; literary character, 40; on the Lords Protector, 273 f.; on the natural, 77; on objective truth, 101; orthodoxy, 78, 90, 174, 190; pacifism, 269; on penal theory, 265; philosophy, 17; quotes the *Book of Rites*, 70, 191; reply to Kao-tze, 53, 223; the right of revolt, 268, 269; on ruler and ruled, 246; Sage not emphasized, 289; on spirits, 61, 64, 143; taxation, 262 f.; as transmitter of the Tao, 85; travelled, 14, 22 f.; virtue is rewarded by the throne, 54, 277 f.; on war, 266, 270; why did not Confucius become emperor, 281; why did he not become emperor, 282

Mental philosophy, 74

Metaphysics, 11, 51 f., 63, 76, 153

Micus, the, 21, 28, 33

Micus, attacks Confucius, 247; attacks Li, 124; attacks music, 86, 164 f.; attacks burials, 80, 139 f.; based his philosophy on

- one principle, 86; broke from Confucius, 89; criticized by Hsüntze, 109, 141; on equality, 246; on expensive burials, 139 f.; on history, 54; Hsüntze replies to, 223; logic, 15, 58, 207, 211 f., on the natural, 77; pacifism, 267; philosophy, 17; religion, 275; reply of Hsüntze to, 141; Sages used as proof, 105, 108, 193; on spirits, 65, 142; style, 41; war, 270.
 Militarism, 270 f.
 Military Art, 268
 Mind, the; Ch. XI; 90 f., 98, 214, 220 f., 234
 Moh Ti, *see* *Métius*
 Moral judgment, 49
 Moral paradox, 176 f.
 Moral truth, 87
 Morals, 11
 Mourning, 148 f.
 Music; Ch. X; 199, 201, 203
 Musical instruments, 162

 Nan, the last Chou emperor, 20
 Napoleon, 269
 Natural law, 275
 Nature, human, *see* *Human nature*.
 Nature powers, 2
 Neo-Métiens, 57, 226; on dialectic, 221 f., 238; logic, 58, 213 f., 227, 229; paradoxes, 21, 223, 238; philosophy, 18; science, 73; on space and time, 108, 234; on terms, 232; on up and down, 230
 New England Transcendentalists, 63
 Nominalism, 210 f., 216, 218, 233

Odes, Book of, *see* *Book of Odes*
 Officials; Ch. XV *passim*; 15, 241, 245, 252
 Opportunism, 286
 Optimism, 78
 Order of text, 45 f. note.
 Originality of Hsüntze, 292
 Orthodoxy, 6, 241; of Hsüntze, 78
 Ox-horse, 236
 Pacifism, 260 f.
 Pantomime, 103
 Paradoxes, 219 f., 221, 237 f.
 Passion, 28
 Passionlessness, 95 f.
 Passion-nature, 170
 Peace, 23
 Peacefulness of Chinese, 1, 14
 Penal theory, 265 f.
 Perfection, moral, 84
 Perseverance, 187
 Positivism, 209, 222
 Philosopher-ruler, 95
 Philosophy of history, 260, 276 f.
 Physics, 16
 Plato, 14 f., 52, 95, 100, 103 f., 173, 177, 180, 190, 208, 272
 Poetry, 162
 Point of reference, 237 f.
 Politics; Ch. XV; 51, 242, 245
 Polygamy, 5
 Positivism, 59
 Practical philosophy, 51
 Practice, 186 f.
 Pragmatism, 52
 Prayer, 59, 61, 66
 Prejudice, 92, 98, 107
 Problem of evil; Ch. XVI; 58
 Problem of knowledge, 76, 87 f.
 Progress, 75, 107, 184, 253 f., 256
 Proper conduct, *see* *Li*
 Propriety, *see* *Li*
 Providence, 59
 Psychology; Ch. XI; 74, 91, 177 f.
 Punishment, 252, 263 f.
 Puzzles, logical, 219 f.

 Quietism, 123, 222

 Rank, 205
 Ranking Great Profects, 22, 26 f., 30
 Rationalism, 99
 Realism, 208, 211, 214, 219, 227
 Rectification of terms, 109, 224, 226 f., 261
 Reform, 181, 272 f.
 Reform of the criminal, 266

- Reformational Protestant Theology, 104
 Relational words, 42
 Relativism, 203, 210
 Religion, 2, 50, 72, 112 ff., 120, 161, 213, 276, 291
 Reverence for the elder (Ti), 4 f., 160, 282
 Revolt, right of, 258 ff.
 Righteousness, *see* Yi
 Rites: *see* Li; Five, 115; Six, 115; Nine, 115
 Rites, Book of, *see* Book of Rites
 Ritual, 114; *see also* Li
 Ritual of the Senior Tai, 136, 144
 Rome, 117, 242
 Rousseau, 103
 Rulers: Ch. XV *passim*; 2, 12 f., 14, 243 f., 279; and ruled, 7, 264
 Rules of proper conduct, *see* Li
 Sacrifice, 22, 144, 147, 150 f.
 Sages, the, 13, 17, 22, 81 ff., 85, 87, 89 f., 98 f., 101 f., 103 ff., 109, 134 f., 149, 159, 173 f., 184 ff., 187 f., 190, 194 ff., 203, 209, 224 ff., 237 ff., 240, 255 f., 280 ff., 282 ff., 287, 289, 291
 Same, terms as, 232 ff.
 Scholar, 194 f., 203
 Scholarship, 187
 Scepticism, 18, 73
 Science, 15 f., 73 f., 100
 Self-control, 172, 174
 Self-culture, 185, 196
 Self-dependence, 63, 72
 Self-development, 78, 196
 Self-reliance, 181
 Sensation, 178, 214, 229 f., 234
 Sense of dependence, 72
 Sentence, 201
 Sex morality, 4 f., 163
 Sex relations, 250
 Shame, 228
 Sheng-tze, 109
 Shentze, 109, 262
 Shool, 71
 Shih Hwangti, *see* Ts'in Shih Hwangti
 Shun, the emperor, 83, 85, 106, 118, 161, 260, 272, 281 f., 284 f.
 Shao Wen, 115
 Sincerity, *see* Ch'eng; *see also* Chung
 Singing, 182
 Slavery, 196, 253 f.
 Small-minded man, 83; *see also* Little-minded man, the
 Social agreement, 230 f., 234
 Social ceremonies, 116
 Social control, 248
 Social life, 76, 145, 152
 Social organization, 3, 48, 50, 58, 167, 250
 Social solidarity, 4, 14
 Sociality, 48 ff., 227, 247
 Socrates, 58, 88, 91, 111, 198, 207
 Son of Heaven, 3, 6, 29
 Space and time, 234
 Specialization, 64
 Speculation, 16, 57 ff., 88
 Spinoza, 52, 97
 Spirits, 2 f., 17, 50, 61 f., 64, 66, 70, 73, 142 ff., 179, 212, 275
 Spring and Autumn, 13, 30, 189, 192, 204 ff., 260, 266
 Standard: *see also* Authority; 174 f., 177, 193, 202 f., 221 f., 234, 237 f.
 Stimulus and response, 179
 Stoicism, 176, 258 f.
 Strategy, 168
 Study: *see also* Education, 74, 102, 185, 187 f., 193 f.
 Style, 41 f.
 Su Ts'in, 21, 22, 228
 Su Wu, 279
 Sung-tze, 108 f., 169 f., 171, 223, 228, 235 n., 236 n., 260 f.
 Superior and inferior, 7, 248
 Superior man, the, 16, 83, 126, 179, 186, 194 f., 197, 199, 289, 290 f.
 Supernatural, 275
 Superstition, 3, 64, 68, 121
 Su-ma Ch'ien, 26, 28, 34 f., 130, 144, 271, 282

- T'ang, the emperor, 30, 54, 85, 105,
 108, 250, 272 f., 277, 283
 T'ang dynasty period, the, 44
 T'ao, 32, 61 ff., 77, 91, 94, 90, 98,
 105 ff., 108 f., 111, 119, 123,
 133 f., 153, 159, 168, 187 n., 190 f.,
 202, 239, 243, 290
 Tatars, 21
 Taxation, 202 f.
 Teacher, 80, 193 f.
 Temperance, 174
 Terms, 200, 211, 215 f., 219, 224 ff.,
 226 ff.
 Textual criticism, 46
 Thoroughness, 194
 Throne, acquired by virtue, 277 ff.
 T'i, *see* Reverence for the elder
 Time and space, 214 f.
 Tithes, 262 f.
 Tradition, 100
 Translations of Hsüntze, 47 n.
 Travels of Hsüntze, 22
 Treachery, 280
 Tribute, 283
 Tsao Tsao, 271
 Tsontze, 112 n., 190
 T'ai, state of, 19, 22, 26 f., 29 f., 35 f.
 T'ai-hsia, 22, 29, 35
 T'ai Shih Hwangti, 10, 44, 56, 100,
 226, 240, 256, 288 f.
 T'ai'n, state of, 19 ff., 23, 31, 34, 36,
 80, 138
 T'ai, state of, 19, 21, 23, 27, 30, 37
 Tung Chung-shu, 32 f., 130
 Tyrant, 260, 267, 270
 Tze-kung, 291
 Unity, 93 ff., 103 n., *see also* Con-
 centration
 Universal, the, 233
 Unorthodoxy, 109
 Unperturbedness, 95 ff., 99, 103 n.,
 173
 Utilitarianism, 211 f.
 Value judgment, 228, 234
 Virgin land, 263
 Virtue leads to the throne, 13, 277 ff.
 Wang Hsien-ch'ien, 46
 Wang Yang-ming, 103 n., 152
 War, 1, 14, 23, 260 ff., 279
 Warring States : *see also* Contending
 States, 10
 Wars of the Roses, 285
 Way, Way of the Kings, Way of the
 Sages, *see* Tao
 Wen, King of Chou, 30, 85, 106,
 108, 118, 264, 277
 Wicked, inwardly unhappy, 290
 Will, 91, 171, 179
 Women, 6
 Worth of the individual, 84
 Worthy, the, 24, 30 f., 37
 Written discourse, 39 f.
 Writing, 202 ; difficulty of
 Hsüntze's, 42
 Written language, 7, 10, 15, 42
 Wu, King of Chou and emperor, 20,
 24, 54, 55 n., 85, 105 f., 145, 162,
 226, 272 f., 277, 283
 Wu, a piece of music, 162
 Yang Hsiung, 82
 Yang Liang, 44
 Yangtze, 234 n. ; attacks the Kings,
 86 ; attacks the Sages, 282 ;
 logic, 207, 210 f. ; philosophy, 17
 Yao, the emperor, 83, 85, 106, 269,
 272, 281 f., 284 f.
 Yi, 23, 32, 48, 81 f., 83 f., 111 n.,
 133, 155 ff., 175, 180, 188, 243 f.,
 268
 Yu, the emperor, 20, 85, 101, 105 f.
 Zeno, 18, 219

INDEX OF REFERENCES TO *THE* *WORKS OF HSÜNTZE*

(Quoted by Book and page of the Chinese edition of Wang Hsien-sh'ien.)

- | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| i. 2 :—183 | viii. 16 :—280 |
| 3 :—195 | 18 :—237 |
| 4 :—71 | 19 :—133, 183 |
| 5 :—187 | 20 f. :—190 |
| 6 :—187 | ix. headings—43 |
| 7 :—189 | 3 :—261 |
| 8 :—60, 104 | 4 :—258 |
| 9 :—103 | 5 :—263 |
| 9 f. :—191 | 6 :—263 |
| 10 :—135 | 8 :—100, 256 |
| 12 :—104 | 8 f. :—260 |
| ii. 17 :—179 | 9 :—263 |
| 18 :—258 | 9 f. :—265 |
| 20 :—195, 223 | 10 :—41, 204 |
| 21 :—187, 194 | 11 :—48, 116 |
| 23 :—194, 104 | 12 :—156 |
| iv. 12 :—69 | 12 f. :—266 |
| 15 f. :—262 | 13 :—253 |
| 17 :—63, 200 | 18 :—40, 200, 276 |
| 18 :—178 | 10 ff. :—290 |
| 21 :—84, 172, 273 | x. 1 f. :—248-90 |
| 23 :—247 | xi. 14 :—128 |
| v. 6 :—53 | xv. :—136, 263 |
| 5 f. :—248 | 5 f. :—260 |
| 6 f. :—100 | 10 f. :—268 |
| 7 :—75 | 11 :—125, 270 |
| vii. 1 :—34 | 11 f. :—280 |
| 23 :—14 | 16 ff. :—260 |
| 23 ff. :—273 | xvi. 10 :—240 |
| 24 :—71, 274 | 11 :—168 |
| 28 :—260 | xvii. 1-4 :—42 |
| viii. 3 :—219 | 12 :—62 |
| 3-6 :—243-5 | 13 :—57, 62 |
| 6 :—63 | 14 :—172 |
| 7 :—58 | 16 :—3, 40, 179 |
| 13 f. :—190 | 17 :—60 |
| 13 :—60 | 18 :—3, 63 |

- xvii. 18-20 :—133
 19 :—3, 59
 20 :—107, 261
- xviii. :—283
 2-12 :—54
 3 :—260
 4 f. :—287
 5 f. :—266
 6 :—260, 206
 6 f. :—265
 7 :—41
 9 ff. :—25, 37, 101
 14 f. :—235, 270
 15 :—238
 15 f. :—228, 238
 17 f. :—170, 236
- xix. 1 :—247
 6 f. :—144
 7 :—52, 134
 7 f. :—135
 9 f. :—142
 10 f. :—141
 11 :—146
 12 :—146
 17 f. :—148
 18 :—138, 149
 19 :—140
 20 :—3, 114, 150
 21 :—179
 23 :—151
- xx. :—70
 1 :—45
 2 :—43, 166
 3 :—108
 4 :—162
 5 :—34
 5 ff. :—117
- xxi. :—43
 1 :—107, 178
 2 :—108
 3 :—109
- xxi. 5 f. :—80
 6 :—60
 6 f. :—180
 7 :—91 f., 94, 97, 180
 7 f. :—99
 8 :—91 f., 99, 172
 9 :—16, 41, 94, 97
 10 f. :—98
 13 :—99, 159, 174, 179
 14 :—95 f.
 14 f. :—74, 190
 15 :—102
- xxii. :—43
 1 :—173, 179, 225, 227, 230
 2 :—71, 224, 260
 3 :—203, 224 ff., 227, 238 f., 270
 4 :—228
 4 f. :—178
 5 :—229
 6 :—232 f.
 6 f. :—231
 7 :—234 ff.
 8 :—208, 227, 231, 236, 239
 9 :—239
 10 :—227
 11 :—51
 11-16 :—171
 12 :—51, 171
 14 :—177, 247
 14 f. :—290
 15 :—179, 289
 15 f. :—176
- xxiii. 42 :—80
 1 :—80, 83
 5 :—89
 7 f. :—83
 8 :—78, 84
 9 :—39
 10 :—262
- "The Gloses" :—34, 39, 78, 282

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
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